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Introduction: The Building Blocks to Recognition of
Human Rights and Democracy: Reconciliation, Rule of
Law, and Domestic and International Peace
James D. Wilets
The theme of this 2000 Goodwin Seminar issue, "International Human
Rights in the 21st Century: The Role of Development, Reconciliation, and
Democracy in Securing World Peace," addresses one of the great ironies of
the late twentieth century. While universal recognition of human rights and
democracy has made great progress, raging ethnic conflict, war, and a lack of
economic development continues to worsen the lives of millions.
Traditional concepts of human rights and democracy have also been unable
to provide easy answers to the difficult problems of reconciliation haunting
countries only recently emerging from decades of terror. The five visiting
professors leading the Goodwin Seminar were chosen specifically because of
the perspectives they bring in addressing the complexity of creating a
democratic society that is respectful of human rights. The Goodwin
professors were as follows: President Oscar Arias, President Jean-Bertrand
Aristide, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Dean Claudio Grossman, and Judge Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald.
The human rights community has increasingly recognized that human
rights cannot be respected in a vacuum. Acceptance of human rights treaties
and formal acceptance of human rights norms is meaningless without the
rule of law. The rule of law, however, cannot exist unless society itself
comes to terms with the deep divisions resulting from preexisting violations
of human rights and a lack of democracy. Thus, reconciliation is an essential
prerequisite to the establishment of a rule of law and respect for human
* Assistant Professor, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center;
Executive Director of the Inter-American Center for Human Rights, hosted at the Shepard
Broad Law Center. J.D., 1987, Columbia University School of Law; M.A., International
Relations, 1994, Yale University. Consultant to the National Democratic Institute, 1994; the
International Human Rights Law Group, 1992; and the United Nations in the Second Half
Century, a project proposed by U.N. Secretary-General Boutros-Ghali and funded by the Ford
Foundation. I would like to thank Douglas Donoho, the co-director of the Goodwin 2000
Seminar, and the Goodwin 2000 Visiting Professors: President Oscar Arias, President Jean-
Bertrand Aristide, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Dean Claudio Grossman, and Judge Gabrielle Kirk
McDonald.
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rights. The Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa' and the
Guatemalan Commission for Historical Clarification2 are two examples of
the victims' need, and that of society, for acknowledgement of the suffering
inflicted upon them. Acknowledgment is necessary for establishing the
legitimacy of the legal order. It does not even appear that retribution or
punishment need accompany the acknowledgment in order for some degree
of reconciliation to occur.
Without reconciliation, there cannot be domestic peace and a country
must enjoy some degree of domestic peace in order to enjoy the rule of law.
The exigencies of domestic strife too frequently have provided justification
for the Pinochets of the world to apply measures against their own people
that would violate international law, if applied against captured enemy
soldiers. Goodwin visiting professors President Arias and Dr. Ashrawi
1. For more information on the South African Truth and Reconciliation
Commission, see http://www.truth.org.zal.
2. For more information on the Guatemala Commission for Historical Clarification,
see http://hrdata.aaas.org/ceh/reportlenglish/toc.html.
3. Oscar Arias, former president of Costa Rica and 1987 Nobel Peace laureate, holds
international stature as a spokesperson for the Third World. Championing such issues as
human development, democracy, and demilitarization, he has traveled the globe spreading a
message of peace and applying the lessons garnered from the Central American Peace Process
to topics of current global debate. President Arias was born in Heredia, Costa Rica in 1940
and studied Law and Economics at the University of Costa Rica.
In 1974, he received a doctoral degree in Political Science at the University of
Essex, England. After serving as Professor of Political Science at the University of Costa
Rica, he was appointed Costa Rican Minister of Planning and Economic Policy. In 1986,
Oscar Arias was elected President of Costa Rica. In 1987, President Arias drafted a peace
plan to end a time of great regional discord in Central America. Widely recognized as the
Arias Peace Plan, his initiative culminated in the signing of the Esquipulas II Accords, or the
Procedure to Establish a Firm and Lasting Peace in Central America, by all the Central
American presidents on August 7, 1987. In that same year he was awarded the Nobel Peace
Prize. In 1988, President Arias used the monetary award from the Nobel Peace Prize to
establish the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress. From these headquarters,
President Arias has continued his pursuit of global peace and human security. President Arias
has received honorary doctorates from numerous universities and many honorary prizes,
among them the Jackson Ralston Prize, the Prince of Asturias Award, the Martin Luther King,
Jr. Peace Award, the Albert Schweitzer Humanitarian Award, the Liberty Medal of
Philadelphia, and the Americas Award.
4. Dr. Ashrawi holds a Ph.D. in medieval literature from the University of Virginia
and is the founder of the International Human Rights Council, an organization committed to
human rights and democracy in a free and independent Palestine. As a feminist, one of Dr.
Ashrawi's major goals is to strengthen the political participation of Palestinian women and to
achieve equal rights in a new nation based on the foundations of credibility, freedom, and
legitimacy. In 1991, she became the Official Spokesperson for the Palestinian Liberation
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specifically address the issue of peace and human rights in their discussions
of Central America and the Middle East. President Aristide continues to
grapple with building a democracy in a society where many of the former
agents of oppression are still active. Added to this is the explosive political
situation where some of his own supporters have committed human rights
violations upon others. Dr. Ashrawi must help her own people in a manner
to reconcile themselves to the existence of Israel, while preserving their
dignity in the process. She also finds herself in the painful position of
criticizing the very leaders of the struggle for independence when they have
themselves violated democratic and human rights norms. In this sense, Dr.
Ashrawi has played a dual role as spokesperson for the Palestinian cause, but
also as an outspoken critic of the current Palestinian leadership for its failure
to exhibit transparency in governance. She also voices criticism where the
government violates the human rights of the Palestinian people. Her
outspokenness is all the more remarkable given her status as a Christian in a
largely Islamic political movement and as a woman in a largely male
dominated world. Throughout her visit to Nova Southeastern University, Dr.
Ashrawi emphasized that peace must be achieved through negotiation among
equals and that democracy cannot be achieved, nor human rights fully
respected in the region, without peace.
The rule of law also cannot exist unless society itself creates
independent civic institutions to monitor observance of human rights and
encourage compliance with human rights norms. In this issue, Claudio
Grossman, Dean of the Washington College of Law at American University
and a current member and former president of the Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights, discusses the challenges in achieving full respect
for the right of free speech in societies that have only recently emerged from
dictatorship and systematic vi6lations of human rights.5 Citing the
Organization ("PLO' ) and in 1993 was appointed General Commissioner of the Palestine
Independent Commission for Citizen's Rights. Dr. Ashrawi was an active participant in the
creation of the 1993 Oslo Accords. In 1996, she was elected to the Palestinian Legislative
Council and named Minister for Higher Education. She is currently a member of the
Legislative Council where she has become an outspoken critic of corruption in government
and a leader for the creation of a democratic Palestine committed to human rights and peace.
Dr. Ashrawi is married to Emil, a photographer with the United Nations headquarters in
Jerusalem, and has two daughters, Amal and Zina.
5. Claudio Grossman was appointed Dean of the Washington College of Law,
American University in 1995. Recognizing his achievements in the field of human rights, the
Washington College of Law appointed him the Raymond Geraldson Scholar of International
and Humanitarian Law. In 1989, Dean Grossman litigated several landmark cases decided by
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights that resulted in favorable decisions for the
2001]
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Argentinean political scientist, Guillermo O'Donnell, Dean Grossman refers
to these recent democracies as "delegated democracies." 6 These delegated
democracies are the products of relatively free elections but without the civic
institutions and other institutions, usually present in a more established
democracy, to check the authoritarian tendencies of even democratically
elected leaders. In these cases, the existence of a human rights system of the
Organization of American States is especially important to the consolidation
of democracy.
Social justice must exist in order for the rule of law, domestic peace,
democracy, and respect for human rights to thrive. Dr. Ashrawi dealt with
this issue in the context of redressing some of the current inequities between
the economic privilege enjoyed by the Palestinian political leadership and
the economic hardship endured by the great majority of Palestinians.
Moreover, until Palestinian citizens of Israel enjoy the full political, social,
and economic rights of Jewish citizens of Israel, peace cannot be assured.
It is difficult to ascertain the extent of President Aristide's involvement
in the problems in Haiti's transition to democracy, but there can be no
question that the enduring lack of social justice in Haitian society after
decades of rule by oligarchy and dictatorship has only embittered the body
politic, making reconciliation, domestic peace, and full respect for human
rights a daunting task.
Finally, the Goodwin visiting professors demonstrate that democracy
and human rights can only flourish in an international context in which
peace is assured and some form of justice is meted out to those national
actors that fail to respect fundamental human rights norms. The pursuit of
peace is exemplified by the life work of President Arias, who recognized that
plaintiffs. He has served as the General Rapporteur of the Inter-American Bar Association, an
organization representing lawyers of the Americas, and is currently a member of the Council
of the Inter-American Institute of Human Rights. In 1993, Dean Grossman was elected to the
seven member Inter-American Commission on Human Rights ("IACHR") of the Organization
of American States. He was elected Special Rapporteur on Women's Rights for the IACHR in
1995 and served as IACHR President in 1997. Representing the IACHR, Dean Grossman has
participated in human rights missions to Haiti, Brazil, Guatemala, the Dominican Republic,
Mexico, Paraguay, Surinam, Nicaragua, and the Middle East. A native of Chile, Dean
Grossman is married to Dr. Irene Klinger, a Chilean economist and Chief of the Office of
External Relations of the Pan American Health Organization. They have two daughters,
Sandra and Nienke.
6. Claudio Grossman, Freedom of Expression in the Inter-American System for the
Protection of Human Rights, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. -. (2001), 25 NOVA L. REv.
411,412 (2001) (citing Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55, 56
(1994)).
[Vol. 25:387
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the exemplary democratic history of Costa Rica can only be guaranteed in
the future if the region itself is free from military conflict and a debilitating
arms race. To that end, President Arias authored and promoted the "Arias
Peace Plan," a blueprint for ending decades of conflict in Central America.
Despite considerable hostility from the United States, the Arias Peace Plan
provided the necessary impetus for ending the decades of civil war ravaging
Central America. President Arias, coming from a country that has been a
beacon of democracy and one that respects human rights, nonetheless
articulated the importance of regional peace for the economic, political, and
social development of his own country:
In a poor region like ours, we cannot afford to squander
opportunities for development by wasting our energy on violence
and repression. Having seen the destruction wrought by internal
conflicts in Guatemala, El Salvador and Nicaragua, Costa Ricans
have come to understand the true importance of maintaining a
culture that respects human rights.
7
Indeed, a primary focus of President Arias' writing, and his work in the
last decade, has been the appeal for an abandonment of the arms race in
Latin America and elsewhere. In doing so, President Arias has not hesitated
to condemn the West's complicity in the arms race among the world's
poorest countries:
As debt servicing payments and military spending continue to
rob the poor of basic health and education services, developed
nations continue to profit from this tragic situation.... In the
1980s, Western governments and corporations played a significant
part in arming Saddam Hussein's despotic regime in Iraq. Earlier
in this decade, France provided significant military aid to the
genocidal government of Rwanda. Until recently, the Indonesian
military used British-made equipment against pro-independence
groups in East Timor .... It is unconscionable that undemocratic
states and governments that abuse human rights can easily acquire
sophisticated weaponry on the international market, and it is
outrageous that leading democracies such as the United States,
France and Great Britain fuel bloody conflicts by supplying
warring factions with armaments.8
7. Dr. Oscar Arias, What is Needed to Protect International Human Rights in the
21st Century, 7 I.SA I. INT'L & COMP. L. . . (2001), 25 NovA L. Rv. 485, 486
(2001) (internal citations omitted).
8. Arias, supra note 7, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. at _, 25 NOVA L. Ray. at 496
(internal citations omitted).
Wi/ets
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The pursuit of a particularly legal form of international justice is
exemplified by the work of Judge McDonald, recent past president of an
international criminal tribunal,9 and the work of Dean Grossman with the
Inter-American Commission. Judge McDonald presided over the creation of
one of the most important international legal institutions since the end of the
Second World War: the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia ("ICTY"). As Judge McDonald notes, the creation of this
tribunal came at a critical juncture in history when the international tribunal
was finally prepared to respond to the kinds of atrocities that had previously
been ignored. The Cold War had ended, permitting the international
community to focus on issues of international justice with large agreement
among the world's nations as to the substantive validity of human rights
norms. Perhaps, as Judge McDonald wryly notes, the creation of the ICTY
was possible because the atrocities were committed in Europe.
Nevertheless, the creation of the ICTY was shortly followed by the
9. In 1993, the United Nations General Assembly elected Gabrielle Kirk McDonald
as a Judge of the Tribunal and in 1997, she was re-elected to a second four year term. As
President of the Tribunal, she presided over a rapid growth in the Tribunal's activities and
effectiveness. She has traveled extensively on behalf of the Tribunal promoting its mandate
before the United Nations Security Council, the Council of Foreign Relations, the Peace
Implementation Council, numerous universities, and the international media. Judge
McDonald increased the visibility of the Tribunal within the former Yugoslavia by creating an
Outreach Program designed to inform the peoples of the former Yugoslavia about the work of
the Tribunal and combat misinformation.
During the course of her Presidency, the number of detainees held by the Tribunal
more than tripled, a third trial chamber was added, and two new courtrooms were constructed.
Judge McDonald has also presided over the Appeals Chamber, which receives appeals from
both the ICTY and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"). She served as
the presiding judge over the ICTY's first successful prosecution (the Tadic' Case, 1995-
1997). Judge McDonald has also participated in the proceedings leading to the establishment
of the permanent International Criminal Court. After graduating first in her class at Howard
University Law School in 1966, Judge McDonald was a highly successful lawyer before
becoming the first African-American appointed to a federal court in Texas.
After serving as a federal district judge in Houston for nine years, Judge
McDonald became a partner with a major law firm in Texas. She has also worked for the
NAACP and taught at the law schools of St. Mary's University, the University of Texas, and
Texas Southern University. She has received numerous awards and honors including the
CEELI Leadership Award, the National Bar Association's First Equal Justice and Ronald
Brown International Law Awards, and the American Society of International Law's Goler Teal
Butcher Award for Human Rights. Judge McDonald is the mother of a son attending law
school and a daughter working in the film industry. See Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The
International Criminal Tribunals: Crime & Punishment in the International Arena, 7 ILSA J.
INT'L & COMP. L. __ (2001), 25 NOVA L. REv. 463 (2001).
[Vol. 25:387
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establishment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR")
in November 1994, in response to the atrocities committed in Rwanda.
These tribunals have had remarkable successes, and the successes have only
increased as peace has slowly returned to the regions affected. The new
democratic government of Croatia has turned over a number of indicted war
criminals to the ICTY in the Hague and the Yugoslavian government is
debating whether Slobodan Milosevic himself should be turned over to the
International Tribunal.
Judge McDonald notes in her article that the International Tribunals
have not only broken ground in developing new procedures for prosecuting
war criminals, they have additionally developed new substantive law. They
have defined sexual violence as an international crime in the context of war,
a development that has been long overdue. Finally, the courts have also
been instrumental in laying the groundwork for the creation of the permanent
International Criminal Court:
The Tribunals have demonstrated that international criminal justice
is possible. They are positive proof that it is possible to try persons
charged with serious violations of international humanitarian law in
international courts and that the differences in the civil and
common law systems-not to mention the country-by-country
differences even within the same type of system-are not
insurmountable obstacles.'
In his article, President Arias recognizes the importance of the
permanent International Criminal Court, arguing that "its existence alone
would serve to deter would-be violators of human rights who might
otherwise be able to act with impunity."' To this end, the court would "help
conflict-tom nations on the road to reconciliation and recovery.'
' 2
One of the most remarkable aspects of Judge McDonald's work at the
Tribunal was her groundbreaking launch of the Tribunals' "Outreach
Program," which was an effort to make the processes and personalities of the
Tribunals' work known to the larger world community. Judge McDonald
recognized that the process of creating, institutionalizing, legitimizing, and
enforcing international law requires much more than the will of international
lawyers, academics, and politicians. The law must be accessible and clear to
the international community at large and must be accepted by the people of
10. McDonald, supra note 9,7 RSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. at_ 25 NovA L REV. at
482.
11. Arias, supranote7, 7 ILSA J. INT'L& COMP. L. at.. 25 NOvAL REv. at491.
12. Id.
2001]
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that community as legitimate. As Judge McDonald observes, this is
particularly important for the peoples of the conflict from which the
international criminal defendants originate. Realizing the goal of broad-
based legitimization is an enormous, difficult, but necessary task.
All five speakers have demonstrated through their life work that
democracy and respect for human rights require much more than a ritualistic
acceptance of elections or the ratification of treaties. Without the building
blocks for democracy and human rights such as rule of law, reconciliation,
social justice and domestic peace, the goals of a peaceful, democratic, rights-
based society will remain elusive.
10
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Human Rights and Development in the 21st Century: The
Complex Path to Peace and Democracy: Themes from the
2000 Goodwin Seminar
Douglas Lee Donoho
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I. INTRODUCTION
As the twenty-first century begins, the international human rights
system faces a profound anomaly. Despite enormous normative and
* Professor of Law, Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center.
B.A., Kalamazoo College; J.D., Rutgers University Law School - Camden; LL.M., Harvard
University Law School. I sincerely thank our five incredible guests, Dr. Hanan Ashrawi, Dean
Claudio Grossman, President Oscar Arias, President Jean-Paul Aristide, and Judge Gabrielle
Kirk McDonald, and my inestimable colleague Professor James Wilets, for making the 2000
Goodwin Seminar a truly remarkable learning experience.
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institutional achievements,1 the system seems incapable of delivering its
ultimate promise to those who need it most.2  A comprehensive, albeit
underdeveloped,3 network of lofty norms has been created, theoretically
binding governments to follow a universal moral code. An almost
bewildering array of institutional mechanisms, although virtually invisible to
most of humanity, is set in place to supervise and monitor implementation of
these collective aspirations.4  Well-financed, nongovernmental
organizations, devoted to the enforcement of rights, have gained the ears of
international institutions and governments alike, exposing violations and
1. Among the hundreds of international human rights instruments promulgated under
United Nations authority since 1945, there are at least seven major multilateral treaties with
over one hundred state parties each. International conventions on Civil and Political Rights,
Economic and Social Rights, Genocide, Racial Discrimination, Women, Torture and Children
have 142, 144, 130, 156, 165, 119, and 191 state parties, respectively. See The United
Nations Treaty Collection, at http:llwww.un.org/Depts/Treaty/final/ts2/newfileslparLboo/
iv_ll.htm (last visited Mar. 24, 2001); Millennium Summit Multilateral Framework: An
Invitation to Universal Participation, U.N. Doc. DPI/2130 (2000), available at
http:/untreaty.un.orglEnglishlmillenniumllawlindex.html. There are also three
comprehensive regional human rights treaties covering a wide variety of human rights
concerns in Europe, Africa, and the Americas. See generally GUIDE TO INTERNATIONAL
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICE chs. 7-9 (Hurst Hannum ed., Ardsley, N.Y.: Transnational, 3d ed.
1999); HENRY J. STEINER & PHmLip ALSTON, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEXT:
LAW, POLmCS, MORALS ch. 10 (OXFORD UNIv. PRESS 1996).
2. Professors Helfer and Slaughter have perceptively described the "sad paradox"
that human rights institutions are "most effective" in the states that "arguably need them the
least: those whose officials commit relatively few, minor, and discrete human rights
violations." Lawrence R. Heifer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Towards a Theory of Effective
Supranational Adjudication, 107 YALE L.J. 273, 329 (1997).
3. Although the international system has developed a comprehensive network of
human rights norms, the manifestation of many human rights is still nascent and their specific
meaning unsettled. See Douglas Lee Donoho, The Role of Human Rights in Global Security
Issues: A Normative and Institutional Critique, 14 MICH. J. INT'L L. 827, 837-43, 847-50
(1993); Henry Steiner, Book Review, 84 AM. J. INT'L. L. 603, 604-05 (1990) (reviewing
THOMAS BUERGENTHAL, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS IN A NTSHELL (1988)). Thus, the
specific meaning of many human rights remains underdeveloped. Reasons for this include the
relative newness of the norms and the international system's limited capacity for rendering
authoritative interpretations of rights. Donoho, supra at 866-68.
4. In addition to United Nations Charter based institutions such as the Commission
on Human Rights, each of the three existing regional systems and six of the major multilateral
human rights treaties have enforcement mechanisms in the form of monitoring institutions
and, in some cases, judicial or quasi-judicial procedures. See generally STEINER & ALSTON,
supra note 1; THE UNITED NATIONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL (Phillip
Alston ed. 1992).
[Vol. 25:395
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working tirelessly for change.5 Even the politically cynical and formerly
stodgy United Nations Security Council has significantly raised the profile
of human rights, justifying a series of interventions based upon a perceived
connection between human rights and threats to peace. Perhaps most
dramatically, the international community has begun to take leadership
accountability more seriously, endorsing the use of criminal sanctions, both
domestic and international, to bring human rights violators to justice.7
Human rights have, in essence, become a critical part of international
relations. More importantly, they have become a dynamic force for change
that provides hope for millions of oppressed people around the world.
Yet, despite these advances and so many reasons for hope, the world
remains mired in widespread and profound violations of human dignity.
Despite the world's collective mantra "never again," genocidal episodes
have repeatedly marred the consciousness of human kind since World War
1[.8 Floods of refugees, and newly refined forms of oppression such as
5. See generally STENER & ALSTON, supra note 1, at ch. 8.
6. See Douglas Lee Donoho, Evolution or Expediency: The United Nations'
Response to the Disruption of Democracy, 29 CORNELL INT'L L.J. 329, 331, 351 n.l 17, 358-
70, 375-76 (1996); Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq,
Somalia and Beyond, 15 Micm. J. INT'L L. 519 (1994).
7. See infra text accompanying notes 32-39.
8. The persistence of genocidal episodes prompted Michael Scharf's wry observation
that:
[The pledge of "never again" quickly became the reality of "again and
again" as the world community failed to take action to bring those
responsible to justice when 4 million people were murdered during
Stalin's purges (1937-1953), 5 million were annihilated during China's
Cultural Revolution (1966-1976), 2 million were butchered in
Cambodia's killing fields (1975-1979), 30,000 disappeared during
Argentina's Dirty War (1976-1983), 200,000 were massacred in East
Timor (1975-1985), 750,000 were exterminated in Uganda (1971-1987),
100,000 Kurds were gassed in Iraq (1987-1988), and 75,000 peasants
were slaughtered by death squads in El Salvador (1980-1992).
Michael P. Scharf, The Prosecutor v. Dusko Tadic: An Appraisal of the First International
War Crimes Trial Since Nuremberg, 60 ALB. L. REV. 861, 861-62 (1997). Scharf might have
also mentioned mass killings in Nigeria (Biafra, 1966-1971), Bangladesh (1970-1971),
Burundi, and Sudan. See Robert Melson, The Holocaust: Remembering for the Future:
Paradigms of Genocide: The Holocaust, the Armenian Genocide, and Contemporary Mass
Destruction, 548 ANN AS 156 (1996). The most recent examples, of course, are the tragic
events in Bosnia, Kosovo, and Rwanda. The dramatic difference in the international
community's response to these more recent events is cause for optimism. Freed of cold-war
constraints, the international community's reactions to Bosnia, Rwanda, and Kosovo, although
flawed and somewhat halting, were ultimately decisive.
2001]
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"ethnic cleansing," have challenged the international community's capacity
to respond. Grotesque forms of physical abuse, such as torture and summary
execution, continue to haunt many societies and despite a tide of democratic
transitions around the world, violations of basic civil liberties remain
commonplace. 9 Most disheartening of all, the two greatest enemies of
human dignity, armed conflict and poverty, persistently plague the vast
majority of human kind. 10
Responding to these sober realities, while embracing our many reasons
for hope, the Law Center chose to focus the 2000 Goodwin Seminar on
human rights, peace, and democracy in the twenty-first century. Through the
generosity of the Leo Goodwin, Sr. Foundation, the Law Center hosted the
following five distinguished visitors over the course of our semester long
seminar: Dean Claudio Grossman, Judge Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Dr.
Hanan Ashrawi, President Jean Paul Aristide, and Nobel Peace Laureate
President Oscar Arias.11 These distinguished visitors brought to the Law
Center a wealth of profound personal and professional experiences in the
front line struggle for human rights. For each visitor, the quest for human
rights has been a lifelong commitment. The visitors spent several days at the
Law Center, teaching, listening, and sometimes debating with students and
faculty about the current status of human rights and their potential for
realization in the twenty-first century.
9. See, e.g., AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL U.S.A., The Campaign to Stop Torture, at
http://www.amnesty-usa.org/stoptorture/; HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, 2001 World Report,
available at http://www.hrw.orglwr2kl/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2001); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE,
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices, at http:llwww.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/
(last visited Mar. 21, 2001); see also http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-
rights/hrpreports.mainhp.html.
10. See, e.g., SIPRI YEARBOOK 1998: ARMAMENTS, DISARMAMENT AND
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (Oxford Univ. Press 1998), at
http:/leditors.sipri.sepubslyb98/chl.html (surveying armed conflicts around the world);
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN FUND, The State of the World's Children 2001, available at
http://www.unicef.orglsowcOll (last visited Mar. 21, 2001) (describing, among other things,
the effects of armed conflict on children, estimating that conflicts during the last decade have
left two million dead, between six and eight million children seriously injured, and twelve
million children homeless). For detailed reports surveying world poverty and efforts to
eliminate it, see UNrrED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, Poverty Report 2000, available at
http://www.undp.orglpoverty/publicationsl and WORLD BANK POVERTY NET, available at
http://www.worldbank.orgpoverty.
11. For pertinent biographical information regarding these five distinguished guests,
see James D. Wilets, The Building Blocks to Recognition of Human Rights and Democracy:
Reconciliation, Rule of Law, and Domestic and International Peace, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP.
L. - (2001), 25 NOVA L. REV. 387 (2001).
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The discourse prompted by our distinguished guests covered a wide
array of current human rights issues ranging from the Middle East peace
process, international criminal law, transitions to democracy and
reconciliation, the future of the Inter-American system, disarmament, and
debt relief. Despite the breadth of the subjects discussed, and the diversity
of opinions expressed, a clear set of central themes emerged. These inter-
related themes focused steadily on the future of human rights and the
various ways in which politics, economics, power, and oppression are
entangled in the struggle to achieve basic human dignity for all. While
some of these themes are clearly expressed in the essays prepared by our
guests for publication in this volume, others emerged only in classrooms,
offices, and over dinner tables. They involve both insights regarding the
causes of continuing human rights violations and speculations regarding the
next phase in a movement that has bettered the lives of millions, yet fallen
frustratingly short of its objectives. What follows is a brief description of
the four most significant themes that emerged from the seminar and some
observations regarding each one.
II. THEMES FROM THE 2000 GOODWIN SEMINAR
A. There Is a Profound Relationship Betweeen Peace, Democracy, and
Human Rights
The notion that human rights, democracy, and peace are profoundly
interrelated was a consistent theme of each Goodwin visitor. For each, this
central belief is one founded on personal experience. President Arias, for
example, was awarded the 1987 Nobel Peace Prize for his work nurturing
this relationship into concrete results during the Central American Peace
Process. 12  For both President Aristide and Dr. Ashrawi, the complex
dynamics of armed conflict, violence, oppression, and the hope for human
rights and democracy pose a continuing daily struggle.13 Dean Grossman
12. See John 3. Moore, Jr., Note, Problems with Forgiveness: Granting Amnesty
Under the Arias Plan in Nicaragua and El Salvador, 43 STAN. L. REV. 733, 735, 738-45
(1991) (providing a detailed description of the Arias Plan and the role of President Arias in
the peace process).
13. See, e.g., Mike Williams, Aristide Takes Office, Calls for Peace: Poor in Haiti
Joyous, But Foes Ready to Act, ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 8, 2001, at 3A; Edward Cody, Haiti
Torn by Hope and Hatred As Aristide Returns to Power, WASH. POST, Feb. 2, 2001, at Al;
Ilene R. Prusher, Why a Human Rights Advocate Leaves Arafat's Cabinet: Real Issues of
Reform "Not Addressed", CHISTiAN Sci. MoNrrOR, Aug. 31, 1998, at 8; Associated Press,
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spoke poignantly of his bitter experience watching from forced exile as
General Pinochet dismantled a proud Chilean tradition of democracy and
systematically violated the basic rights of all those who opposed him. Judge
McDonald presided over the creation and development of the War Crimes
Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, an institution whose very existence was
founded on the premise that human rights violations may constitute a threat
to international peace.
14
The idea that peace, democracy, and human rights are interdependent is
not a novel idea. Indeed, Immanuel Kant suggested such a connection in
1795, when he argued international peace is tied to democracy.' 5 In recent
years, international institutions increasingly sounded this message, often
justifying international initiatives on this basis. The United Nations, for
example, engaged considerable resources in the promotion of democracy,
including extensive election monitoring.' 6 The United Nations Security
Council increasingly relied on human rights concerns in finding threats to
peace, justifying interventionist activities believed unthinkable just a decade
earlier.' 7 The Security Council's unprecedented decision to authorize the
use of force to restore democracy in Haiti is perhaps the clearest example of
this promising new trend.' 8  Most recently, the North Atlantic Treaty
Arafat Critic Demands "Genuine Democracy", Cm. TRW., Aug. 13, 1998, at N17; Jessica
Berry, Women: Five and Kicking, THE GUARDIAN, Feb. 8, 1996, at T7.
14. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993); infra text accompanying notes 32-35.
15. IMMANum KANT, PERPETUAL PEACE AND OTHMR ESSAYS ON POLMCS, HISTORY,
AND MoRALs 107 (Ted Humphrey, trans., Hackett Publishing Co. 1983); see also Fernando R.
Teson, The Kantian Theory of International Law, 92 COLUM. L. REv. 53, 53 n. 1 (1992).
16. See Donoho, supra note 6, at 333-40; see generally David Stoelting, The
Challenge of UN-Monitored Elections in Independent Nations, 28 STAN. J. INT'L L. 371
(1992).
17. See S.C. Res. 688, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 2982d mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/688
(1991) (implicit authorization of force to protect Iraqi Kurds); S.C. Res. 794, U.N. SCOR,
47th Sess., 3145th mtg., U.N. Doc. SIRES/794 (1992) (intervention in Somalia to prevent
humanitarian crisis, including force); S.C. Res. 770, U.N. SCOR, 47th Sess., 3106th mtg.,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/770 (1992) ("all necessary means" to deliver aid in Bosnia); S.C. Res. 940
U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994) (restoration of democracy
in Haiti by "all necessary means"); S.C. Res. 929 U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3392nd mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/929 (1994) (safe zones in Rwanda); S.C. Res. 1262, U.N. SCOR, 54th Sess.,
4038th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1262 (1999) (East Timor); Donoho, supra note 6; Gordon,
supra note 6.
18. See S.C. Res. 940, U.N. SCOR, 3413th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/940 (1994). But
see Donoho, supra note 6, at 370-82.
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Organization ("NATO") justified its forceful interventions in Bosnia and
Kosovo on essentially this rationale.
19
Although widely articulated, the actual relationshig between human
rights, peace, and democracy is rarely examined critically. One certainty is
that armed conflict is perhaps the greatest single source of human rights
violations. It also seems plausible that genuine democracy lessens the
potential for egregious human rights violations, violent internal conflict, and
the aggressive use of armed force.21 The available empirical evidence to
assist in the inquiry is, however, limited and controversial, making it
difficult to assess the implications of this perceived relationship with any
degree of certainty.
Often, even the most basic questions are never asked. Do violations of
human rights cause breaches of peace, or are such violations merely
symptomatic of deeper economic and social conflicts? Do we mean that
respect for human rights is an important precondition for peace, or only that
peace itself is a prerequisite to the effective protection of rights? Does
democratic governance actually reduce the potential for international armed
conflict?2 Does democracy, often itself promoted as a basic human right,2
serve as an important precondition to the ultimate realization of human rights
and, in turn, peace? If so, would not the absence of democracy justify
forceful intervention or other drastic measures aimed at nondemocratic
United Nations members, including the Peoples Republic of China?
While all seem to agree that the relationship between peace, human
rights, and democracy is vital, the precise nature of this relationship and its
implications remain somewhat elusive and dependent upon the speaker's
perspective and agenda. One of the clearest lessons that emerged over the
course of the Goodwin Seminar is that the relationship between peace,
democracy, and human rights is far more complex than the lofty platitudes
19. See generally Richard B. Bilder, Kosovo and the "New Interventionism":
Promise or Peril?, 9 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & PoL 153 (1999).
20. See Valerie Epps, Peace and Democracy: The Link and the Policy Implications,
4 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 347, 350 (1998) (discussing some of the empirical studies of the
Kantian thesis and pointing out some of the difficult uncertainties).
21. Id. at 348.
22. Even studies that have suggested that liberal democracies do not fight each other
have acknowledged that many democratic states commonly employ armed forces
internationally. See id. The most obvious example of this phenomenon is, of course, the
United States.
23. See, e.g., Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86
AM. J. INT'L L. 46, 53-56 (1992); Gregory Fox, The Right to Political Participation in
International Law, 17 YAM J. INT'L L. 539 (1992).
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that typically emerge from such discussions. Beleaguered on all sides by
class violence, rampant poverty, and economic disparity, President Aristide
must continually wrestle with the complex realities of nurturing an infant
democracy in the context of oppressive social and economic conditions.
President Aristide's frustrated efforts to build Haiti's fledgling democracy
under these oppressive conditions demonstrate that genuine democracy
cannot exist and will not contribute to the protection of basic rights, absent
the material conditions necessary for its development.24
Similarly, Dr. Ashrawi has witnessed her aspirations for meaningful
democratic self-governance for Palestinians sacrificed in the quest for
"security" and peace with the oppressor. While Dr. Ashrawi steadfastly
argued that peace is impossible without full respect for human rights, she
readily acknowledged that the struggle for independence has itself caused
the Palestinian people some self-inflicted wounds. Moreover, fundamental
lingering conflicts over scarce land, power, and security raise unanswered
questions regarding which rights and whose rights must be protected and
under what conditions. Palestinians and Israelis, alike, find themselves
locked in circular political rhetoric over human rights. There can be no
peace without security, no security without peace, no human rights without
peace, and no peace without human rights. The rhetoric of conflict has thus
obscured the underlying premise that respect for human rights on all sides is
a prerequisite for meaningful negotiations and the compromises necessary to
peaceful coexistence.
In this regard, Presidents Aristide and Arias both astutely argued that
economic justice was an essential prerequisite for peace, human rights, and
the development of real democracy. Yet, even this appealing insight
arguably holds human rights hostage to the political realities of scarce
resources and global concentrations of economic power. It gives rise to the
reasonable suspicion that the most significant factor in the relationship
between human rights, peace, and democracy has yet to be clearly identified.
Perhaps the clearest message of all is that economic justice and development
must figure more prominently in our thinking about peace, democracy, and
human rights.
24. See Williams, supra note 13; Cody, supra note 13; Prusher, supra note 13;
Associated Press, supra note 13; Berry, supra note 13.
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B. The International Community Must Identify and Address Systemic
Causes of Human Rights Violations Such as Poverty, Economic
Disparity, Debt Burden, and Militarization
A recurring concern raised during the symposium was that the
international community has failed to adequately identify and respond to
systemic causes of human rights violations. Ironically, the dramatic rise in
human rights consciousness among governments has not been accompanied
by similarly dramatic improvements in the lives of most people. The World
Bank estimates that four billion people live on less than two dollars per
day.2 United Nations Children's Fund ("UNICEF") estimates that three
billion people live in abject poverty without basic sanitation, health care,
shelter, potable water, education, or adequate food-including two million
children who die each year from diarrhea. According to the United Nations
High Commissioner for Refugees, there are currently over twenty-two
million displaced persons and refugees around the world, living in desperate
conditions.27  Recognizing this painful reality, the Goodwin visitors
challenged us to think broadly and critically about the primary causes of
human suffering when considering the future of human rights.
These leaders encouraged us to look beyond our Western preoccupation
with individual liberties and take into account the physical and material
conditions that fundamentally inhibit the realization of human dignity for
most of the world's population. Our visitors' experiences in the struggle for
human rights and peace convincingly demonstrate that economics and
development must play a fundamental role in the achievement of human
dignity for all. Extreme poverty, economic disparity, and lack of basic
development are undisputedly the most fundamental sources of suffering on
the planet. They are also, perhaps, the greatest existing obstacles to the
ultimate realization of fundamental human rights for all.
As witnessed by President Aristide's struggles in Haiti, economic
disparity and deprivation undermine the foundations for genuine democracy
and inhibit the social conditions that make respect and enjoyment of basic
civil liberties possible. It seems equally clear that the material conditions
25. WoPIw BANK POVERTY NET, supra note 10.
26. See UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND, Change the World with Children,
available at http://www.unicef.org/ (last visited Mar. 21, 2001); see also Peadar Kirby,
Poverty Is the Ultimate Threat to Global Security, IRISH TIMES, Dec. 28, 2000, at 61
(describing the worsening income gap between rich and poor).
27. See U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, UNHCR Statistics, at
httpJ/www.unhcr.ch/staist/main.htm (last visited Mar. 21, 2001).
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within societies frequently serve as the catalyst for abusive exercises of
authoritarian power and misguided governmental priorities that commit poor
nations' scarce resources to ever increasing militarization. Armed conflict
and internal civil strife, rooted in social and political power struggles over
the material aspects of life, are undeniably powerful catalysts for human
rights violations.
Thus, while human rights are linked to peace and democracy, attaining
meaningful peace and democracy depends, in turn, on addressing economic
disparity and lack of development. President Aristide's entire life, from
priest to politician, has been premised on this conception of the role of
economic justice in the realization of human rights and dignity. His
experiences in Haiti demonstrate the complex and stubborn nature of the
problem. President Arias has similarly taken these insights seriously,
campaigning for a fundamental shift in governmental priorities in developed
and underdeveloped countries alike. Recognizing the significance of
economic development to human rights, he has championed the idea that
demilitarization and serious debt relief are necessary for critical economic
development and ultimately the realization of fundamental human rights.2
Despite noble beginnings and recent advances, 29 the profound
connection between economic deprivation and human rights has not figured
prominently in Western human rights agendas.30 Rather, Western
28. See Oscar Arias, What is Needed to Protect International Human Rights in the
21st Century, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMp. L. - (2001), 25 NovA L. REV. 485 (2001); see also
Eric A. Friedman, Debt Relief in 1999: Only One Step on a Long Journey, 3 YALE HuM. RTs.
& DEV. L.J. 191 (2000); OXFAM INTERNATIONAL, Debt Relief, at
http://www.oxfam.orgtadvocacy/debt (last visited Mar. 21, 2001) (describing some of the
effects a $2000 billion debt burden has on developing countries); JUBILEE 2000 COAUTIoN, A
Debt Free Start for a Billion People, at http://www.jubilee2000uk.org/index (last visited Mar.
21, 2001) (asserting that seven million children die each year as a result of the debt crisis).
29. See, e.g., Frank E.L. Deale, The Unhappy History of Economic Rights in the
United States and Prospects for Their Creation and Renewal, 43 How. L.J. 281, 305-306
(2000) (describing how economic rights were a central theme in the policies and public
pronouncements of President Franklin D. Roosevelt).
30. The United States Government, for example, has traditionally taken the position
that economic, social, and cultural rights are not really rights at all, or at least are not
enforceable as such. Most human rights nongovernmental organizations have also been
reluctant to place economic rights on their agendas. See, e.g., STENm & ALSTON, supra note
1, at 267-70. International institutions such as the United Nations Development Program and
the World Bank have, however, taken the problem of poverty seriously. See Williams, supra
note 13; Cody, supra note 13; Prusher, supra note 13; Associated Press, supra note 13; Berry,
supra note 13; see also Chris Jochnick & Javier Mujica Petit, Preface to the Quito
Declaration on the Enforcement and Realization of Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in
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governments and nongovernmental organizations have focused their
resources on protection of civil liberties, largely ignoring or discounting the
underlying material causes of human rights deprivations. It is tragically
ironic that the Western human rights movement has seemingly failed to
recognize persistent and widespread poverty, which denies vast segments of
the world's population the material needs essential to human dignity, thus
making the meaningful enjoyment of our treasured civil liberties virtually
impossible.
C. The Effective Protection of Human Rights Requires the Development of
Stable, Independent Domestic Civic Institutions and a Culture of
Democracy
Born from personal, sometimes painful and bitter experience, our
Goodwin visitors repeatedly emphasized the significance of a strong civic
infrastructure to the creation of lasting democracy and respect for human
rights. As a member of Salvadore Allende's administration in Chile, Dean
Grossman watched Pinochet's bloody regime systematically dismantled the
Chilean judicial system and other institutions of democracy. Dr. Ashrawi
spoke of the dilemmas of institution building in the context of oppression,
under which Palestinians face both internal and external threats to their basic
dignity. Perhaps most dramatically, President Aristide has witnessed
firsthand, from coup to current turmoil, how fragile democracy is in the
absence of strong civic institutions and the material conditions that nurture
their growth.
The importance of institution building has not been lost on the United
Nations or in academic literature.31  The personal experiences of our
Goodwin visitors, however, brought the complexity of this mission into clear
focus. If strong civic institutions provide a bulwark against human rights
violations, then economic progress, a culture of democracy, respect for the
rule of law, and the development of "rights consciousness," provide the
Latin America and the Caribbean, 12 YALE HUM. RTS. & DEv. L.J. 209 (1999); see generally
Isabella D. Bunn, The Right to Development: Implications for International Economic Law,
15 AM. U. It 'LL. REy. 1425 (2000).
31. Heifer and Slaughter, for example, cite the existence of strong, independent
domestic institutions, committed to the rule of law and responsive to individual claimants, as a
"strongly favorable precondition for effective supranational adjudication." Heifer &
Slaughter, supra note 2, at 333-34; see also Linda Reif, Building Democratic Institutions:
The Role of National Human Rights Institutions in Good Governance and Human Rights
Protection, 13 HAIV. HUM. RTS. J. 1 (2000).
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foundation upon which such institutions are built. The effectiveness of such
institutions is tied to the dynamics of economic and power relations within
society.
The bitter experiences of our distinguished guests dramatically
demonstrate that civic institutions and frameworks for rights protections are
the first to be sacrificed under the yoke of oppression. In Haiti, for
example, recent events show that much more effort and work is necessary
for the establishment of meaningful democracy and respect for human
rights than United States sponsored elections. The struggle for basic
human dignity continues in Haiti with little improvement, because the
primary economic and power dynamics of oppression have remained
largely unaltered. Economic development and justice have proven no more
than empty promises, and a fundamental absence of adequate civic
institutions remains unremedied. How to create and maintain effective
institutions in the face of oppressive conditions and lingering internal
conflict remains a mystery despite its importance. Moreover, it seems
clear that institution building, while a necessary ingredient for the effective
protection of human rights, is wholly inadequate in the absence of critical
economic and political reforms addressing the underlying sources of
conflict.
D. A Meaningful Commitment to Leadership Accountability is Essential to
Elimination of Human Rights Atrocities
A fourth recurring theme raised by the Goodwin visitors involved the
significance of leadership accountability for human rights violations.
Perhaps one of the most significant human rights developments at the close
of this century has been the increasing willingness of governments to
abandon outdated notions of immunity that have for too long served as the
refuge of oppression. When discussing the vital issue of human rights
enforcement, our guests inevitably referenced three recent developments-
the creation of ad hoc war crimes tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda, the
movement to create a permanent international criminal court, and the
extradition case against General Pinochet. These three developments
arguably signal a profound shift in the traditional paradigm of anemic
international human rights enforcement limited to toothless monitoring and
supervision. More importantly, they may also signal a change in the attitude
of states regarding the personal accountability of political leadership for
egregious violations of human rights.
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The United Nations Security Council's creation of ad hoc war crimes
tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda under Chapter VIL and its endorsement
of their wide mandate, may represent the first wave in this shifting paradigm
of human rights enforcement. Indeed, the creation of the tribunal for the
former Yugoslavia, presided over in its infancy by Judge McDonald, and the
subsequent creation of the tribunal for Rwanda, are perhaps the most
profound developments in human rights enforcement since Nuremberg. The
very existence of these tribunals is premised upon the importance of
imposing criminal accountability on impugned leadership. Each tribunal has
sought to indict and bring to justice, not only rogue actors in the field, but
more importantly, the leadership that directed and nurtured human terror in
those tortured lands. Thanks to pioneers like Judge McDonald, the tribunals
have broken new ground in the development of international criminal law,
generating not only a sophisticated jurisprudence regarding criminal liability
for human rights violations, but also establishing rational rules of procedure
and important substantive expansions of basic humanitarian norms.33 Most
importantly, the tribunals' work has enormously increased public awareness
and established a new vision of what is possible in human rights
enforcement. The international community did not, for once, simply sit by
and watch with horror as thousands were murdered, enslaved, tortured, and
systematically raped. Whatever their flaws,M the work of these tribunals
32. See, e.g., Ivan Simonovic, The Role of the ICTY in the Development of
International Criminal Adjudication, 23 FoRD. IN'L LJ. 440 (1999); Scharf, supra note 8.
The Tribunal has described its own work in exactly these terms stating that, "[a] whole body
of lofty, if remote, United Nations ideals will be brought to bear upon human beings ....
Through the Tribunal, those imperatives will be turned from abstract tenets into inescapable
commands." Report of the International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible
for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the
Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 152, at 49, U.N. Doc.
A/49/342 (1994).
33. See S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/827
(1993) [hereinafter ICTY Statute]; S.C. Res. 808, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3175th mtg., U.N.
Doc. S/RES/808 (1993); Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, The International Criminal Tribunals:
Crime & Punishment in the International Arena, 7 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. _ (2001), 25
NOVA L. REV. 463 (2001); see also Justice Louise Arbour, Access to Justice: The Social
Responsibility of Lawyers: The Prosecution of International Crimes: Prospects and Pitfalls,
1 WA SH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 13 (1999); Barbara Crossette, Crimes Against Humanity: A New
Legal Weapon to Deter Rape, N.Y. TIMEs, Mar. 4, 2001, sec. 4, at 5 (rape held to constitute
crime against humanity by ICTY).
34. The proceedings were clearly hampered by the apparent lack of political will on
the part of NATO to undertake the politically sensitive and dangerous work of arresting those
accused of war crimes and a host of practical problems in implementation of their mandates.
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have begun to dismantle outdated attitudes regarding the accountability of
leadership and set important new limits on what will be tolerated.
The ultimate significance of the tribunals in Yugoslavia and Rwanda is,
however, somewhat constrained by their ad hoc nature and limited
geographic and temporal jurisdiction.35 As eloquently argued by Judge
McDonald, the momentum gained through the tribunals' work must be
carried to full fruition by the implementation of the permanent International
Criminal Court proposed in the Treaty of Rome.36 The creation of this court
may signal that the international community, some fifty years after
Nuremberg and the birth of the modem human rights system, has finally
developed the resolve necessary to make human rights enforcement
meaningful.
The extradition case against General Pinochet, the significance of
which has yet to be fully realized, reflects a potential third wave in this
shifting paradigm.37  Although ultimately frustrating, the British court's
courageous decision denying Pinochet traditional immunity potentially
represents an enormously positive development. Among other things, this
decision may reflect an increasing willingness by states to recognize the
applicability of domestic criminal processes and universal jurisdiction to
human rights violators. 38 Although potentially a vital development, the
See, e.g., Arbour, supra note 33. They were also hampered by an initial lack of financial
support that has subsequently been remedied. Lengthy trials and alleged inefficiencies have
caused a recent review of the Tribunal's practices by a panel of United Nations appointed
experts. See Daryl A. Mundis, Improving the Operation and Functioning of the International
Criminal Tribunals, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 759 (2000).
35. ICTY Statute, supra note 33, at art. 1.
36. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/CONF. 183/9
(1998), available at http://www.un.orgllaw/icclstatute/contents.htm; see Michael A. Newton,
The International Criminal Court Preparatory Commission: The Way it Is & the Way Ahead,
41 VA. J. INT'L L. 204 (2000); Arbour, supra note 33.
37. See generally William J. Aceves, Liberalism and International Legal
Scholarship: The Pinochet Case and the Move Toward a Universal System of Transnational
Law Litigation, 41 HARV. INT'L L.J. 129 (2000).
38. A distinct but important parallel development has been ongoing in the United
States on the civil side since the landmark case of Filartiga v. Pena-Irala. 630 F.2d 876 (2d
Cir. 1980). An important recent example of this approach, which focuses on civil
compensation for "external" human rights violations in domestic courts, is the case of Kadic v.
Karadzic, involving human rights claims against Bosnian Serb leader Radovan Karadzic. 70
F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995). See generally Beth Stephens, Human Rights & Civil Wrongs at
Home and Abroad: Old Problems and New Paradigms: Conceptualizing the Violence Under
International Law: Do Tort Remedies Fit the Crime?, 60 ALB. L. REV. 579 (1997)
[Vol. 25:395
24
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss2/1
Donoho
ultimate significance of the Pinochet case depends on the political will of
individual governments to employ their domestic processes. One can only
hope it signals the repudiation of an era of impunity and gives fresh life to
the admonition that barbaric violators of human rights are "hostis humani
generis," enemies of all human kind.
Taken together, these developments hopefully reflect a wise shift away
from immunity toward individual accountability for human rights violations.
Carried to their full implications, they may signal a final assault of the
citadel of immunity and, eliminating safe havens for the oppressor, send a
clear message that justice will be served.40
III. CONCLUSION
The 2000 Goodwin visitors brought to the Law Center profound
insights regarding the future of human rights in the twenty-first century.
Their willingness to explore these complex and fundamental issues, and to
share their collective wisdom borne of experience, brightened all of our
horizons and helped rekindle our commitment to effective realization of
human rights for all people everywhere.
(discussing parallels and differences between civil and criminal remedies for international
human rights violations).
39. After Pinochet's release and return to Chile for health reasons, a Chilean
magistrate issued an indictment against the former dictator alleging human rights crimes. This
indictment was later overturned on procedural grounds but the effort to bring Pinochet to
justice under Chilean law has continued. See Sebastian Rotella, Court Throws Out Pinochet
Indictment, L.A. TMES, Dec. 21, 2000, at A15. In February 2000, human rights advocates
celebrated as Senegal appeared to follow the Pinochet paradigm by indicting Hissene Habre,
former dictator from Chad, and placing him under house arrest on charges of torture and
"barbarity." See Karl Vick, African Eyes Opened By Ex-Leader's Indictment: Where
Impunity Prevails, Chadian's Case Is a First, WASH. POST, Feb. 5, 2000, at A13.
Unfortunately, the case was subsequently dismissed through the apparent intervention of the
new Senegalese President. The initial success in Senegal, however, has apparently prompted
the filing of more than 50 cases against Habre and his henchmen in Chad. See Douglas Farah,
Chad's Torture Victims Pursue Habre in Court: Pinochet Leaves Ex-Dictator Vulnerable,
WASH. POST, Nov. 27, 2000, at A12; see also Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232 (2d Cir. 1995);
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980); Stephens, supra note 38.
40. See Reed Brody, One Year Later, The 'Pinochet Precedent' Puts Tyrants on
Notice, BOSTON GLOBE, Oct. 14, 1999, at A19.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Freedom of expression is one of democracy's fundamental values. Its
importance takes on special connotations in nations where the separation of
powers is fragile. This is particularly true in many Western Hemisphere
nations-in transition from long years of dictatorships-that have political
systems characterized by weak judicial and legislative branches which fail to
provide effective counterweights to an all-powerful executive branch.
Argentine social scientist Guillermo O'Donnell has characterized such
systems as "delegative democracies," where a charismatic figure assumes the
presidency after relatively free elections, and then governs without the
traditional counterweights normally associated with a representative
democracy.' Inherent in such "delegative democracies" is a risk of
backsliding into authoritarianism. Faced with serious problems with no easy
1. Guillermo O'Donnell, Delegative Democracy, 5 J. DEMOCRACY 55, 56 (1994).
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solutions, the popular enthusiasm that leads to the election of such
charismatic leaders is tempered by subsequent disillusion.
Since judicial and legislative powers in these nations are so weak,
freedom of expression-essential to every society-functions as the
fundamental counterweight. It allows information to be gathered and
disseminated, strengthens civil society, and facilitates individual
participation in the democratic process.
The importance of this right is diminished, however, if it is
inadequately protected under domestic law, or if the rules designed to protect
it are not respected.2  Prior censorship, contempt laws,3 and excessive
subsequent liability for defamation, libel, and slander are examples of
4
measures that seriously infringe upon the right to freedom of expression.
Through the exercise of prior censorship, bureaucracies decide what
individuals can see, read, write, and produce by invoking such justifications
as "national security," "public order," "national morals," "truth in
information," and "personal honor." Since the possibility for abusing prior
censorship is so great, enduring the exaggeration of free debate seems better
than risking censorship's "protective" suffocation.
5
Contempt laws currently in force in seventeen countries in the region
penalize "offensive" expression directed at public officials. Punishing
critics of authority was a logical corollary that affirmed the superior power
of those who exercised it both in absolute monarchies (based on divine right)
and in dictatorships (that repressed alternative views). In a democracy,
however, criticism free from fear of punishment-especially when directed
at authority-reaffims egalitarian principles and ensures that public
2. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression 1998, OEA/ser.LVJII.102, dec. rev. 6, at vol. M, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.orglannualrepf98engVolume%20IIa.htmn (last visited Apr. 4, 2001)
[hereinafter 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur]. The Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression reported that anachronistic legislation exists in many American States relative to
freedom of expression and that such legislation is incompatible with the American Convention
on Human Rights and other international human rights instruments. Id. at ch. II.
3. The phrase "contempt laws" is used to refer to what are known as leyes de
desacato in Spanish. Generally speaking leyes de desacato punish offensive expressions
directed at public officials. Id. at ch. IV, sec. A.
4. Inter-Ar. C.H.R., Report of the Office of the Special Rapporteur for Freedom of
Expression 1999, OEA/ser.L./VAI.106, doc. rev. 6, at vol. m, available at
hup://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99engfVolume3.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2001) [hereinafter
1999 Report of the Special Rapporteur].
5. See generally CoMM. TO PROTECT JOURNAUSTS, at http://www.cpj.org; WORLD
PRESS FREEDOM COMM., at http://www.wpfc.org/charter.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2001).
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officials carry out their duties with transparency and responsibility. 6
Conversely, the threat or imposition of penal sanctions suffocates democracy
and responds to an authoritarian logic that is incompatible with democratic
tenets.
Rather than resort to prior censorship, some nations allow the
subsequent imposition of liability in cases of defamation, libel, and slander.
If such liability-under the guise of defense of honor-is exorbitant,
however, its interference with the free expression of ideas is comparable to
that of prior censorship.7
Any of these measures can seriously affect or even destroy freedom of
expression. They are promulgated within a juridical context that provides
norms under which their application is authorized in certain circumstances.
But such a context is clearly absent when crimes committed against
8journalists-including assassination-go unpunished . This brutal method
of "silencing" journalists--one hundred fifty have been assassinated in the
region during the last ten yearsg-also intimidates nations as a whole by
demonstrating the possible tragic consequences that can result from the free
expression of ideas.10
Freedom of expression is also seriously diminished by such de facto
measures as threats, economic measures that punish or reward the press for
its ideas, and public and private monopolies in information media.1 In
addition, the serious inadequacies of legal protection for freedom of
expression within domestic legal systems reaffirm the need for
international-in this case hemispheric-safeguarding of this fundamental
freedom.
International protection of human rights has developed since World
War II as a consequence of the tragic failure of an international order based
on the principle of absolute sovereignty. As the international protection of
human rights developed, international rules and international institutions
were created to provide a layer of supervision above the domestic
realm. The purpose of this article is to analyze freedom of expression from
the perspective of the rules and institutions that have been created to
6. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. IV, sec. A.
7. Id.
8. Id. at ch. IV, see. C.
9. Id.
10. COMM. TO PROTECT JouRNALUTS, Attacks on the Press in 1999, at http:
//www.cpj.orglattacks99/frameset.att99/rightframe_att99.html (discussing results of
worldwide survey by the Committee to Protect Journalists) (last visited Apr. 4, 2001).
11. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. III.
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supervise human rights in the Western Hemisphere, known as the Inter-
American System for the Protection of Human Rights ("Inter-American
System"). In view of this purpose, this article will discuss the regulatory
framework that applies to freedom of expression in the Inter-American
System by systematizing relevant jurisprudence which, due to its recency,
has not been sufficiently studied and disseminated. The rules that regulate
the right to freedom of expression in the Inter-American System will also be
examined with reference to how the rules have been interpreted by the
organs created to supervise compliance. Finally, this article will outline a
series of measures adopted to achieve full application of the relevant norms.
II. THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF
HUMAN RIGHTS
A. Organs
The Inter-American System is a combination of norms and institutions
that apply to Western Hemisphere nations. The applicable rules consist
principally of the American Convention on Human Rights' 2 ("American
Convention") and the American Declaration on Rights and Duties of Man13
("American Declaration"). The institutions involved are the organs
responsible for supervising compliance with the established rules: the Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights14 ("the Commission") and the
Inter-American Court for Human Rights 5 ("the Court"). In addition to these
supervisory organs, the political organs of the Organization of American
States ("OAS")-consisting of the Permanent Council and the General
Assembly-also share in the responsibility of guaranteeing compliance with
the rules designed to protect human rights, including the right to freedom of
expression.16 The task of guaranteeing protection of human rights, includingcompliance with decisions of the Court and the Commission, falls to the
12. Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 143 [hereinafter American Convention].
13. O.A.S. Official Res., Adopted by the Ninth International Conference of American
States, OEA/ser.LJVJII.23, doe. 21 rev. 6 (1948), available at http:/Iwww.cidh.oas.
orglBasicoslbasic2.htm [hereinafter American Declaration].
14. Inter-Am C.H.R., Annual Report 1998, OEA/ser.LJVJII.102, doe. 6 rev. (1998) at
ch. I available at http://www.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/98eng/Table%2Oof%2OContents.htm
[hereinafter IACHR 1998 Annual Report].
15. O.A.S., Annual Report of the Secretary General 1999-2000, at ch. I, available at
http//www.cidi.oas.org/annualreportOD-e/annualreport99-00-3.htn.
16. Charter of the Organization of American States, Apr. 30, 1948, 2 U.S.T. 2394, 19
U.N.T.S. 3.
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political organs, especially the General Assembly. 7 As a result, the Court
and the Commission submit their reports to the General Assembly for
approval.' 8
To assist in guaranteeing compliance with the rules relative to freedom
of expression, the Commission created a special office dedicated to the
protection of the right to freedom of expression in 1998, called the Special
Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression 19 ("Special Rapporteur").
B. The Juridical Regime
The right to freedom of expression in the Inter-American System is
established in Articles 13 and 14 of the American Convention and in Article
4 of the American Declaration. Article 13 of the American Convention
expressly states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought and expression.
This right includes freedom to seek, receive, and impart
information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either
orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or through any other
medium of one's choice.
2. The exercise of the right provided for in the foregoing
paragraph shall not be subject to prior censorship but shall be
subject to subsequent imposition of liability, which shall be
expressly established by law to the extent necessary to ensure:
a. respect for the rights or reputations of others; or
17. It should be noted that the performance of these organizations relative to
fortifying freedom of expression has been inadequate. See El Sistema Interamericano y los
Derechos Humanos en la Region [The Inter-American System and Human Rights Law in the
Region], in LA LuCHA CONTRA LA POBREZA EN AMERICA LATINA [THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR
IN LATIN AMEICA] (Bemardo Kligsberg ed., 2000).
18. American Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 41, 65. Article 41 provides at section
(g) that the Commission "submit[s] an annual report to the General Assembly of the
Organization of American States." Id. at art. 41. Likewise, Article 65 establishes that in each
regular session "the Court shall submit, for the Assembly's consideration, a report on its work
during the previous year." Id. at art. 65.
19. Summit of the Americas Information Network, Second Summit of the Americas,
Declaration of Santiago, (Apr. 18-19, 1998), available at http://www.sumniit-americas.
org/chiledec.htm. The heads of state participating in the summit affirmed that "a free press
plays a fundamental role in [the area of human rights]," and reaffirmed "the importance of
guaranteeing freedom of expression, information, and opinion." Id. In addition, they
commended "the recent appointment of a Special Rapporteur for Freedom of Expression,
within the framework of the Organization of American States." Id.
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b. the protection of national security, public order, or public
health or morals.
3. The right of expression may not be restricted by indirect
methods or means, such as the abuse of government or private
controls over newsprint, radio broadcasting frequencies, or
equipment used in the dissemination of information, or by any
other means tending to impede the communication and circulation
of ideas and opinions.
4. Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public
entertainments may be subject by law to prior censorship for the
sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral protection
of childhood and adolescence.
5. Any propaganda for war and any advocacy of national, racial, or
religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to
any other similar illegal action against any person or group of
persons on any grounds including those of race, color, religion,
language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses
punishable by law.20
Article 14 adds:
1. Anyone injured by inaccurate or offensive statements or ideas
disseminated to the public in general by a legally regulated medium
of communication has the right to reply or to make a correction
using the same communications outlet, under such conditions as the
law may establish.
2. The correction or reply shall not in any case remit other legal
liabilities that may have been incurred.
3. For the effective protection of honor and reputation, every
publisher, and every newspaper, motion picture, radio, and
television company, shall have a person responsible who is not
protected by immunities or special privileges.
20. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13.
21. Id. at art. 14.
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Finally, Article 4 of the American Declaration provides that "[e]very person
has the right to freedom of investigation, of opinion, and of the expression
and dissemination of ideas, by any medium whatsoever."
22
The American Convention applies to the countries in the Western
Hemisphere that have ratified it. Those countries are Argentina, Barbados,
Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominica, Chile, the Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras,
Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay,
and Venezuela. In contrast, the American Declaration is used in the United
States, Canada, and the following Caribbean countries: Antigua and
Barbuda, the Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Guyana, Saint Kitts, Saint Lucia, Saint
Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.24 This article will
focus on the protections of the right to freedom of expression found in the
American Convention. Although freedom of expression is also a right under
the American Declaration, its formulation therein is more general. As a
result, only the American Convention provides the type of specificity that
permits its content and scope to be established as a fundamental norm of this
important right.
The Commission supervises compliance with the rules through its case
system, country visits, 2recommendations to member States, and through
22. American Declaration, supra note 13, at art. 4.
23. Claudio Grossman, Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System: The
Current Debate, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC. 186, 188 n.8 (1998).
24. Id. at 188 n.9.
25. American Convention, supra note 12, at arts. 44-51. The Commission opens cases
either on its own initiative or in response to petitions filed by individuals affected by the
violation of any right covered by the American Convention. Grossman, supra note 23, at 188.
Once the Commission analyzes a case, it publishes an opinion with respect to the existence of
the alleged violation and offers recommendations to the responsible member State. Id. If the
State does not comply with the recommendation, the Commission may also prepare a second
report and offer the State a second opportunity to comply. Id. If the State still does not
comply, the Commission may publicly reveal the result of the report and its recommendations.
Id. This is the only possibility that exists relative to those States that have not ratified the
American Convention. Id. For States that have ratified the American Convention, the
Commission may opt to either publish the report or present it to the Court within three months
after the first report is approved. Grossman, supra note 23, at 188. When it appears before
the Court, the role of the Commission changes from that of judge to that of complainant. Id.
It acts in the name and in representation of the victim (generally designating the original
complainants as its legal advisers). Id. This case mechanism is one of the most efficient
means available to the Commission to review individual human rights violations. Id.; see also
THOMAS BuERGENTHAL ET AL., PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTs IN THE AMERICAS 97 (1982).
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the activities of the rapporteurs.2 The Court reviews cases presented to it by
the Commission and by member States that have recognized its
competency.29 At present, thirty-eight contentious cases have been brought
by the Commission, and one case has been brought by the government of
Costa Rica. 30  The Court, like the Commission, can adopt preventative
measures in cases where the risk is "grave and imminent."31 To date the
Court has adopted such measures in twenty cases.
32
The Court also prepares "advisory opinions" to interpret human rights
treaties in the Western Hemisphere and to review the compatibility of such
treaties with the domestic laws of member States.33  Fifteen advisory
26. BUERGEMNHAL, supra note 25, at 140. Visits to a particular country are the result
of a formal invitation by the country, which originates either at the request of the political
organs of the OAS, or on the initiative of the country, or the Commission. Grossman, supra
note 23, at 187-88. A country visit is a high visibility event directed at mobilizing public
opinion. The visit is followed by the publication of a report. Id. This type of mechanism is
useful for massive and serious violations of human rights that require swift mobilization of
public opinion. Id.
27. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 41. The Commission also prepares
proposals for declarations and treaties. Grossman, supra note 23, at 187-88.
28. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 41. The Commission has named
work groups and special rapporteurs to confront problems having a "collective component,"
including a work group on prisons along with special rapporteurs on issues concerning women
and indigenous populations, as well as freedom of expression. Grossman, supra note 23, at
189. All of the rapporteurs are members of the Commission except the Special Rapporteur on
Freedom of Expression. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. IV, sec. C.
29. Grossman, supra note 23, at 188. The following countries have recognized the
competency of the Court: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Costa Rica, Chile, the
Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico,
Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Uruguay, and Venezuela. Id. at n.8.
30. For a list of cases resolved or pending before the Court, see Inter-Am. Ct. H.R.,
Series C, Decisions and Judgments, available at http:lwww.corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/cil
PUBLICACIINDICES/SERIES_C.HTM (last visited Feb. 12,2001).
31. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 63(2) (providing that "[i]n cases of
extreme gravity and urgency, and when necessary to avoid irreparable damage to persons, the
Court shall adopt such provisional measures as it deems pertinent in matters it has under
consideration," and "[w]ith respect to a case not yet submitted to the Court, it may act at the
request of the Commission").
32. For a list of these cases, see Inter-Am. CL H.R., Series E, Provisional Measures,
available at http:llwww.corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAC/INDICES/SERIEE.HTM (last
visited Feb. 24, 2001).
33. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 64(1), (2). Article 64 establishes that:
1. The member states of the Organization may consult the Court regarding
the interpretation of this Convention or of other treaties concerning the
protection of human rights in the American states. Within their spheres of
20011
34
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
opinions have been adopted to date.34 The advisory opinions that have been
most important in the area of the right to freedom of expression are Advisory
Opinion OC-05/85, "Compulsory Membership in an Association Prescribed
by Law for the Practice of Journalism" ("Advisory Opinion OC-05/85") 35
and Advisory Opinion OC-07/86, "Enforceability of the Right to Reply or
Correction" ("Advisory Opinion OC-07/86").3 a
The office of the Special Rapporteur was created by the Commission in
1998 to protect and promote freedom of expression in the Americas.37 In
October 2000, the Commission-interpreting the American Convention-
adopted the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression to guide the
activities of the Special Rapporteur.38 The Special Rapporteur's principal
activities include: 1) the preparation of general and specific thematic
reports; 2) the creation of a hemispheric network for the protection of
freedom of expression; 3) visits to OAS member States to observe the
freedom of expression climate; and 4) the promotion of the right to freedom
of expression among OAS members.39 Underscoring the importance that the
Commission places on freedom of expression, its Special Rapporteur works
on a full-time basis.4° Moreover, since the Special Rapporteur is not one of
the seven commissioners who are responsible for the overall supervision of
competence, the organs listed in Chapter X of the Charter of the Organization
of American States, as amended by the Protocol of Buenos Aires, may in like
manner consult the Court.
2. The Court, at the request of a member state of the Organization, may
provide that state with opinions regarding the compatibility of any of its
domestic laws with the aforesaid international instruments.
Id.
34. For a list of the Court's advisory opinions, see Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Series A,
Judgments and Opinions, available at http://www.corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAT/INDICES
/SERIESA.HTM (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
35. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Nov. 13, 1985, Series A, No. 5, available at http://corteidh-
oea-nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAT/SERIES_A/A_5_ING.HTM (last visited Feb. 12, 2001) [herein-
after Advisory Opinion OC-5/85].
36. Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Aug. 29, 1986, Series A, No. 7, available at http://corteidh-
oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAT/SERIESA/A_7_ING.HTM (last visited Feb. 12, 2001) [herein-
after Advisory Opinion OC-07/86].
37. IACHR 1998 Annual Report, supra note 14, at ch. II, sec. 5.
38. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of
Expression, available at http://www.cidh.oas.org/declaration.htm (last visited Feb. 12,2001).
39. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. I, sec. B.
40. IACHR 1998 Annual Report, supra note 14, at ch. II, sec. 5.
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rights protected under the American Convention, the office is dedicated
exclusively to the protection and promotion of freedom of expression.4'
As the following sections of this article illustrate, these organs have
interpreted the scope of the American Convention's rules on freedom of
expression as prohibiting prior censorship and authorizing only subsequent
imposition of liability. In the process, they have established the scope of
permissible restrictions on this right that may apply in emergency situations,
as well as the existence of a right to correction or reply. They have also
repeatedly affirmed that in the Inter-American System there is a strong
connection between the right to freedom of expression and the development
of democracy.
42
1. The Scope of Freedom of Expression
Subsection one of Article 13 of the American Convention establishes
the right of individuals to think and express themselves freely.43 It also
explains exactly what freedom of expression means-"to seek, receive, and
impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers'"--and
emphasizes that the medium used is irrelevant, since expression can be
communicated "either orally, in writing, in print, in the form of art, or
through any other medium of one's choice.""
Both the Court and the Commission have interpreted this provision of
the American Convention. In Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, for example, the
Court considered "whether there is a conflict or contradiction between
compulsory membership in a professional association as a necessary
requirement to practice journalism... and the international norms."45
The Commission, for its part, has interpreted the scope of the right to
freedom of expression in the following cases: Jehovah's Witnesses v.
Argentina Republic,46 Francisco Martorell v. Chile,47 Hector Felix Miranda
41. Id.
42. See generally 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2.
43. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(1).
44. Id.
45. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 11 (referring to Articles 13 and
29 of the American Convention on Human Rights.)
46. Case 2137, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.N.II.47 (1978), available at
httpJ/www.cidh.oas.org/annualrepf78splargentina2l37.htm.
47. Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V./II.95 doc. 7 (1997), available at
http:lwww.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/96eng96ench3k.htm (last visited Feb. 24,2001).
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v. Mexico,48 Juan Pablo Olmedo v. Chile,49 Horacio Verbitsky v. Argentina
Republic,s° Victor Manuel Oropeza v. Mexico,51 and Baruch Ivcher
Bronstein v. Peru.5 2  On February 6, 2001, the Inter-American Court of
Human Rights (to which the Ivcher Bronstein case had been referred by the
Commission) confirmed the Commission's finding that Peru was responsible
for violating Mr. Ivcher's right to freedom of expression.5 The
interpretative work of the Commission and the Court has resulted in the
following characteristics of the scope of freedom of expression in the
context of the Inter-American System.
a. Special Dual Character
The Court has found that freedom of expression possesses a special
dual character, in that it not only involves the right of individuals to express
themselves, but also the right of everyone to receive information and ideas.
5 4
As such, a violation of the right to freedom of expression not only violates
an individual right, but also "a collective right to receive any information
whatsoever and to have access to the thoughts expressed by others. 5
The Commission has also had several opportunities to discuss the dual
character of freedom of expression. In Martorell, where censorship of the
book Impunidad diplomatica [Diplomatic Impunity] was at issue, the
Commission asserted that:
Article 13 establishes a dual right: the right to express thoughts
and ideas, and the right to receive them. Therefore, arbitrary
48. Case 11.739, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L./V.I.102 doe. 6 (1998), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/98englMeritslMexico%2011739.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2001).
49. Case 11.803, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.N.II.102 doe. 6 (1998), available at
http:/lwww.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/98eng/Admissibility/Chile%2011803.htm (last visited Feb.
12, 2001).
50. Case 11.012, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.LJV./II.88 doe. 9 (1995), available at
http:lwww.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/94eng/94ench3.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
51. Case 11.740, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.N./II.106 doe. 6 (1999), available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/annualrep/99engMeritsMexico/I 1.740.htm (last visited Feb. 12,
2001).
52. Case 11.762, Inter-Am. C.H.R., OEA/ser.L.NII.95 doe. 7 (1997), available at
http:lwww.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/97eng97ench3nan.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2001).
53. Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Sentence, Feb. 6, 2001
[hereinater Ivcher Bronstein Sentence] (on file with author).
54. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 30.
55. Id.
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interference that infringes this right affects not just the individual
right to express information and ideas but also the right of the
community as a whole to receive information and ideas of all
kinds 56
Ivcher Bronstein involved an Israeli-born Peruvian citizen-owner of a
television station, whose Peruvian nationality was arbitrarily rescinded in
order to deprive him ownership of the station that had regularly criticized
governmental abuses. The Commission asserted it was clear that the social
character of the right of freedom of expression has both an individual
perspective as well as a much broader one, protecting and covering all those
who seek out and receive information or opinions emitted by journalists.5 7
As such, all of society is the victim in the case of a violation of freedom of
expression.58
The dual character of freedom of expression was reiterated by the
Commission in the Oropeza case, where a Mexican journalist was
assassinated for allegedly criticizing government authorities in his
newspaper column, which included references to links between the police
and drug trafficking.59 The Commission affirmed that freedom of expression
is a universal legal concept that ensures individuals and the community are
able to express, transmit, receive or disseminate thoughts, and, in parallel
and correlative form, that freedom to inform oneself is universal and
involves the collective right to receive information communicated by others
without interference or distortion. 0
b. Indivisibility of Expression and Dissemination
In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed the following:
[E]xpression and dissemination of ideas and information are
indivisible concepts. This means that restrictions that are imposed
on dissemination represent, in equal measure, a direct limitation on
the right to express oneself freely. The importance of the legal
56. Martorell, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 53.
57. Ivcher Bronstein, Case 11.762, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 31.
58. See generally Ivcher Bronstein Sentence, supra note 53.
59. Oropeza, Case 11.740, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 2.
60. Id. at para. 51 (citing Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1980-1981,
OEA/ser.LJVJII, at 122).
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rules applicable to the press and to the status of those who dedicate
themselves professionally to it derives from this concept.61
It added that "[f]or the average citizen it is just as important to know the
opinions of others or to have access to information generally as is the very
right to impart his own opinions." 62
In Martorell, the Commission determined:
[T]he decision to ban the entry, circulation and distribution of the
book Impunidad diplomatica in Chile violates the right to impart
"information and ideas of all kinds," a right that Chile is bound to
respect as a State party to the American Convention. In other
words, the decision is an unlawful restriction of the right to
freedom of expression, in the form of an act of prior censorship
disallowed by Article 13 of the Convention.63
In Miranda, the co-director of a Mexican weekly publication was
assassinated for authoring and publishing opinions critical of the
government." The Commission declared that freedom of thought and of
expression under Inter-American jurisprudence involves the freedom to
voice and disseminate ideas, as well as the complimentary freedom that
every citizen has to receive such information without illegal or unjustified
interference.6 5
c. Irrelevance of Medium Employed
The American Convention provides that freedom of thought and of
expression includes the right to disseminate information and ideas by any
means.6 In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed that "freedom
of expression... cannot be separated from the right to use whatever medium
is deemed appropriate to impart ideas and to have them reach as wide an
audience as possible. 6 7  For its part, the Commission asserted in the
complaint it filed in the lvcher Bronstein case that the American Convention
61. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 31.
62. Id. at para. 32.
63. Martorell, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 59.
64. Miranda, Case 11.739, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para. 3.
65. Id. at para. 48.
66. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(1).
67. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 31.
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consecrates the right to disseminate information and ideas in artistic form or
by any other means.
68
d. Protection of Individual Ideas and Those of Others
In protecting freedom of expression, no distinction is made between
protecting an individual's ideas and those of third parties. Protection is
afforded to the expression of opinions, thoughts, and ideas of all kinds,
without distinguishing whether they are one's own thoughts or those of
others. The Commission explained its position with respect to this point in
its complaint before the Inter-American Court of Human Rights in the Ivcher
Bronstein case. It asserted that Article 13 reflects a broad interpretation of
freedom of expression and personal autonomy, the object of which is to
protect and foment access to information, ideas, and expressions of all types,
in order to fortify the democratic process.69 Respect for these freedoms is
not limited to allowing the circulation of "acceptable" opinions and ideas.70
The duty not to interfere with the voicing of opinions and the dissemination
of information, as well as the enjoyment of the right to access information of
all types, extends to the circulation of information and opinions, and does
not require the personal approval of whomever represents the authority of
the state in a given moment.
e. Multiplicity of Forms of Expression
The right to freedom of expression is not limited to verbal expression;
all types of expression are protected, including silence.72 An example of the
juridically established scope of the protection is found in the case of
Jehovah's Witnesses. In 1976, the Argentine military dictatorship
promulgated Decree No. 1867/76, which prohibited the public exercise of
the Jehovah's Witness religion in Argentina.74 The government alleged the
religion was based on principles contrary to the Argentine nationality and
68. Baruch Ivcher Bronstein v. Peru, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., Complaint of the Inter-Am.
C.H.R. at 27 [hereinafter Ivcher Bronstein Complaint] (on file with author).
69. Id.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(1).
73. Jehovah's Witnesses, Case 2137, Inter-Am. C.H.R. (1978).
74. Id.
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basic state institutions.75 As a result of the decree, followers of the religion
76
were persecuted. More than three hundred children were expelled from
school after being accused of refusing to swear allegiance to the country or
to sing the Argentine national anthem, opting instead for silence because
their reliion prohibited them from engaging in such veneration of national
symbols. Pursuant to Resolution No. 02/79, the Commission condemned
the action of the Argentine government, which it considered to be
responsible for the alleged violations.
78
f. Exclusion of Direct and Indirect Restrictions
Subsection three of Article 13 of the American Convention prohibits
restrictions on freedom of expression that are carried out by indirect means
designed to impede communication. 79 The Ivcher Bronstein case provides
an example of an indirect restriction on freedom of expression. As discussed
above, this important case was initiated based on a decision of the Peruvian
government that deprived the majority shareholder and director of Peruvian
television channel Frecuencia Latina-Canal 2 [Latin Frequency-Channel 2]
of his Peruvian nationality because the channel broadcast various reports of
human rights violations by the Fujimori government.8s Because foreigners
could not own television or radio stations in Peru, the revocation of Ivcher
Bronstein's Peruvian citizenship resulted in his forced withdrawal from the
directorship of the channel. The new owners fired the journalists who had
produced critical programs and ceased the broadcast of negative news about
the Peruvian government. 8' The Commission decided the case on December
9, 1998, finding that the right to freedom of expression was violated and
recommended that Peru immediately reinstate Bronstein's Peruvian
citizenship.8 2 In the face of the government's refusal to comply, the case
was presented to the Court on March 31, 1999 and, as stated above, the
Court confirmed the Commission's decision that Peru was responsible for
83violating Bronstein's rights.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Jehovah's Witnesses, Case 2137, Inter-Am C.H.R.
79. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(3).
80. See generally Ivcher Bronstein Complaint, supra note 68.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. See generally Ivcher Bronstein Sentence, supra note 53.
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g. Incompatibility of Public and Private Monopolies in Information Media
with Freedom of Expression
'The existence of public and private monopolies impedes the
dissemination of individual ideas as well as the reception of the opinions of
others. As a result, the existence of monopolies in the communications
industry is inconsistent with freedom of expression. Both the Court and the
Commission have affirmed this. In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court
stated the following:
If freedom of expression requires, in principle, that the
communication media are potentially open to all without
discrimination or, more precisely, that there be no individuals or
groups that are excluded from access to such media, it must be
recognized also that such media should, in practice, be true
instruments of that freedom and not vehicles for its restriction. It is
the mass media that make the exercise of freedom of expression a
reality. This means that the conditions of its use must conform to
the requirements of this freedom, with the result that there must be,
inter alia, a plurality of means of communication, the barring of all
monopolies thereof, in whatever form, and guarantees for the
protection of the freedom and independence ofjournalists.8
In Ivcher Bronstein the Commission affirmed the free circulation of
ideas is only conceivable where there are multiple sources of information as
well as respect for the communications mdia. It explained it is not enough
to guarantee the right to found or direct organs dedicated to public opinion;
it is also necessary that journalists and all those professionals working in the
communications media be able to do so with the protections that the free and
independent exercise of this work require.86
2. Prohibition of Prior Censorship
One of the principal characteristics of the protection of freedom of
expression in the Inter-American System is that it does not allow prior
censorship. Subsection two of Article 13 of the Convention provides that
84. Advisory Opinion OC-5/85, supra note 35, at para. 34 (emphasis omitted).
85. Ivcher Bronstein Complaint, supra note 68, at 28.
86. Id.
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freedom of expression cannot be restricted a priori by any means or under
any excuse without being subject to the subsequent imposition of liability.
This prohibition on prior censorship implies an acknowledgment that
there is a danger in creating "filters" to decide what individuals can hear,
see, or read. Such a danger does not simply disappear when specific rules
that permit prior censorship in certain cases are adopted, and justifications
like "national security," "morality," or "good habits" are easily used as
pretexts to eliminate or seriously limit the free expression of ideas.
Certainly, this danger is even greater when the domestic agencies are in
charge of prior censorship. In an attempt to limit this danger, the European
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms
("European Convention") was adopted in 1953 shortly after the end of
World War 11. The European Convention allowed prior censorship but
established an organ charged with supervising the validity of freedom of
expression and the application of prior censorship in certain enumerated
situations.8 In practice, European organizations have been reluctant to
apply prior censorship norms, signaling a broad interpretation of freedom of
expression which minimizes the censorship option.89
87. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(2).
88. Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 222 (entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter
European Convention]. Article 10 states:
1. Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. This right shall include
freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas
without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. This
article shall not prevent States from requiring the licensing of broadcasting,
television or cinema enterprises.
2. The exercise of these freedoms, since it carries with it duties and
responsibilities, may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or
penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society,
in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the
protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure
of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and
impartiality of the judiciary.
Id. at art. 10.
89. See, e.g., 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. II, sec. B(3)
(citing Sunday Times Case, Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) (1979) and discussing how, in interpreting
Article 10 of the European Convention, the European Court for Human Rights "concluded
that 'necessary,' while not synonymous with 'indispensable,' implied 'the existence of a
'pressing social need' and that for a restriction to be 'necessary' it is not enough to show that
it is 'useful,' 'reasonable' or 'desireable').
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In the Western Hemisphere, both the Court and the Commission have
had the opportunity to interpret matters involving the prohibition on prior
censorship, from which the following characteristics are evident.
a. Defense of Honor is Excluded as a Basis for Prior Censorship
In Martorell, the Commission affirmed that subsequent imposition of
liability was the only restriction authorized by the American Convention to
protect society from offensive opinions, as well as limiting the abusive
exercise of this right.90 The Commission reiterated its interpretation of
Article 13 in the Olmedo case, also brought against Chile. The case involves
prior censorship of the movie The Last Temptation of Christ, and a decision
in the case is pending.91 Also awaiting judgment before the Commission is a
third Chilean case in which the book The Black Book of Chilean Justice by
Alejandra Matus was confiscated and its distribution banned. 92
According to the Special Rapporteur's 1998 report:
When legislating the protection of honor and dignity referred to in
Article 11 of the American Convention-and when applying the
relevant provisions of domestic law on this subject-States Parties
have an obligation to respect the right of freedom of expression.
Prior censorship, regardless of its form, is contrary to the system
that Article 13 of the Convention guarantees.
93
In Martorell, the Commission also expressed its opinion on the duty to
protect the right to honor and dignity and its possible conflict with the right
to freedom of expression. The government of Chile and the Chilean
judiciary maintained that in the event of a conflict between Articles 11 and
13 of the American Convention, the former must prevail.94 The Commission
rejected this theory, and advanced its interpretation that the rights included
in those two articles of the American Convention do not.present a conflict of
different principles from which one would have to choose. 95 Accordingly,
the Commission quoted the European Court which, in a similar case,
considered .'it was faced not with a choice between conflicting principles,
one of which is freedom of expression, but with a principle of freedom of
90. Martorell, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at para 55.
91. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. II, sec. C.
92. Id. atch. Il.
93. Id. at ch. II, sec. B(5).
94. Martorell, Case 11.230, Inter-Am. C.H.R., at paras. 60-75.
95. Id.
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expression that is subject to a number of exceptions which must be narrowly
interpreted."' 96
b. Authorized Exceptions
Without prejudicing its overall prohibition on prior censorship, the
American Convention permits the following exceptions: 1) censorship of
public entertainment for the exclusive purpose of regulating access to such
events to protect the morals of children and adolescents; 97 and 2) prohibition
of propaganda promoting war or advocating racial, moral, or religious hatred
which incites violence toward individuals or groups. 98 These exceptions,
however, are only permitted within the framework of the Inter-American
System if they conform to the requirements of legality, necessity, reality or
imminence, or valid purpose.
In order to conform to the legality requirement, the exception must be
authorized by law, in the event that decrees or other administrative measures
prove insufficient. The requirement of necessity implies an evaluation of
the pertinence of the measure on a case-by-case basis in order to exclude
improperly motivated prohibitions. If a State can give the required
protection through the police force or if there is no imminent danger, the
restriction on freedom of expression will not satisfy the requirement of
necessity. The reality or imminence requirement refers to measures that are
adopted in light of actually existing conditions or conditions that are certain
to occur, not mere hypothetical situations which might affect the morals of
children or adolescents (in public entertainments) or which incite violence in
terms of Article 13. The valid purpose exception corresponds to cases
involving children where protection of morals is at issue, while in the case of
advocacy of war or racial or religious hatred the protection at issue is that of
individuals or groups at whom the violence is directed.
96. Id. at para. 71, n.5 (quoting Sunday Times Case, Eur. Ct. H.R., (ser. A) (1979)).
97. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(4) (providing that
"[n]otwithstanding the provisions of paragraph 2 above, public entertainments may be subject
by law to prior censorship for the sole purpose of regulating access to them for the moral
protection of childhood and adolescence").
98. Id. at art. 13(5) (providing that "[any propaganda for war and any advocacy of
national, racial, or religious hatred that constitute incitements to lawless violence or to any
other similar action against any person or group of persons on any grounds including those of
race, color, religion, language, or national origin shall be considered as offenses punishable by
law").
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3. The Impact of Situations of Emergency on Freedom of Expression
The regulation of emergency situations is of great importance to the
protection of rights in general, and to the protection of freedom of
expression in particular. Emergency situations-where it is argued that a
threat exists against the life of the nation itself-permit certain restrictions
on rights, including the right of freedom of expression.
In the Western Hemisphere-for many reasons, among them political
instability-emergency situations have been abused. As a result, the
American Convention has regulated the exception extensively. Article 27 of
this Convention establishes the conditions that must exist in order for an
emergency to be declared, the rights that can never be suspended in such a
situation, and the requirements that must be met to suspend other rights.9
The enumerated conditions under which such an emergency can be declared
are strict, specifically: the declaration must be preceded by an event of
99. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 27. Article 27 provides as follows:
1. In time of war, public danger, or other emergency that threatens the
independence or security of a State Party, it may take measures derogating
from its obligations under the present Convention to the extent and for the
period of time strictly required by the exigencies of the situation, provided
that such measures are not inconsistent with its other obligations under
international law and do not involve discrimination on the ground of race,
color, sex, language, religion, or social origin.
2. The foregoing provision does not authorize any suspension of the
following articles: Article 3 (Right to Juridical Personality), Article 4 (Right
to Life), Article 5 (Right to Humane Treatment), Article 6 (Freedom from
Slavery), Article 9 (Freedom from Ex Post Facto Laws), Article 12 (Freedom
of Conscience and Religion), Article 17 (Rights of the Family), Article 18
(Right to a Name), Article 19 (Rights of the Child), Article 20 (Right to
Nationality), and Article 23 (Right to Participate in Government), or of the
judicial guarantees essential for the protection of such rights.
3. Any State Party availing itself of the right of suspension shall immediately
inform the other States Parties, through the Secretary General of the
Organization of American States, of the provisions the application of which it
has suspended, the reasons that gave rise to the suspension, and the date set
for the termination of such suspension.
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exceptional seriousness that affects in a real or imminent way the continued
existence of the State as a whole.'00
Article 27 also specifies that certain rights cannot be temporarily
removed in any event, and others that can only be limited as authorized by
the American Convention, provided that certain conditions listed in the
treaty are met. 01 The requirements prescribed by the American Convention
for the temporary suspension of rights-including freedom of expression-
are: 1) necessity (there must be absolutely no other possible alternatives in
the case at hand); 2) temporariness (suspensions of rights are valid strictly
for the amount of time required); 3) proportionality (measures cannot
constitute an excessive reaction on the part of the authorities in light of the
existing emergency); 4) compatibility (with other duties imposed by
international law); 5) non-discrimination; and 6) compliance with the law by
the authorities (since the temporary suspension of rights supposes actions by
authorities consistent with the law declared for reasons of general interest
and for the purpose for which they were established). 0 2 In this setting, the
invocation of an emergency to limit freedom of expression requires a case-
by-case analysis to ensure compliance with the legal requirements which
authorize the limitation.
4. Subsequent Liability
The Inter-American system's prohibition on prior censorship does not
exclude the subsequent imposition of liability. But when subsequent
liability is of an exaggerated degree, it effectively "gags" individuals who
are faced with the threat of serious "retaliation" for expressing their
opinions. Consequently, the American Convention establishes specific
requirements tied to the validity of subsequent liability. These requirements
are: 1) legality; 2) democratic legitimacy; 3) necessity; 4) proportionality;
5) subjective content; 6) differentiation between opinions based on facts and
value judgments; 7) preclusion of liability for reproduction of information;
and 8) incompatibility with contempt laws.
100. Id.; see also Claudio Grossman, Situaciones de Emergencia en el Hemisferio
Occidental Propuestas Para Fortalecer la Proteccion de Derechos Humanos, in DEEC-o
CONSTrIUCIONALCOMPARADo MEXICO-ESTADOS UNiDos 175 (James Frank Smith ed., 1990).
101. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 27; see also Claudio Grossman, El
Regimen Hemisferico Sobre Situaciones de Emergencia, 1993 SERvICIO EDITORIAL DEL
INSTITUTO INTERAMERICANO DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 155.
102. Id.
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a. Legality
Article 13 of the American Convention provides that the subsequent
imposition of liability should be "expressly established by law."'03 This is
confirmed in Article 30 which provides the restrictions that "may be placed
on the enjoyment or exercise of the rights or freedoms recognized [in the
American Convention] may not be applied except in accordance with the
purpose for which such restrictions have been established."' 4  In its
Advisory Opinion OC-6/86, "The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the
American Convention on Human Rights," the Court held that the criteria of
Article 30 are applicable in all cases in which the word "law" or a similar
phrase is used by the American Convention for the purpose of the
restrictions which the Court itself authorizes with respect to each one of the
protected rights. 05
Different consequences arise from this concept of legality. First, the
norm that prohibits a given action cannot have a hierarchy inferior to that of
the norm that recognizes the right, for example, a decree or an ordinance can
not narrow a constitutional protection. Second, there is a prohibition on
retroactive application, based on the notion that no one can be responsible
for conduct that, when undertaken, was not illegal.
b. Democratic Legitimacy
Article 13 requires that in order for the imposition of subsequent
liability to be valid under the Convention, the ends sought to be achieved
must be legitimate. 0 6 In Advisory Opinion-05/85, the Court affirmed that
this principle should be understood as one requiring public authorities to
conduct themselves in strict conformity with the constitutional and legal
requirements. 107 Moreover, the principle of legality is inseparably linked tothat of legitimacy. In the Western Hemisphere, legitimacy requires the
103. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13.
104. Id. at art. 30; see also Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., The Word "Laws" in Article 30 of the
American Convention on Human Rights, May 9, 1986, Series A, No. 6, available at
http:llwww.corteidh-oea.nu.or.cr/ci/PUBLICAT/SERIES_A/A_6_ING.htm [hereinafter Advi-
sory Opinion OC-06186].
105. Advisory Opinion OC-06/86, supra note 104, at para. 17.
106. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13.
107. Advisory Opinion OC-06186, supra note 104.
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effective exercise of representative democracy, including, inter alia, respect
for divergent views.'08
c. Necessity
Article 10 of the European Convention for the Protection of Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms uses the expression "necessary in a democratic
society," while Article 13 of the American Convention omits those specific
terms. 0 9  In Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, the Court sustained that this
difference in terminology is not relevant since the European Convention
does not contain any provision comparable with Article 29 of the American
Convention.110 As a consequence, the "necessity" of subsequent liability
will depend upon whether it is oriented towards satisfying a compelling
public interest within the framework of representative democracy. Among
the options that may be used to meet this objective, the most closely tailored
one should be chosen."' Finally, whether "public order," "public morals,"
"national security," "public health," or some other concept is invoked to
establish subsequent liability, such expressions should be subject to an
interpretation strictly tied to the "just demands" of "a democratic society,"
that of course include freedom of expression.
d. Proportionality
Subsequent liability should be in proportion to the end sought, whether
the end is to assure respect for individual rights or the reputation of third
parties, protection of national security, public order, or public health or
morals. This requirement has great importance, since excessive fines,
detention, and imprisonment can have the same chilling effect as prior
108. Id.
109. Id. at para. 45.
110. Id at para. 44. Clauses c) and d) of Article 29 the American Convention provide
as follows:
No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as:
c) precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human
personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of
government; or
d) excluding or limiting the effect that the American Declaration of the Rights
and Duties of Man and other international acts of the same nature may have.
Id. at art. 29(c), (d).
111. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 46.
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censorship. What can be gathered from this is that respect for freedom of
expression is not only assured by prohibitions on prior censorship and the
adoption of subsequent liability, but also that the imposition of these
sanctions must be coherent and proportional to the punished conduct.
e. Subjective Content
The subsequent imposition of liability requires the existence of "actual
malice," which implies acting with intent (positive intention to violate the
facts) or with serious negligence (having been able to foresee the falsity of
the facts).112  In its report on contempt, the Commission indirectly
established the requirement for the existence of "actual malice" when it
noted the exception that truth (exceptio veritatis) when used as a defense is
insufficient to protect freedom of expression." 3 This exception requires the
journalist involved to prove the defense, thus effectively placing the burden
of proof on the defendant,' when, in the opinion of the Commission, the
burden of proof should be placed on the plaintiff, not on the defendant.
15
f. Differentiation Between Opinions of Fact and Value Judgments
If there were liability for expressing value judgments, freedom of
expression would be seriously curtailed. In effect, value judgments imply
that each individual has a right to express opinions and interpretations that
he or she believes. This type of expression is protected in broad terms by
Article 13, which asserts that freedom of expression involves "the freedom
to seek, receive, and impart information and ideas of all kinds."'"6
Value judgments, since they are subjective, do not create liability
because they do not assert facts. They are simply subjective opinions which
individuals can freely determine to be valid or invalid. In the system created
by the American Convention, there is an explicit right not only to "receive"
information but also to "disseminate" opinions." 7 If subsequent imposition
of liability were permitted in the case of the dissemination of value
judgments, it would not only inhibit the person who expresses the opinion,
112. 1999 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 4, at ch. II, sec. B(l)(a).
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. See id.
116. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(1).
117. Id. atart. 13(l),(2).
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but also debate that allows different opinions to be expressed, a form of
expression that enhances society.
g. Exclusion of Liability for Reproduction of Information
The need to exclude liability for the reproduction of the opinions of
third parties is undeniable. To hold those who reproduce the opinions of
third parties liable would seriously limit freedom of expression, since it
would force those who reproduce the opinions of others to set up verification
systems to assure the veracity of each opinion. These verification systems
would prove to be notoriously onerous for a complex and diverse society
where a vast influx of information proceeds from divergent sources. It
should be noted, however, that within the framework of the American
Convention, the exclusion of liability for reproducing the opinions of third
parties does not, of course, imply curtailing the liability of the individual
who made such statements in the first place.
h. Incompatibility of Contempt Laws with the American Convention
Seventeen OAS member states still have contempt laws that provide
punishment for offensive expressions directed at public officials in the
fulfillment of their duties.1 8 The Commission has emphatically decreed that
such laws are incompatible with freedom of expression, both through its case
system as well as in its Report on the Compatibility of "Desacato"
[Contempt] Laws with the American Convention on Human Rights ("Report
on Contempt Laws").119
In the Verbitsky case, an Argentine journalist was sentenced to one
month in prison after being found guilty of contempt when he published an
article in the newspaper Pdgina 12 [Page 12] in which he referred to an
Argentine Supreme Court justice as "disgusting."12  Subsequent to the
rejection of his appeal, Verbitsky brought a complaint before. the
118. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. IV, sec. A (noting that
the countries that have contempt laws are Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Costa Rica, Cuba, Ecuador,
El Salvador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, the Dominican
Republic, Uruguay, and Venezuela).
119. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1994, at ch. V available at http://www.
cidh.oas.orgfannualrep/94eng/94ench5.htm [hereinafter Report on Contempt Laws].
120. Verbitsky, Case 11.012, Inter-Am C.H.R., at para. 1. The English version of the
case points out that the Spanish word used in Verbitsky's article was "asqueroso" and explains
that the term can mean either disgusting or disgusted. Id.
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Commission.12' After several meetings, the parties arrived at a common
proposal for friendly settlement, which was successfully fulfilled when the
sentence against Verbitsky was revoked and all its effects were annulled, and
when the contempt statute was abolished. 12 The Commission accepted this
friendly settlement since it met the Commission's requirement that such
agreements protect human rights in conformity with the American
Convention.123
In its Report on Contempt Laws, the Commission stated that contempt
laws contradict the principle that a properly functioning democracy is the
best guarantee of social harmony and the rule of law, and contempt laws,
when applied, directly affect the type of open debate guaranteed by Article
13 that is essential to the existence of a democratic society.12 Moreover,
invoking the concept of social harmony to justify contempt laws goes
directly against the logic that sustains freedom of expression and thought.125
The Commission emphasized critical expressions not related to an official's
position may be subject to civil liability for slander and defamation, just as is
the case with other citizens.126
For his part, the Special Rapporteur stated in his 1998 report that "[tihe
contempt laws seek to avoid debate as well as the scrutiny or criticism of
state officials," and that "contempt laws, instead of protecting freedom of
expression or [sic] civil servants limit freedom of expression and weaken the
democratic system."1 27
121. Id. at para. 3.
122. Id. at paras. 18-20.
123. Id. at para. 20.
124. Report on Contempt Laws, supra note 119, at sec. 4(B).
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at ch. IV, sec. A. In a press
release, the Special Rapporteur stated his opposition to a court decision in Argentina that
sentenced the journalist Eduardo Kimmel to one year in jail and a fine. Office of the Special
Reporter for Freedom of Expression, Inter-Am. C.H.R., Press Release, PREN/8/99, available
at www.cidh.oas.orgIRelatoria/Spanish/ComPrensa8.htm. He reminded that the Court has
stated that in a democratic society, political and public figures should be more open to public
scrutiny and criticism, and that open debate, which is crucial to a democratic society, must
necessarily include those persons who participate in the creation or the application of public
policy. Id. Since these individuals are at the center of public debate and are knowingly
exposed to public scrutiny, they must display greater tolerance toward criticism. Id.
The United Nations Rapporteurs for Freedom of Expression for the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe, and the OAS Special Rapporteur stated in a joint
resolution that laws exist in many countries, such as contempt laws, that unduly limit the right
to freedom of expression, and they prevailed upon the States to amend those laws in order to
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5. The Right to Access Information
The right to access information is fundamental to the ongoing
development of democracy. This right is found in subsection one of Article
13 of the American Convention, which provides that the right to freedom of
expression includes the freedom to seek out and receive information of all
kinds.'28
With respect to this issue, the Court has noted that "a society that is not
well informed is not a society that is truly free.' 29 Restrictions on access to
information held by public or private institutions (e.g., credit institutions)
must be "judged by reference to the legitimate needs of democratic societies
and institutions.,,130 This implies that the existence of an absolute
prohibition on access to information is incompatible with the American
Convention. Although limited restrictions are possible (e.g., national
security), as with other exceptions, they should be narrowly constructed and
subject to judicial review in all cases.
To guarantee the right of access to information, the Special Rapporteur
has proposed as a remedy the writ of habeas data.1 Although neither the
Commission nor the Court has yet interpreted what form the proposed
remedy will take, this fact does not in any way prevent the actual exercise of
the right to access information in the hands of government or private entities.
6. The Right of Correction and Reply
Having established freedom of expression and thought in Article 13, the
American Convention provides for a right of correction and reply in Article
14.132 In Advisory Opinion OC-07/86 the Court asserted:
The inescapable relationship between these articles can be deduced
from the nature of the rights recognized therein since, in regulating
the application of the right of reply or correction, the States Parties
must respect the right of freedom of expression guaranteed by
Article 13. They may not, however, interpret the right of freedom
bring them in line with their international obligations. 1999 Report of the Special Rapporteur,
supra note 4, at Annex 2.
128. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 13(1).
129. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 70.
130. Id. at para. 42.
131. 1999 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 4, at ch. II, sec. B(3).
132. American Convention, supra note 12, at art. 14.
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of expression so broadly as to negate the right of reply proclaimed
by Article 14(1).'
The Court added that the right to reply guarantees respect for freedom of
expression in both its individual and shared dimensions:
In the individual dimension, the right of reply or correction
guarantees that a party injured by inaccurate or offensive
statements has the opportunity to express his views and thoughts
about the injurious statements. In the social dimension, the right of
reply or correction gives every person in the community the benefit
of new information that contradicts or disagrees with the previous
inaccurate or offensive statements. In this manner, the right of
reply or correction permits the re-establishment of a balance of
information, an element which is necessary to the formation of a
true and correct public opinion. The formation of public opinion
based on true information is indispensable to the existence of a
vital democratic society.
134
While the Court has not had the opportunity to apply the law of correction to
a contentious case, its Advisory Opinion OC-07/86 confirms certain
elements of this right. It is important to reiterate that the right of correction
cannot legitimately include value judgments. It should also be noted that
there are many ways of expressing opinions, so assuring correction by the
same means (e.g., location, size, format) inadequately protects freedom of
expression.
7. The Link Between Freedom of Expression and Democracy
Both the Court and the Commission have established that there is an
inherent link between freedom of expression and democracy. 35 In Advisory
Opinion OC-05/85, the Court affirmed:
133. Advisory Opinion OC-07/86, supra note 36, at para. 25.
134. Id. at Separate Opinion of Judge Hector Gros Espiell, at para. 5.
135. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Annual Report 1999, OEA/ser.LJV./II.106 doc. 6 rev. at vol. II,
Annex 5 (1999) [hereinafter IACHR 1999 Annual Report], available at http:ll
www.cidh.oas.orglannualrep/99eng.htm. The Declaration of Chapultepec, drafted by the
Inter-American Press Society and adhered to by several member countries, affirms that the
battle for freedom of expression and of the press, by whatever means, is an essential cause of
democracy and of civilization in the hemisphere. Id.
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Freedom of expression is a cornerstone upon which the very
existence of a democratic society rests. It is indispensable for the
formation of public opinion. It is also a conditio sine qua non for
the development of political parties, trade unions, scientific and
cultural societies and, in general, those who wish to influence the
public. It represents, in short, the means that enable the
community, when exercising its options, to be sufficiently
informed. Consequently, it can be said that a society that is not
well informed is not a society that is truly free. 36
In his 1998 Annual Report, the Special Rapporteur stated:
Freedom of expression certainly holds a prominent position among
the different requirements for a participatory and stable democracy.
If it does not exist, it becomes impossible to develop the other
elements needed to deepen democracy. Thus, freedom of
expression has often been said to be the fundamental freedom
underlying the very existence of democratic society.137
In concluding the report, the Special Rapporteur asserted, "[c]onsolidation of
democracy in the hemisphere is closely related to freedom of expression.
When freedom of expression is limited, the development of democracy is
interrupted, since the free debate of ideas and opinion among citizens is
impeded.'
The link between freedom of expression and democracy has been part
of a development process, within the context of the OAS, that membership in
the Organization is only open to democratic states. An important milestone
in this process was reached when OAS Resolution 1080 was adopted in
Santiago, Chile in 1991.139 This resolution allows a series of measures to be
adopted in cases where the constitutional process of a country breaks
down.' 40
136. Advisory Opinion OC-05/85, supra note 35, at para. 70.
137. 1998 Report of the Special Rapporteur, supra note 2, at Introduction.
138. ld. at ch. V.
139. O.A.S. Res. 1080 (XXI-O/91), Adopted at the Fifth Plenary Session, June 5, 1991,
available at http:llwww.oas.orgjuridico/englishlagreslO80.htm.
140. Id.
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III. CONCLUSION
The interpretation of the American Convention by both the Court and
the Commission confirms the existence of a legal framework in the Inter-
American System designed to protect freedom of expression. The
application of the regional framework to specific cases, illustrates the scope
of this important freedom as a cornerstone of democracy. Achieving
complete freedom of expression in the Western Hemisphere requires that
States fully comply with existing regional norms and that they integrate them
into domestic law. Such compliance and integration constitutes adherence to
the obligations that member States freely contracted to meet through
ratification of the American Convention. To fully meet their obligations,
States should implement the following policies.
First, slander, libel, and defamation should be decriminalized. Within
the framework of a participatory society, the interchange of ideas in political
debate is a fundamental mechanism by which full exercise of freedom of
expression can be attained. Slander, libel, and defamation laws have been
used to chill this mechanism, arguing, in the case of "offended" authorities,
that they exercise a public function. This stance is contrary to the principles
established in Article 13 of the American Convention. Moreover, civil
action is an alternative that provides sufficient protection to those who are
subjected to intentional attacks on their honor or reputation, and limits
disproportionate subsequent liability.
Second, Article 13 of the American Convention establishes that prior
censorship is incompatible with full freedom of expression, and strictly
enumerates the circumstances in which it can be applied. Strict compliance
with permissible exceptions is fundamental to prevent the conversion of the
exception into the general rule, taking into account that the exceptions exist
only for use in specific cases, since the general principle is full freedom of
expression.
Third, public and private monopolies in information media should not
be permitted. As this article illustrates, the existence of public and private
monopolies works against the creation of an atmosphere that allows for the
interchange of diverse opinions. To achieve this objective, anti-monopolistic
laws should be developed and strictly enforced.
Fourth, access to information should be guaranteed. The creation of
domestic laws that guarantee free access to information in the hands of
government and private organizations is fundamental to achieving full
protection of freedom of expression. Since the initial phase of creating rules
and establishing their normative context has already been achieved, the
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challenge now is the full application of those rules and norms. In this new
phase of international supervision, the system requires a combination of
measures that will assure the effectiveness of the Special Rapporteur,
provide training to civil servants, judges, and journalists, provide for the
adoption of urgent measures (in cases of possible irreparable harm),
strengthen the case system, and provide for increased action by political
organs.
There are a number of ways these objectives can be achieved. One way
is by allowing the Special Rapporteur to visit countries where freedom of
expression is seriously threatened without the need to seek prior permission
or receive an invitation from the State. Another is to finance the office of
the Special Rapporteur to guarantee that it has sufficient resources to
function properly. In addition, lawyers and judges should be trained to
invoke and apply international norms in domestic law. This training in both
the jurisprudence and procedure of the Inter-American System can play a
preventive role by fostering internal remedies without the need to involve
international organs.
The Commission should also adopt preventive measures in the case of
threats against journalists. If the measures are not applied, the cases should
be submitted immediately to the Court in order to raise international
awareness of this type of threat. All cases involving freedom of expression
should be taken to the Court if the State involved does not accept the
opinions and recommendations of the Commission. This will open more
possibilities for enforcing compliance with international norms. Finally, the
OAS political organs should adopt measures directed at States that do not
comply with decisions of the Commission and the Court on freedom of
expression issues. The political organs, at a minimum, should place these
issues on the agenda and discuss them, and also adopt measures of a political
nature to promote this freedom, for example, suspension from participation
in the organization.
There is an ongoing debate about which rights are most important.
Regardless of whether non-derogable rights or economic, social, cultural,
civil, or political rights take precedence, the discussion itself is only possible
if the right to freedom of expression exists. Accordingly, full respect for this
freedom in the Western Hemisphere must be guaranteed.
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A Conversation with Dr. Hanan Ashrawi*
Introduction: Dr. Ashrawi was the official spokesperson at the Madrid
Peace Process (also known as the Madrid Conference) for the Palestinian
Delegation and will speak about those issues and whatever issues you would
like to talk about.'
Dr. Ashrawi: Anything you are interested in, I would be glad to address,
related of course, to what I have been doing. I am not going to address the
latest space explorations, but I am quite willing to be diverse in talking about
the Middle East Peace Process, how it started, the issues of Palestinian-
Israeli realities, regional realities, questions related to human rights and
democracy in the region, and developments in our part of the world. So, I do
not know if you want me to begin with a brief presentation or if you would
like to start with your questions and tell me what you are interested in,
because every session I promise to be interactive, and then I end up
lecturing, and this time I will do it too. I am going to have you ask questions
and I will answer those questions.
* Hanan Ashrawi, who holds a Ph.D. in medieval literature from the University of
Virginia, is the founder and Secretary General of the Palestinian Initiative for the Promotion
of Global Dialogue and Democracy, an organization committed to human rights, democracy,
and global dialogue in Jerusalem. As a feminist, one of Dr. Ashrawi's major goals is to
strengthen the political participation of Palestinian women and to achieve equal rights in a
new nation based on the foundations of credibility, freedom, and legitimacy. In 1991, she
became the official spokesperson for the Palestinian delegation to the Middle East Peace
Process and in 1993 was appointed General Commissioner of the Palestine Independent
Commission for Citizen's Rights. Dr. Ashrawi was an active participant in the creation of the
1993 Oslo Accords. In 1996, she was elected to the Palestinian Legislative Council and
named Minister for Higher Education and Scientific Research. She is currently a member of
the Legislative Council, where she has become an outspoken critic of corruption in
government and a leader for the creation of a democratic Palestine committed to human rights
and peace. Dr. Ashrawi is the author of several publications, the latest of which is her book
This Side of Peace: A Personal Account. Dr. Ashrawi is married to Emil, a photographer
with the United Nations headquarters in Jerusalem, and has two daughters, Amal and Zeina.
1. On March 8, 2000, Dr. Ashrawi held this conversation with students of Nova
Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center during her visit as one of five
distinguished speakers at the Law Center's 2000 Goodwin Seminar on International Human
Rights in Fort Lauderdale, Florida. The Nova Law Review selected the materials included in
the citations to this conversation.
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Student: Although Israel is negotiating with the Palestinian Authority2 for
peace, are Palestinian authorities doing all that they can to influence the
perception of the Palestinian community as to the benefits of peace and as to
why they should want peace instead of organizing student demonstrations
against the peace process?
Dr. Ashrawi: First, I doubt anybody can organize a student demonstration or
tell the students to demonstrate now and not to demonstrate later. That is
one. Second, Israel is negotiating with the Palestine Liberation Organization
("PLO")3 and not the Palestinian Authority. The Palestinian Authority was
sort of a formation of the interim phase agreements where a system of
government was set up to govern part of the land and part of the people, only
for the transitional phase. Then we get to permanent status issues.
Supposedly, we will end up with the devolution of occupation and the
evolution of statehood. One of the negotiating parties is the PLO, which
represents the Palestinian people everywhere, because as you know five
million Palestinians are refugees. We are not only going to deal with
Palestinians who are in the West Bank and Gaza, because you do not make
partial peace with part of the people. So, that is number one. Two, I do not
know if you have looked at the facts, or if you have an underlying
assumption, or if you have looked at the Israeli statements, but frankly
speaking, Palestinian public opinion has moved and has made a serious
qualitative shift in its political discourse, basically since 1991.
In 1974, the Palestinians accepted the idea. First of all, let me go back
to 1967. In 1967, we proposed a one state solution, one democratic non-
sectarian, pluralistic state in Palestine for everybody--Muslims, Christians,
Jews, Arabs, Palestinians, and Israelis--after the war. That was turned
down by the Israelis because they said that goes against the Zionist ideology.
That was before the 1967 War. Then there was the revolution where we said
all of Palestine belongs to the Palestinians because in 1947, 1948, when
Israel was formed, there was such a thing as a Palestine.
2. Hillel Frisch, From Palestine Liberation Organization to Palestinian Authority: The
Territorialization of "Neopatriarchy", in THE PLO AND ISRAEL FROM ARMED CONFLICT TO
POLmCAL SOLUTION, 1964-1994 75-77 (Avraham Sela & Moshe Ma'oz eds., 1997)
[hereinafter Frisch]. The Palestine Liberation Organization ("PLO") was established in 1964
for the purposes of liberating Palestine and establishing a form of government for Palestine.
Id.
3. Id. at 56-57. The Palestinian Authority began as an interim government that
expanded into Gaza and the West Bank. Id.
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Historical Palestine was a country in which people were living for
centuries on their own land. What happened then was that the state of Israel
was created on the majority of what was Palestinian land. We ended up with
a situation of tremendous suffering. We had the dual injustice of
dispossession, dispersal, and exile. More than 750,000 Palestinians were
kicked out, more than 400 villages were totally demolished.4 We had a
series of massacres. We can talk about these later, which can only be
described in modern terminology as ethnic cleansing in 1948. Then again,
beyond that, when we made the concession, we made that historical shift,
which began in the early 1970s, to accept sharing Palestine and to accept a
two state solution. That was a very serious historical compromise.5 Because,
as my father said, we are not denying this past, this history, the fact that
there was a Palestine on all of Palestine but, we are dealing with a future for
our children in which we recognize that a homeland, a historical homeland,
is not the same as a state, a contemporary geopolitical state. So while we
would not deny our past, while we would not change our historical narrative
and deny our existence, we would at the same time accept to share historical
Palestine within the two state solution.
Now, this took a lot of doing and I discovered, through a very
painstaking debate and dialogue, even within the Palestinian circles. In the
1970s it was very difficult not just to mention the two state solution, but
even to talk to any Israeli or Palestinian or to propose a peaceful settlement
for the conflict. I am saying this to give you a background as to the major
changes and to the political thought in Palestine. Then, in 1988 there was a
meeting of the Palestinian National Council ("PNC") in the aftermath, or
when the intifada was still active. We set up a meeting of twenty-two
Palestinians from all over the world and we issued a statement. 6 We Sent it
to the PNC. We said that this is our position, and that the only resolution for
the conflict is through peaceful means. The only way it can be done is to
accept the two state solution and we should launch a peace initiative. We
4. See Wendy Lehman, A Return to the 4 June 1967 Borders: Critical for Peace.
Report from a CPAP Briefing with Faisal Husseini, available at
http://www.palestinecenter.org/news/20000918ftr.html (Sept. 18,2000).
5. Samer Badawi, "Ashrawi Delineates Palestinian 'Red Lines,' Reiterates Need for
a Two-State Solution," Report From a CPAP Briefing With Hanan Ashrawi, available at
http:llpalestinecenter.orglnewsI20000316ftr.html (Mar. 16, 2000). This article is based on
remarks delivered on March 14, 2000, by Dr. Hannan Ashrawi and was written by Samer
Badawi, staff writer for the Center for Policy Analysis on Palestine. It should be noted that
Dr. Ashrawi's views do not necessarily reflect those of the Center.
6. Palestine National Council, Political Communique and Declaration of
Independence, Nov. 15, 1988, 27 I.L.M. 1660 (entered into force Nov. 15, 1988).
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called it a peace initiative then. In 1988, the PNC, which is the parliament in
exile, accepted the two state solution in Algiers and declared Palestinian
statehood.7 And, of course, there is a beautiful declaration of independence.8
I would like you to read it at some point, as it is a very good basis for a
constitution. And then, we moved from there, giving rise to the acceptance
of the peace initiative and the peace process itself in 1991, when we
participated in the peace process. Now, although we started the process
earlier, when we started the official meetings with Baker in 1991, 9 the
majority of Palestinians were against the meetings. 1° We had about forty
percent in support and sixty percent against the meetings. Systematically,
we continued with an internal dialogue and debate until we got a
constituency for peace.
I do not know if any of you remember the launching of the Madrid
Peace Process in 1991, but when we came back from Madrid, we had eighty-
seven percent support. 1 We managed to do this with the most open system
of dialogue, of debate, and of discussion. People were involved in the
decision making. People would hold us accountable. They would ask us,
"what did you do, what did you say?" They would come to our homes and
have a right to know, and say, "we are telling you what to say next." So they
had a stake in it, they understood it, and it was absorbed. It was not imposed
from above. That is why I believe the discourse for peace has a legitimacy
and constituency which we gained, systematically through not just
persuasion, but through active participation. You have a stake in the
process. Until now, there has been a majority of support for the peace
process or for peace. This is despite all the problems. It is despite the fact
that the peace process has produced more suffering for the Palestinians. It is
despite the fact that more land is being confiscated, more houses demolished.
Despite living, we will live in an area that is like a series of Bantustans or
isolated reservations. And Israel still controls our crossing points and we
have no freedom of movement whatsoever.
Approximately fifty percent of Palestinians are still critical of the
process itself and the way the negotiations have been conducted. But, we
have over seventy percent consistently in favor of a peaceful solution. Israel
cannot claim the same because they are almost down the middle, for and
against the peace process.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. HANAN ASHRAWi, THIS SIDE OF PEA E: A PERSONAL ACCOUNT 79-94 (1995).
10. Id.
11. See id.
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Now, of course we have political pluralism. We have those who do not
approve of our coming to Madrid and starting the peace process, but we will
defend that right to dissent and to disagree. We have the right to disagree.
Why is it that in Palestine when we have democracy and pluralism and
people express different points of view, we are told, "well you are not
unified, you are fragmented or you have extremists." And, if we all agreed,
you know, as a nation of sheep, they would say, "you have a monolithic
dictatorial system." Well, no, we do not all agree. We have different points
of view. We are not a nation of sheep and we have never been. Nobody can
dictate to us how to think and what to think Palestinian Authority cannot
brainwash people and cannot prevent people from speaking out, from
expressing their opinions. But it must safeguard the rule of law, and it must
hold people accountable through due process, of course. The peace process
said in some of the agreements that there would be no incitement. And at the
same time there was tremendous emphasis on Israeli security, no emphasis
on Palestinian security whatsoever. And while, if you look at it numerically,
and I hate to do that, more Palestinians have been killed, daily actually, by
Israeli violence, by settler violence, by soldiers who do it with impunity.'2
The last time settlers killed the Palestinians, they were fined one cent each.
So we said "this is the value of Palestinian human life." The soldiers, who
in the early days buried people alive, were demoted, reprimanded. This is
the kind of distortion that you have. While Palestinians, I suppose, are not
only to safeguard their own security, they are supposed to safeguard Israeli
security and prevent any possible dissent and action, or violence, which has
led to internal distortions and violations within Palestinian society.
The Palestinian Authority is now arresting people on the basis of their
political beliefs in order to show good faith and that they are committed to
the peace process and to prevent any acts of violence. They have cracked
down on the opposition. They have implemented a state security court that
is a military court to try people instantly. And, the Israelis keep pushing for
more. Now, when you distort internal realities, you upset, you violate the
rule of law, you create a police state, and you are not going to have peace
with anybody. The peace process should not be an instrument for the
distortion of Palestinian ideologies, it should be for the empowerment of
Palestinians because only the strong can make peace.
So, when I get questions like this I generally answer more than just the
question. Because these questions are generally being sent out by the Israeli
12. See generally HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, A LICENSE TO KILL: ISRAELI OPERATIONS
AGAINST "WANTED" AND MASKED PALESTINIANS 1-4 (1993) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH].
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government and by the American-Israel Public Affairs Committee
("AIPAC"). I even received some of these questions last night. They are
misleading because they are not based on facts. You have to look at the
whole context and you have to look at the facts. The facts are that the
Palestinian Authority and the PLO have bent over backwards to fulfill all
their obligations as per the agreements, even though it meant self-negation
with the Palestinian people, and then erosion of their own credibility and
their own support among the people. They have accepted their role as
guardians of Israeli security when the Israelis, for more than thirty years of
occupation, using the most brutal military means, could not guarantee their
security because there was a situation of occupation and injustice.
And of course we do not control or patrol Israeli streets and cities. And
not only that, the Palestinian Authority and the PLO accepted to do that
without having any assurances that Palestinian security would be
safeguarded, be it in terms of territorial security, political security, economic
security, or human security. You can lose your land, you go to bed owning a
home and you wake up in the morning and it is gone. Your house can be
demolished, you could be deported, you are living in a state of siege and at
the same time you are measured and judged only in accordance with how
much Israeli security you can provide.
Now, I told everybody that if we were all secure, if we were living
happily ever after next to each other as good neighbors, there would be no
need for a peace process. The peace process is there in order to prevent any
situation of conflict and violence and to promote security for everybody. So,
if you make security a prerequisite, it means that you make peace
impossible. Security comes from signing a peace agreement, from dealing
with the causes of conflict, from removing the grievances, and creating a
situation that is conducive to cooperation rather than one that produces more
conflict. You can not occupy a people, a whole nation and enslave a nation,
rob them of all their rights, and then tell them they have to sit back and take
it and that if they defend themselves, if they resist, they are automatically
terrorists. Then, at the same time in the context of the peace process, we
should find democratic and peaceful means of expressing dissent. Otherwise,
you would end up having to arrest more than half of Israel which, is against
the peace process.
Student. Yes, but these Israelis that you say are against the peace process do
not go around blowing up buses within the Palestinian Authority.
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Dr. Ashrawi: Will they kill Palestinians with impunity? Yes. They shot
people in the mosque. The attack at the al-Ibrahimi Mosque during
Ramadan at the hands of Baruch Goldstein is a famous example, but I can
tell you of daily incidents.13 I do not want anybody's loss of life. There is
equal value to all human lives. I do not want violence at all. That is why we
entered the peace process.
Student: How can Israel be asked to create peace if the PLO cannot control
these terrorist organizations within its nation to create peace? How can you
make peace with someone who cannot control his own people?
Dr. Ashrawi: How do you control your own people? Of course, anybody
who breaks the law should be punished in accordance with the law.
Student: Should be, but can be? What about Hamas?
14
Dr. Ashrawi: Why do you assume that Hamas is all terrorists? Hamas is a
political organization." It has a military wing.16 I have a constant dialogue
with Hamas. We should. You have to give them a stake in the process. You
cannot accept that Israel dictates to exclude all political parties who disagree
with you, then they will turn to violence. Anybody who breaks the law
should be punished. Be it Israeli, be it Palestinian, but you cannot suspend
rights, including political rights, and you cannot have political prisoners and
political detention.
Also, you do not say, "control everybody." Otherwise, every time there
is a bombing, whether in Oklahoma or anywhere else, you could hold
Clinton accountable and you punish him. No, you have to have a system, a
legal system. You have to have a law enforcement system. This is just law
and order, but it does not mean that you outlaw anybody who disagrees with
you or who criticizes you, which is what is happening now. And actually,
13. ASHRAwi, supra note 9, at 282.
14. About the Islamic Resistance Movement "Hamas", at http://www.palestine-
info.com/hamas/about/index.htm (last visited Jan. 21, 2001) [hereinafter Islamic Movement].
Hamas stands for the Islamic Resistance Movement that dates back to the 1940s. Id. It stems
from the Muslim Brotherhood with the purpose of emancipating the Palestinian people. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. Military action is the Movement's main strategy against Zionism. Islamic
Movement, supra note 14.
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even the language, can Arafat17 control this? No. Can anyone control every
individual person, short of creating a police state and having a policeman
with everybody? No. However, you need to create a collective atmosphere,
a discourse of peace that is not conducive to violence. You need to end
Palestinian victimization. I cannot tell people whose lands have been stolen,
whose houses have been demolished or whose relatives have been killed,
whether their children, or their sisters or their brothers, "you have to act
peacefully, you have to love the Israelis. They are good neighbors. They are
doing nothing wrong."
No, they are doing all sorts of things wrong. But we can say that we
will deal with the occupation. We will deal with it through peaceful means.
We will end the occupation. So it is much more than the simple slogans, you
know, "control your people," "stop all violence." No. You want to stop
violence, let us stop it on all sides then. How do you do that? It can only be
done through a just and genuine peace that addresses the causes of the
conflict and ends the sense of grievance and hostility.
Student: Just to put a little bit more of a historical perspective on this, what
was life like in Palestine before 1948 and even in the early 1960s before the
Palestinians got ejected?
Dr. Ashrawi: I wish you would ask my parents. I was a baby in 1948, I am
telling you my age now, which I do not mind. It is the worst kept secret
anyway. But, I am not one of those who have idealistic memories and who
have romanticized the past with nostalgia. Palestine was a country that had
been under several occupations. The Ottoman occupation, and then the
British Mandate, and then the West Bank annexed to Jordan after 1948, and
Gaza was under the control of Egypt. So before 1947 or 1948, even before
the nineteenth century, if you read the travel books and literature, Palestine
had a society which was predominantly peasant. Agriculture was the major
source of income. It was also a land of pilgrimage.' 8 So even before the
days of tourism, even in my medieval studies going back to Holy Jerusalem' 9
17. See generally SAID K. ABURISH, ARAFAT: FROM DEFENDER TO DICTATOR (1998).
Born in Cairo, Egypt, in 1929 as Abdul Rahman Abdel Rwout Arafat Al Qwdua Al Husseini,
he is now known as Yasser Arafat, leader of the Palestinian National Authority. Id.
18. See Marshall J. Breger, The Future of Jerusalem: A Symposium: An
Introduction, 45 CATH. U. L. REv. 653 (1996).
19. Id. at 653-54. Mr. Breger points out that each religious group has long
recognized Jerusalem as being the most holy place in the world, and each had co-existed for
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and Holy Palestine, there were Christian communities and Christian
pilgrims, constantly. It was a land of pluralism also, because three religions
coexisted in Palestine.
Student: Are you talking about before 1948?
Dr. Ashrawi: Before 1948, of course. There were three religions. The
principal religion was Islam. The second was Christianity. The third'
religion was Judaism. They were a distinct minority. In 1923, the
boundaries of Palestine were delineated and then the League of Nations
placed it under the British Mandate, as Palestine.20 The people there were,
on the whole, highly educated, because historically Palestinians have placed
tremendous emphasis on education, and I know that was the case of my
parents' generation. My father studied medicine. He used to write all the
time. He wrote on women's rights and I will give you some of his writings.21
When he died, at his memorial service, the bishop chose those statements
dealing with women to read. In the 1920s, before he married and had five
daughters, he said that women were equal by right and not as a gift from the
men.22 And he said "beware, if you do not recognize that right, I advise the
oppressor to be aware of the anger of the oppressed, once women rebel and
take what is theirs by right, by force." 3 He said they should have it without
force. So in a sense there was a movement for women. There was a
movement in education, there was a center of intellectual and literary
achievements. Palestine was thriving. There was a lot of trade. There were
key urban centers. Jaffa was the greatest city in Palestine, along with Haifa,
and of course Jerusalem. These were the major intellectual trade and
centuries. See also Ruth Lapidoth, Freedom of Religion and of Conscience in Israel, 47
CATH. U. L. REV. 441 (1998).
20. FRANK J. CALABRESF, THi PALESTINE LEGACY: A POLUTICO-LEGAL HISTORY
1917-1990 33 (1994): -
The British Mandate acquired jurisdiction de jure over Palestine in
September 1923 following conclusion with Turkey of the Treaty of
Lausanne. Before this, the defacto administration was first in the form of
a military government from December 1917 to June 1920, with a civilian
High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, taking office on July 1, 1920.
Id.
21. See generally ASHRAWI, supra note 9.
22. Id. at 47. For more information see Andrea E. Bopp, The Palestine-Israeli Peace
Negotiations and Their Impact on Women, 16 B.C. THImD WORLD L.J. 339 (1996).
23. ASMHAUw, supra note 9, at 47.
24. See id.
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cultural centers. At the same time, Jerusalem remained a city where we had
a lot of pilgrimages, a lot of activity, and was always an education center.
Many of the journals, books and so on, written during the intellectual
renaissance, started in Jerusalem by some who were friends of my parents.
So it was mainly agricultural and rural areas and city centers that were based
on education, culture, and trade, and of course the pilgrimage and tourist
industry.
Student: So it was a sovereign nation by itself?
Dr. Ashrawi: It was under occupation. It had boundaries. It was
recognized. My parents' marriage certificate says Palestine. My birth
certificate says Palestine. The money said Palestine. Even what is now the
Jerusalem Post was called the Palestine Post. So there was a Palestine with
its own currency, with its own laws. Israelis use the fact we were always
under occupation or unjustly treated to justify further occupation and lack of
justice. No, there was a culture, it had a history. We had institutions. We
had colleges and schools. We had everything. Actually, we were known as
the most advanced country in the Arab world.
Now our development, our growth, was rudely suspended in 1948, of
course with the partition25 and then with the war.2 After that, in 1951, the
West Bank was next to Jordan, which was the kingdom of Trans Jordan and
Gaza was graced under Egyptian rule. These were the days of Arab
nationalism, when the Arabs said "we want to have Arab unity and what we
will do is we will save Palestine for the Palestinians." This created a greater
mess because the Arabs were certainly not democratic regimes, nor were
they equal to Israel in military power. It was not until the mid 1960s that the
Palestinians had even set up the PLO as part of an Arab venture. The
Palestinians decided to rescue Palestinian decision making from Arab
decisionmaking, resulting in our own organization and our own world. Not
because we were against Arab unity. No, but because it was under the guise
of unity Palestine was lost, and it was subsumed by an Arab cause. What we
25. Report to the General Assembly by the United Nations Special Committee on
Palestine, G.A. Res. 181, U.N. GAOR, 2d Sess., Supp. No. 11, at 322, U.N. Doc. A/364
(1947) [hereinafter Report on Palestine].
26. Salman Abu-Sitta, Palestinian Refugees and the Permanent Status Negotiations,
at http://palestinecenter.org/news/19991116pb.html (last visited Jan. 27, 2001). "In 1948, 85
percent of the Palestinians who lived in the part of Palestine that became Israel were driven
out of their homes by Jewish forces." Id.
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wanted was to, first of all, get an affirmation of our identity and our history,
regain our rights, and build our state.
Now, in the meantime, in 1967 of course, Israel occupied the rest of
Palestine. If you look at it historically, the United Nations Resolution 18127
and the Partition Plan2 gave Israel fifty-six percent of Palestine at that
time.29 These are historical facts. Fifty-six percent of the land of Palestine
was given to the Jews. At that time they owned seven percent of the land.
And they were less than ten percent of the people. Then they became thirty
percent of the people with the Holocaust. We were made to pay the price of
Western anti-Semitism and Western crimes against humanity because many
of the Jews started coming to Palestine and of course Britain, as the
occupying power, as the mandate power, did help and bring them into
Palestine. And now you are going to begin to see the narrative of 1948
Palestine coming through the Israeli new historians, who were called
revisionist historians. Now, they are called the new historians, because they
are relating authentic history and not the revised history. I would advise you
to read people like Benny Morris, 0 Teddy Katz,31 and Norman Finkelstein.32
These authors went through the intelligence archives of Israel and they not
only interviewed Palestinian survivors about what happened, but also
interviewed members of the Jewish armed gangs then in 1948.33
Thus, a picture is going to emerge. Only a couple of months ago, the
history of Al-Tantura came out.3 Al-Tantura was one of the villages that
was destroyed by the Israelis in 1948. Nobody believed the people of Al-
Tantura when they said that there was a massacre. Then, two months ago, a
27. Report on Palestine, supra note 25, at 322.
28. Id. at 323.
29. Palestinian Refugees in 1948, at http:llwww.cyberus.cal-bakerltitle2.htm (last
visited Jan. 27,2001).
30. See generally BENNY MORRIS, RIGHTEOUS VICTIMs: A HISTORY OF THE ZIONIST-
ARAB CONFLICT, 1881-1999 (1999).
31. See Ramzy Baroud, Al-Tantura: Over 50 Years of a Denied Massacre, available
at http://msanews.mynet.netScholars/BaroudItanturahtml (last visited Feb. 2, 2001)
(describing the Israeli historian Teddy Katz and his research at the University of Haifa).
32. See generally NORMAN FINKELSTEIN, THE RrrUAL OF NEW CREATION: JEWISH
TRADmON AND CONTEMRARY LrrERATURE (1992).
33. See Deir Yassin Remembered, at http://www.deiryassin.org/main.html (last visited
Feb. 2, 2001) (describing the Stem Gang's attack on the village of Dier Yassin on April 9,
1948).
34. Wafa Amr, Israeli Researcher Uncovers 1948 Bloodbath, available at
http:lwww.gsnonweb.comlgsnlib-.oaGSN2000/2000_01/20000119/58655.htnl (Jan. 19,
2001). The massacre of AI-Tantura occurred on May 15, 1948. Id. Over 200 people were
killed in one of the biggest attacks by Israeli troops. Id.
2001]
68
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss2/1
Nova Law Review
journalist, who was doing his research for a masters thesis at the Hebrew
University, issued his findings showing that some of the gangs that went into
the army, who were involved in Al-Tantura, came out with a horrible story.35
Now of course there was a resistance to that, because everybody would
like to believe that the creation of the state of Israel was done somehow in
accordance with the myth of a land without people for a people without land.
So they denied our existence as a people, and they considered our land
empty, believing that Israel was a heroic venture, and that it was suddenly
attacked by the Arab world. Not that it came to displace a whole nation and
to expel and massacre a whole people. Now that these things are coming
from Israeli sources, people are beginning to listen. I am not saying this in
order to encourage extremism. I am saying this in order to say that, at a
certain point, you have to come to terms with history. You have to
acknowledge and recognize guilt and culpability. Then, you have to move
ahead and find solutions because if you want a historical reconciliation it has
to be based on truth, on a narrative which is not twisted, which is not a myth,
and which does not impose a distorted reality on both sides' perceptions.
Come to grips with history and move ahead. This is part of the process of
reconciliation. Then, when you make peace, you make peace knowing that
the Palestinians were first excluded and totally denied, even as a people, and
as a nation. The Palestinians were told we did not even exist. Even Golda
Meir asked, "who are the Palestinians?" They did not exist. Once you begin
the politics of recognition, re-recognition, of history and identity, the politics
of inclusion, that we are all people with equal human rights, regardless of
objective power, then you can begin the politics of reconciliation through a
just peace process. I think it is a healthy process of rectification because we
are involved in a historically "redemptive act," not just in an act of
appeasement and recapitulation.
Student: How widely are the facts of which you speak accepted in the
international community?
Dr. Ashrawi: They were totally suppressed for awhile and the Palestinians
who spoke out, the victims, were denied because nobody believed them. The
Palestinians and the Arabs were easily labeled in international public
opinion. We were the Muslims, we were the "other," we were not part of the
Judeo-Christian tradition. We did not have many Arabs or Muslims living in
the United States or the West and so we were not part of the Western
35. Id.
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dialogue. Now, because it is the Israeli historians who are conveying these
facts, who are writing scholarly books on history and even archeology, they
are beginning to be accepted and understood.
In Europe, these things were better known because Europe was close,
Europe was part of it. The British were part of it, if you look at the British
archives. Terrorism was introduced into the region by the Jewish gangs, not
by the Palestinians. They were the ones who assassinated Count Bernadotte.
They were the ones who blew up the King David Hotel. However, it was not
called "terrorism." It was called "liberation." When we were expelled,
when our religious sites were razed and when a series of massacres took
place, again, this was called "liberating the land"; this was not called "ethnic
cleansing." It was heroic to do that to Palestinians who were primarily
unarmed and primarily peasant communities. Now, with the truth coming
out, I think that it is a very healthy process because the Israelis also have to
come to grips with their own history and they have to understand that denial
is not a way of forging a future-that you have to recognize the "other" in
the same way the Palestinians have to understand the Holocaust and the
horror of what happened.
My father used to say "we have to take in the Jews, they are our cousins
and it is the West that is anti-Semitic, it is the West that is killing them and
massacring them and torturing them, and that we should give them refuge."
Then later he told me, "but we didn't do it so they would kick us out." We
thought we could live together because of the Semitic bond, because Arabs
and Jews are Semitic and everybody says that we are cousins. Yet blood
relations and blood ties are not enough. You have to deal with the fact that a
grave historical injustice has been done to the Palestinians. It was "ethnic
cleansing."
Now, how do we undo that injustice? How do we make room for both
peoples to co-exist? How, in historical Palestine, in two states, as good
neighbors, not as occupier-occupied and not within a zero sum game? So it
is a clash of legitimacies, a clash of identities. It is a clash of many things.
However, it has to be understood so that the solution can emerge from the
conflict, from the causes, on the basis of truth, not on the basis of myths,
legends, and distortions. I think we are on the way to reconciliation because
of the historians, the change in attitude, the recognition that power, politics,
and dictates do not make peace. You have to remove injustice to make
peace.
Student: Two questions. One, were there ever talks of carving Israel out of
a piece of Germany because it was Germany who dealt the injustice to the
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Jewish people and that is where the Jewish people were from, primarily in
Eastern Europe? Two, when the British had control over Palestine, did all
three religions live together fairly peacefully without it being a police state?
Dr. Ashrawi: Okay, first the Zionist movemente 6 started in the nineteenth
century. Zionism as you know, is an extension of nineteenth century
ideologies, of nationalism, and nation states.37
Student: Of the Bible.
Dr. Ashrawi: No. The Bible is not Zionist. I am explaining that where
Zionism started as an ideology. I have read the history of Zionism. I have
read Herzl's diaries. I have read everybody. Do not worry. Zionism as a
political ideology began in the nineteenth century. Judaism was viewed as a
religion, not as a national identity. It was with the early Zionists, in the late
nineteenth century, that they started asking for a state for the Jews. First
they were offered, and I think they were contemplating, Uganda, at one
point. Then, I think at some point in the late nineteenth century, early
twentieth, they were offered Cypress. They contemplated different
locations. Only at the beginning of the twentieth century, between 1910 and
1912 did Palestine emerge. Then, they started with the land without the
people.
Zionism was primarily a left wing socialist ideology. Therefore, it did
not have any kind of territorial sort of preference. They said, we need a
homeland for the Jews because we want the Jews to express themselves as a
national identity, not as a religion. When the religious Jews began to be
more powerful and injected themselves into the Zionist ideology, they
brought in the idea of the Bible. Then, Palestine was introduced as that
homeland, even though there were still several alternatives being discussed.
Now the question is how can you arbitrarily or even willfully select
other peoples' lands to create or superimpose a new state on it? Secondly,
we were never asked as Palestinians, are we willing to give away our land,
our history, and so on to create another state? Thirdly, and I think this is the
main issue, it is the guilt of the West over the horrors of what they did to the
Jews that led them to totally deny and disregard Palestinian rights because
they could put all the Jews in one country. They would not have to pay the
36. For a more comprehensive history of the Zionist movement see ZIONISM AND
RELGION, 25-39 (Shmuel Almog, et al. eds., 1998).
37. Id.
38. Id. at3.
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price and then they could ignore the Palestinians. Thus, they unleashed a
whole cycle of conflict and violence. They solved, at least they thought they
solved, an injustice by creating another. Accordingly, if you simplify the
situation, nobody has the right to give away somebody else's land.
In response to your other question, no, nobody thought of Germany.
Germany was paying reparations. However, they were perfectly happy to
support Israel right or wrong, the same way the United States supports Israel,
right or wrong, as a means of paying back for their guilt. Anybody who even
mentioned Palestinians or said we were a people with rights was
immediately branded anti-Semitic, which is amazing since we are Semites as
well.
But the real issue is that historically, Palestine has always been
pluralistic, always. It has never been the home of one religion. Palestine has
the longest recorded culture and history in the region, yet it was totally
denied. Until now, I know many Jewish friends who still say they are
Palestinians and those who did not stay in Israel and came to the States, and
those in Israel wio say they do not have a problem being Palestinian.
However, the issue is that a religion cannot be a national identity. Frankly,
that is what I think. I do not think that you can set up, in the twentieth and
twenty-first century reality, states on the basis of exclusive religions. We are
talking here about pluralism interaction, not of exclusivity. Imagine if we
said we want an exclusively Muslim state or an exclusively Christian state,
or you have rights only if you happen to be of one religion. Had any other
state done that, it would have been an outrage. It is a combination of the
guilt of the West and the Zionist ideology itself. A sense of insecurity
within Jewish communities and Israel per se, which to me nowadays is
needless because I do not believe that contemporary societies allow for
discrimination or racism. Now Israel has to decide, does it want to be a
nation among equals? Does it want to be a Middle Eastern state? Or, does it
want to be an artificial construct and an extension of Western Palestine?
The peace process is giving Israel the opportunity to gain recognition,
legitimacy, and a place in the region to open up. I believe you cannot have a
democracy if all the rights and if all the laws are geared toward exclusivity,
whether you happen to be of one religion or not. I certainly do not like to
see it in Iran. I would not want to see a theocracy in Israel either. However,
it is not up to me to redefine Zionism.
There is some very interesting literature now coming out, the post-
Zionist literature, the new Zionist literature. The Truman Institute is doing a
lot. The Institute is reexamining Zionism to try, first of all, to change it from
nineteenth century roots and its twentieth century expressions, and to make it
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contemporary with, and consistent with, twenty-first century requirements of
democracy and, of course, interactive regional and global realities. That
means that there is a lot of soul searching in Israel taking place. This is
taking place among intellectual circles and it is a very exciting debate that I
follow regularly. But I certainly would not be interested in solving the
Palestinian question by creating another injustice. The cycle of injustice has
to stop and the cycle of vengeance has to stop. Therefore, we need a
language of accommodation, not just inclusion, of re-recognition, not denial
of legitimacies.
One Israeli friend told me, "one reason we do not trust you as
Palestinians is because if anybody did to us what we did to you we would
never forgive and forget." Really, and he said that openly and I appreciated
the honesty. I told him that I am not here to prove to you that I am sincere.
Look at what we are doing. We have launched a peace process. We have
recognized Israel. We have accepted this, although it is a tremendous
historical shift and compromise which did not come easily. We risked our
lives to do it, heaven knows, I mean from both sides. I have had Israeli
settlers try to kill me with machine guns several times. I have had extremists
try to kill or bomb me several times. It does not matter. The thing is you
take risks if you want to resolve the conflict. You do it by addressing the
substance and the issues, not propaganda and statements of distorted history.
No. We need to deal with the truth. Deal with realities. We must include
others and recognize the legitimacies. I always say, disengage from this fatal
proximity a relationship of occupied, unoccupied, and injustice, and we will
reengage as equals and cooperate as equals and forge new realities based on
mutuality, on trust, and on mutual benefit.
Student: In a time when there is so much disharmony in the Middle East,
what is the role of Palestinian women or women of Israel in the Middle
Eastern states?
Dr. Ashrawi: That is a topic close to my heart. The Palestinian women's
movement goes back to the 1920s, as I told you. 39 It was mainly middle
class, urban-educated women, a sort of charitable societies with intellectual
organizations. Now, since the 1970s, actually the early 1970s, we were
involved in the women's movement with a real gender consciousness. It is
not that Palestinian women were ever excluded. We never had a culture that
was entirely closed. We have the discrimination of a traditional patriarchal,
39. See ASHRAWI, supra note 9, at 47.
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male-dominated society, which is true I think of most countries in the world.
There has been discrimination. But, we do not, in a sense, have a total
exclusion of women from education, public life, or work. We have never
done that.
In the 1970s we started the women's movement on the basis of a clear
gender agenda asking for full participation, on an equal basis. And, of
course, rejecting the argument that a national struggle supersedes social
justice. And that there are issues that can be postponed and issues that are
primary and that are secondary. The women's issue is a primary issue and is
not capable of being postponed. If you are fighting for justice, you cannot
tolerate social injustice. If you are struggling for liberation, you cannot
enslave women. If you want self-determination as a nation, you cannot
withhold it from women. So our argument was always the integrated
comprehensive approach to liberation.
You have to struggle against the mentality of oppression, exclusion, and
discrimination on all fronts. You cannot say I want national liberation but I
will enslave the women. That is how we intruded on our patriarchal society.
We are nowhere near where we want to be. Of course the Arab world,
predominantly Muslim culture, tends to be more conservative and has the
whole spectrum-from the most oppressed, excluded, and silenced women
to the most liberated, outspoken, and defiant women, and everything in
between. So we do not generalize about Arab women. But we can say that
Arab society on the whole is traditional, with social conservatism based on a
recognition of a sort of patriarchal system of property and of power. Women
are involved, of course. We have a strong women's movement with several
organizations that have a general agenda.4 There is a tension between the
traditional women who still talk about the national agenda as being separate,
and the women activists who are involved in the gender agenda as being an
instrument of internal empowerment to face external challenges.
We do have support systems for women. We are trying to change the
whole bent of a shame-oriented culture to a guilt-oriented culture when we
deal with issues of honor. For example, honor was always associated with
women's behavior in Arab societies, right? Honor was the whole link to her
social behavior, her sexual behavior, and her obedience. The family honor
was linked to the women and therefore, the women had to pay the price.
They were contained and controlled. There is still the phenomena of honor
40. See The Palestinian Working Women Society, at http://www.pal-pwws.org (2000)
(discussing the goal of developing greater women's involvement in building a Palestinian
democratic civil society); see also Michele Landsberg, Women Missing From Mideast Peace
Negotiations, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 13, 2001, available at 2001 WL 4022113.
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killings which, in Jordan, now has come out in the parliament because they
are trying to change the law.41 There was, by law, a mitigating circumstance
that if you kill your daughter or your wife or your sister because she shamed
you through dishonorable behavior, then you get a very minimal sentence, a
life sentence.42
Quite often there is collusion among the judiciary, the police, and
everybody else to hide these things. I was just dealing with a case before I
came, and this is an extreme case. The case involved a young woman who,
as a child, suffered from incestuous rape having been repeatedly raped by
her brother and her father. Then they married her off at an early age to
somebody who used her as a prostitute, to make money off of her. She ran
away. They threatened to kill her on the basis of honor, that she dishonored
the family by running away. She came to a women's shelter in Jerusalem
where she was sheltered for a while. We agreed that she should be trained to
start a profession. She insisted that she wanted to make peace with her
family. We said "okay, you want to make peace with your family, and with
your past? We will go with you, we will send our lawyers with you, you
should not go alone." So we did. The lawyers went with her, women
lawyers. The family said that of course they will take her back and they
were happy that she.was being trained. They also said they would not force
her to go back to her husband who was abusing her and was using her for
prostitution, as well as subjecting her to physical abuse. They said she
would stay with her family, and she would start her training program with
the women's organization, the legal aid center. I think it took two weeks
before her body was found in a well and the family said she committed
suicide. The doctor who found her, the coroner, was asked to say that it was
suicide. The judge immediately signed a statement that it was suicide. We
had a demonstration and went to that village, which was unprecedented. We
said that we knew that it was not suicide. This woman was starting a whole
new phase, she was being trained. This was a case where a woman was
intensively oppressed. And I used this as the most extreme case with which
we dealt. It is not the case of all Palestinian or Arab women. This is an
extreme case to show you how far this can go.
41. Carol Anne Douglas, Jordan: Working Against "Honor Killings", OFF OUR
BACKS, Jan. 1, 2001. The National Jordanian Campaign Committee to Eliminate Crimes of
Honor has been working for the past two years against "honor killings." Id. Honor killings
are killings of girls and women by their male relatives. Id.
42. Id.; see also 20 Jordanian Women Died in 2000 in "Honour Killings", AGENCE
FRANCE-PRESSE, Dec. 31, 2000, available at 2000 WL 24790096 ("[a] murderer in Jordan
would ordinarily face the death penalty").
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What we need to do is to redefine a woman's honor. By redefining
dishonor and shame as being part of the national establishment, being a
collaborator, women gained new recognition as activists, political activists.
Women who went to jail under occupation quite often did not get married
when they came out of jail because there were questions of virginity-there
were questions of abuse in prison, whether they were tortured, and whether
they were still virgins. Who would marry them?
One woman was released after ten to twelve years of imprisonment and
torture, when she married another person who was imprisoned and it was a
source of honor. We had a huge breaking point just to show that these two
instances have redefined again the concept of honor; that she was honorable
and she was a source of pride and this gradually changed many things for all
Palestinians.
For example, a young girl, my niece, was elected head of the labor
department of our political party. Accordingly, she was giving instructions
to men who were her father's age, who were doctors and lawyers while she
was a student. In the political hierarchy, women came into positions higher
than the men. Thus, the men could not use the traditional means of control
such as "I am your father. I am your brother." And so, we also changed the
system of government. You have to do this systematically.
Now there is dialogue between the Palestinians and the Jews. It started
in the 1970s with what is called the activist dialogue, and the solidarity
movement. It started with a coalition of about thirty-two anti-occupationist
organizations and we asked them all to work together. We were activists and
we went to universities together to create a dialogue. The dialogue was
interactive. The 1980s began what was called political dialogue. They
wanted a different approach and wanted a Palestinian-Israeli partnership. In
1988, there was a historical meeting. We argued and fought but we
discussed the issues and then, after two to three days, everybody ended up
respecting and understanding one another. We came up with a declaration
and it was honest.
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The International Criminal Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and for
Rwanda have come a long way since their establishment in 1993 and 1994,
respectively. This article will give some background on the two Tribunals
and detail some of their contributions to the international community.
I. BACKGROUND OF THE ICTY AND THE ICTR
On May 25, 1993, the Security Council adopted the Statute drafted by
the Secretary General of the United Nations ("U.N.") resulting in the
formation of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
("ICTY").' On November 8, 1994, the Security Council established the
International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda ("ICTR"). 2  Though it may
appear otherwise to many, these tribunals were not created overnight. They
were decades in the making, with several elements coming together to
support their creation. Perhaps the most significant precursor to the
Tribunals was the formation of courts, which were used to try persons
responsible for the staggering atrocities committed during World War II.
Thereafter, states formed the U.N. and joined in drafting agreements
designed to protect basic human rights, including the International Bill of3 4
Human Rights, the Genocide Convention, and the four Geneva
Conventions of 1949.5 Each of those instruments significantly strengthened
international humanitarian law, showing a new respect for the rights of
individuals caught up in conflicts and laying the groundwork for the
Tribunals.
This trend continued with the joint adoption by states of several
additional covenants and conventions protecting human rights, including
1. S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doe. S/INF/49 (1993).
2. S.C. Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doe. SC/5974 (1994).
3. 1947-48 U.N.Y.B. 575, U.N. Doec. A/810.
4. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9,
1948, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951).
5. Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and
Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 (entered
into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T.
3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 (entered into
force Oct. 21, 1950); Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950).
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those prohibiting apartheid, slavery, and torture.6  Despite the admirable
goals, these instruments served largely as lip service to the protection of
human rights since the international community failed to enforce them in
large measure. Indeed, during the twentieth century, more than 170 million
innocent civilians-not combatants-lost their lives in armed conflicts. 7 The
most alarming fact about that statistic is that these civilians were the very
targets of aggression, as opposed to accidental. casualties. Thus, these lofty
instruments did not deter such abuses.
The creation of the ICTY finally empowered the international
community with the ability to punish such abuses by individuals. Not only
were such abuses prohibited after the creation, but they became punishable
by an international tribunal.8 Numerous reasons are cited explaining why the
Tribunals were created at this time, given that wartime atrocities have
occurred many times in the past.9
Some say that it was because the Cold War thawed. Others point
to the effect of the media, bringing images of the atrocities into
living-rooms throughout the world. Still others say that it was
because these heinous acts were carried out in Europe, the site
where the First World War began.
In any event, when we [the international community] witnessed
the horrific methods of "ethnic cleansing" and... [were] either
unable or unwilling to stop this carnage, the decision was made to
establish a tribunal to prosecute persons responsible for these
crimes.10
The decision to form a similar Tribunal for the atrocities that occurred in
Rwanda followed soon thereafter.
6. See generally International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 19, 1966,
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
7. Gabrielle Kirk McDonald, Friedmann Award Address: Crimes of Sexual
Violence: The Experience of the International Criminal Tribunal, 39 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L
1,3 (2000).
8. S.C. Res. 827, supra note 1.
9. Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction: An Interview Study of Bosnian
Judges and Prosecutors, Human Rights Ctr., Int'l Human Rights Law Clinic, Univ. of Cal.,
Berkeley and Ctr. for Human Rights, Univ. of Sarajevo, May 2000 p. 8-9, available at
http://globetrotter.berkeley.edu/humanrights/documents (last visited Jan. 30, 2001).
10. McDonald, supra note 7, at 3.
2001]
79
: Nova Law Review 25, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
Both the ICTY and the ICTR are limited strictlI in their respective
jurisdiction and mandates. The Statute of the ICTY' gives that Tribunal
jurisdiction to prosecute persons who committed or ordered the commission
of grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949,12 violations of laws or
customs of war,13 genocide,' 4 or crimes against humanity. 5 Similarly, but
not identically, the Statute of the ICTR6 gives that Tribunal subject matter
jurisdiction over acts of genocide,1 7 crimes against humanity, 8 and
violations of common Article 3 and Additional Protocol II of the Geneva
Conventions of 1949 committed in Rwanda or by Rwandese nationals during
1994.19
To accomplish these prosecutions, both Tribunals have three organs-
the Chambers, the Office of the Prosecutor, and the Registry.2 The
Chambers of each Tribunal are comprised of three Trial Chambers and one
Appeals Chamber, which they share. The President of the ICTY, which is
one of the ICTY judges, presides over the Appeals Chamber.22 The position
of President of the ICTR is held by one of the ICTR Trial Chamber judges.23
The Office of the Prosecutor, which is also shared by both Tribunals,
includes investigators and attorneys who prosecute the cases against the
accused before the Chambers.2 The Prosecutor heads this office from the
Hague, the Netherlands, 25 although there is a Deputy-Prosecutor for the
11. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, U.N.
SCOR, Annex, art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/25704 (1993) (adopted May 25, 1993, amended May 13,
1998) [hereinafter ICTY Statute].
12. Id.; A.B.A., REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL TO ADJUDICATE WAR
CRIMEs COMMITTED IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 61-71 (July 8, 1993) [hereinafter REPORT OF
TE INTERNATIONALTRmUNAL]; S.C. Res. 827, supra note 1.
13. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 3.
14. Id. at art. 4.
15. Id. at art. 5.
16. Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, U.N. SCOR., Annex,
art. 2, U.N. Doc. S/RES/955 (1994) (adopted Nov. 8, 1994) [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
17. Id.; S.C. Res. 955, supra note 2.
18. ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 3.
19. Id. at art. 4.
20. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 11; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 10.
21. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 11; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 10.
22. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 14.
23. ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 13.
24. See id. at art. 16; ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 16; REPORT OF THE
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 12, at 17.
25. See ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 3 1.
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ICTR in Kigali, Rwanda.26 The Registry is responsible for servicing the
Chambers and the Office of the Prosecutor,27 much like a clerk of a federal
court in the United States. A Registrar heads the Registry of both
Tribunals.2 The ICTY is located in the Hague,29 and the ICTR is located in
Arusha, United Republic of Tanzania.30
The Tribunals are ad hoc, that is, they were established solely for the
conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda. The trials are conducted by
judges without a jury,31 the Prosecutor is independent and responsible for
initiating the investigation and submitting the indictment to a judge who
determines whether a prima facie case has been established.32 The judges
are elected by the General Assembly of the U.N. for a four-year term and are
eligible for re-election. As originally constituted, the Chambers had two
Trial Chambers and one Appeal Chamber shared by both Tribunals. 34  A
third Trial Chamber was added for each of the Tribunals in 1998.
35
As mentioned, the Registry is somewhat like a clerk of the court in the
United States. However, it has considerably more responsibilities, which
include overseeing the Tribunal's Detention Unit and the Victims and
36Witnesses Section, and maintaining contacts with states. National courts
have concurrent jurisdiction with the Tribunals, but the Tribunal, established
by the Chapter VII powers of the Security Council, have primacy, giving
them the authority to request national courts to defer to their competence.
Those accused before the Tribunals are guaranteed internationally
recognized rights, including the presumption of innocence and the right to be38
tried in person. The maximum penalty that may be imposed is life
26. See ICTR, General Information, Structure of the ICTR, available at
http:lwww.ictr.orglENGLISHlgeninfo/structure.htm (last visited Feb. 3; 2001).
27. Id.; REPORT OF THE INTERNATIoNAL TRIBUNAL, supra note 12, at 18.
28. ICTYStatute, supra note 11, at art. 17; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 16.
29. ICTYStatute, supra note 11, at art. 31.
30. ICTR, General Information About the Tribunal, available at
http:lwww.ictr.orglENGLISHlgeninfo/intro.htm (last visited Feb. 3, 2001).
31. See ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 23; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 22.
32. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 18; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 17.
33. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 13; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 12.
34. See ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 11; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 10.
35. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 11; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 10.
36. ICTR, General Information, Lawyers and Detention Facility Management Section,
available at http'J/www.ictr.org/ENGLISH/geninfo/lawyersd.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2001); see
generally REPORT OF THE INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAi, supra note 12.
37. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 9; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 8.
38. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 21; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 20.
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imprisonment. 39 If an accused is found guilty, he serves his sentence in a
state that has agreed to accept convicted persons from the Tribunal.40 States
are required to cooperate with the Tribunal, including the arrest or detention
of persons.41 If a state fails to cooperate, the President may report this
noncompliance to the Security Council for appropriate action.42
This is all reflected in the resolution establishing the Yugoslav
Tribunal, but in 1993, when the judges met at the Hague and were installed,
they were the entire Tribunal.43 The court had no premises, no rules, and no
one in custody. Moreover, the first Prosecutor selected decided he did not
want the job after all, and the U.N. could not agree on his replacement until
nine months later. As a result, Richard Goldstone came on board as
Prosecutor some fifteen months after the Tribunal was established.
Despite these obstacles, the judges went to work in loaned space in the
Peace Palace, where the International Court of Justice sits. The first task
was to draft the rules of procedure and evidence, merging elements of
common and civil law into one hundred and twenty-nine rules. Uniquely
charged with providing rules for the protection of victims and witnesses, and
as the first judicial body specifically mandated to try crimes of sexual
violence under international law, they developed significant measures to
protect the identity of witnesses without infringing on the rights of the
accused to a fair trial. This balancing of rights of the victims and the
accused was an extraordinary challenge and a major accomplishment for a
criminal institution. Moreover, the application of these rules produced the
first comprehensive international code of criminal procedure.
Even after adopting the rules and procedures for the Tribunal, it was
still many months before any of us went near a courtroom, principally
because none existed and there were no prosecutors. However, by late 1994,
the Office of the Prosecutor had a skeletal staff. Prosecution lawyers had
reviewed evidence collected by the Commission of Experts, which had been
created by the Security Council prior to the establishment of the Tribunal to
investigate events in the former Yugoslavia" and collect supplementary
material. Thus, on November 4, 1994, the first indictment was issued
against Dragan Nikolic, an alleged commander of one of the notorious
39. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 24; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 23.
40. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 27; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 26.
41. ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 29; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 28.
42. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, July 14, 2000, Rules 7bis, 11, 13, 59,
and 61, available at http://www.un.org/icty/basic/rpc/IT32.rcvl8.htm.
43. See S.C. Res. 827, supra note 1.
44. S.C. Res. 780, U.N. SCOR, 46th Sess., 3119th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/24618 (1992).
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detention camps in eastern Bosnia and Herzegovina, charging him with war
crimes and crimes against humanity.45 The indictment was reviewed and
confirmed by Judge Elizabeth Odio-Benito from Costa Rica. 46
However, it was not until early 1995, two years after its creation, that
the Tribunal secured custody of an accused.47 The first accused in custody
was Dusko Tadic.48 After extensions of time requested by the parties, the
first full trial in the ICTY began on May 7, 1996. As the Presiding Judge, I
sat on the bench with the two other members of the Chamber, Sir Ninian
Stephen of Australia and Lal Chand Vohrah from Malaysia.50 The opening
day was a real media event; over 300 reporters were on hand. Two red tents
served as their headquarters and almost made for a circus-like atmosphere.
The public gallery, separated from the courtroom by bulletproof floor-to-
ceiling glass, was filled to its 150 seat capacity.
After a few days, however, most of the press left. I was later told that
they were looking for more "blood and gore" than the Prosecutor's opening
case offered. Court TV continued to air the trial in the United States. The
trial lasted some eighty-six days, spanning a six month period, primarily
because the single courtroom had to be shared for other proceedings. We
heard from over 125 witnesses and admitted over 300 exhibits.51 Many
important issues were raised and decided, which set the tone for the trials to
follow. These issues included the handling of hearsay (it is admissible),
52
dealing with the conflicting interests of protecting witnesses from harm
while preserving an accused's right to a fair trial,53 and handling the
45. Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Indictment, Case No. IT-94-2-I (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugo., Trial Chamber, Nov. 4, 1994) (amended Feb. 12, 1999), available at http.//www.un.
org/icty/indictmentlenglish/nik-ii941104c.htm.
46. Prosecutor v. Nikolic, Review of Indictment, Case No. IT-94-2-I (Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Nov. 4, 1994), available at http://www.un.orglicty/
nikolic/decision-e/41104RIB.htm.
47. See Trial Information Sheet, Tadic Case No. IT-94-01, available at http://www.
un.orglicty/glance/tadic.htm
48. See id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 42, at sec. 3, Rules 89-90
(providing for the admission of "any relevant evidence which [a Chamber] deems to have
probative value"); see generally Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case No. IT-94-01 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, May 7, 1997).
53. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the Prosecutor's Motion Requesting Protective
Measures for Victims and Witnesses, Case No. IT-94-01 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo.,
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disclosure of documents between the parties. 54 From a broader perspective,
however, what is of significance is that the Tadic trial gave the Tribunal the
first opportunity to apply the rules it crafted-especially the rules of
evidence-in a way that protected the accused's right to a fair trial, thereby
demonstrating that international criminal justice was possible.
Certainly, both the ICTY and the ICTR are making significant progress
in fulfilling their respective mandates. Since the Tadic trial, the international
community, most notably NATO forces in some sectors, has given the
Tribunals the support they need to arrest those indicted, since the Tribunals
do not have a police force. Alleged perpetrators of some of the worst abuses
are now being arrested. For example, included in the thirty-seven persons
currently in custody of the ICTY are: Momcilo Krajisnik, Radovan
Karadzic's deputy and the former Bosnian Serb member of the post war
national Presidency of Bosnia;55  Dario Kordic, a major political
representative for Bosnian Croats;5 6 Stanislav Galic and Radislav Krstic, the
generals allegedly responsible for organizing Serb military operations
against Sarajevo and against Srebrenica; 57 the commanders of detention
camps in northwestern Bosnia;58 and three men accused of controlling camps
Trial Chamber, Aug. 10, 1995), available at http://www.un.orglicty/tadictriac2/decision-
c/100895pm.htm.
54. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Separate Opinion of Judge Vohrah on Prosecution Motion
for Production of Defence Witness Statements, Case No. IT-94-01 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugo., Trial Chamber, Nov. 27, 1996), available at http:llwww.un/orglicty/tadic/triac2/
decision-e/61127ws21.htm (last visited Feb. 17, 2001); Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision on the
Prosecutor's Motion for Production of Defence Witness Statements, Case No. IT-94-01 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Nov. 27, 1996), available at http://www.un.org
tadic/trialc2/decision-c/61127ws2.htm.
55. Prosecutor v. Krajisnik, Indictment, Case No. IT-00-39-I (Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Feb. 21, 2000) (amended Mar. 21, 2000), available at
http:l/www.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglish/kra-laiOO0321c.htm.
56. Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez, Indictment, Case No. IT-95-14/2 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Nov. 10, 1995) (amended Sept. 30, 1998), available at
http:llwww.un.orgliety/indictmentlenglishlkor-lai980930c.htm (charging Dario Kordic and
Mario Cerkez).
57. Prosecutor v. Galic, Indictment, Case No. IT-98-29-I (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugo., Trial Chamber, Mar. 26, 1999), available at http://www.un.orglicty/indictmentl
english/gal-ii990326c.htm; Prosecutor v. Krstic, Indictment, Case No. IT-98-33 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Nov. 2, 1998) (amended Oct. 27, 1999), available at
http:lwww.un.org/icty/indictmentlenglishlkrs-ii981102c.htm.
58. Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Indictment, Case No. IT-98-30 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugo., Trial Chamber, Feb. 13, 1995) (amended Nov. 9, 1998, May 31, 1999), available at
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and widespread sexual slavery and other torture in Foca.59 Moreover, fifteen
persons have been tried in seven completed trials,60 four cases are on
61 52 6
appeal, four more are ongoing, and nine are in the pretrial stage.63 Four
individuals have exhausted appeals and are serving or have served their
sentences, 64 while ten others are appealing theirs.6 5 Two individuals have
http:llwww.un.orglicty/indictmentlenglishlkvo-2ai990531c.pdf (charging Miroslav Kvocka,
Mladen Radic, Milojica Kos, and Zoran Zigic).
59. Prosecutor v. Kunarac, Indictment, Case No. IT-96-23 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugo., Trial Chamber, June 26, 1996) (amended July 13, 1998, Sept. 6, 1999, Dec. 1, 1999),
available at http:lwww.un.orglicty/indictmentlenglishlkun-lai980819e.htm (charging
Dragoijub Kunarac, Radomir Kovac, and Zoran Vukovic).
60. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14 (Mar. 3, 2000); Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic, Judgment, Case No. 1T-95-16 (Jan. 14, 2000) (prosecuting Zoran Kupreskic,
Mijan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Vladimir Santic, and Dragan Papic);
Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-10 (Dec. 14, 1999); Prosecutor v. Furundzija,
Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1 (Dec. 10, 1998); Prosecutor v. Aleksovski, Judgment, Case
No. IT-95-14/1 (June 25, 1999); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21 (Nov.
16, 1998) (prosecuting Zenjil Delalic, Hazim Delic, Zdravko Mucic, and Esad Landzo);
Prosecutor v. Tadic, Judgment, Case No. IT-94-01 (May 7, 1997). For more information on
these trials, see http://www.un.org/icty/glance/ profact-e.htm.
61. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14 (Mar. 3,2000); Prosecutor v.
Kupreskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-16 (Jan. 14, 2000); Prosecutor v. Jelisic, Judgment,
Case No. IT-95-10 (Dec. 14, 1999); Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21
(Nov. 16, 1998). For more information on these appeals, see http://www.un.orglicty/ind-
e.htm.
62. Prosecutor v. Krstic, Indictment, Case No. IT-98-33 (Nov. 2, 1998); Prosecutor v.
Kunarac, Indictment, Case No. 1T-96-23 (June 26, 1996); Prosecutor v. Kordic & Cerkez,
Indictment, Case No. IT-95-14/2 (Nov. 10, 1995); Prosecutor v. Kvocka, Indictment, Case
No. IT-98-30 (Feb. 3, 1995). For more information on these trials, see http://www.un.org/
icty/glancelprocfact-e.htm.
63. Prosecutor v. Plavsic, Indictment, Case No. IT-00-40 (Apr. 7, 2000); Prosecutor
v. Krajisnik, Indictment, Case No. 1T-00-39 (Feb. 21, 2000); Prosecutor v. Galic, Indictment,
Case No. IT-98-29 (Mar. 26, 1999); Prosecutor v. Brdjanin, Indictment, Case No. IT-99-36
(Mar. 14, 1999) (charging Radoslav Brdjanin and Momir Talic); Prosecutor v. Martinovic,
Indictment, Case No. IT-98-34 (Dec. 21, 1998) (charging Vinko Martinovic and Miaden
Naletilic); Prosecutor v. Vasiljevic, Indictment, Case No. IT-98-32 (Aug. 26, 1998);
Prosecutor v. Krnojelac, Indictment, Case No. IT-97-25 (June 17, 1997); Prosecutor v.
Sikirica, Indictment, Case No. IT-95-8 (July 21, 1995) (charging Dusko Sikirica, Dragan
Kolundzija, and Damir Dosen); Prosecutor v. Simic, Indictment, Case No. IT-95-9 (July 21,
1995) (charging Milan Simic, Miroslav Tadic, Simo Zaric, and Stevan Todorovic); Prosecutor
v. Nikolic, Indictment, Case No. IT-94-2 (Nov. 4, 1994). For more information on these
trials, see http:/www.un.orglicty/glancel procfact-e.htm.
64. These individuals include: Dusko Tadic, Zlatko Aleksovski, Drazen Erdemovic,
Anto Furundzija. For more information on these individuals, see http://www.un.orglicty/
glancelprocfact-e.htm.
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been acquitted and released. 66 With respect to the ICTY's growth, from
virtually no staff the ICTY now has over 1000 staff members from over
sixty-eight different countries and the budget increased from $276,000 in
1993 to close to $100 million in 2000.67
Despite the difficulties faced by the Tribunals, including a delayed start
with trials while it awaited the appointment of a Prosecutor, the failure of the
states and the NATO forces to arrest indictees for so long, and the general
apathy and doubts that a judicial institution would help the peace effort, both
the ICTY and ICTR have made important contributions to international
criminal justice. In particular, I will discuss some of the decisions of the
Tribunals relating to crimes of sexual violence and highlight what I consider
to be the broader, more general contributions.
II. AN ASSESSMENT OF THE WORK OF THE TRIBUNALS
A. Contributions Regarding Crimes of Sexual Violence
One of the most significant contributions of the Tribunals is that they
have broken new ground with respect to crimes of sexual violence; crimes
which, for the most part, have been ignored in international prosecutions.
In the context of war, and otherwise, "[s]exual violence demoralizes
and humiliates its victims. It instills fear, anger, and hatred that may far
outlast the conflict among the warring parties. In the end, its power reaches
beyond its immediate victims to destroy the family and the fabric of
society. Widespread sexual violence has been used in armed conflicts as
a fighting tactic, to reward soldiers, to build morale, or to terrorize or destroy
69inferior people, as women were sometimes called. Unfortunately, sexual
65. These individuals include: Hazim Delic, Zdravko Mucic, Esad Landzo, Goran
Jelisic, Zoran Kupreskic, Mirjan Kupreskic, Vlatko Kupreskic, Drago Josipovic, Vladimir
Santic, and Tihomir Blaskic. For more information, see http:lwww.un.orglicty/glancel
procfact-e.htm.
66. Dragan Papic was released on Jan. 14, 2000. Zejrdl Delalic was released pending
appeal on Nov. 16, 1998. For more information, see http:llwww.un.orglicty/glance/detainees-
e.htm.
67. ICTY Key Figures, at http://www.un.orglicty/glance/keyfig-e.htm (last visited Jan.
23, 2001).
68. M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI & MARCIA McCORMICK, SEXuAL VIOLENCE: AN INvISIBLE
WEAPON OF WAR IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA 3 (DePaul Int'l Hum. Rts. L. Inst. Occasional
Paper No. 1, 1996).
69. See generally SusAN BROWNMILLER, AGAINST OUR WI.L: MEN, WOMEN AND
RAPE (Simon & Shuster, N.Y. 1975).
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violence largely has gone unprosecuted in the international arena. Some say
it is because sexual violence harms primarily women and in international
law, men primarily have made policy and decisions. Whatever the case may
be, the Tribunals are changing this unfortunate tradition. Some historical
background will help to put this in perspective.
1. Prosecution of Crimes Against Women Before
the ICTY and the ICTR
Crimes of sexual violence against women in an international context
have always occurred. Whether seen as an unavoidable consequence of war
or as intentional conduct, rape and other acts of sexual violence date back as
far as war.70 However, the prosecution of such conduct in an international
context is a relatively new phenomenon.7
After World War L the Allies established a commission to investigate
reports of mass rape of French and Belgian women by other troops.
72
However, no real action was taken.7  Similarly, after World War II,
significant evidence of mass rape was written into the trial record of the
Nuremberg trials.74 However, the French prosecutor declined to orally cite
the details of crimes of sexual violence, although he had no problem reciting
atrocious details of other war crimes.75 Yet, the Nuremberg Judgment does
not contain one reference to rape.
76
However, in a rare occurrence, rape was prosecuted in the international
context at the International Military Tribunal for the Far East, which sat in
Tokyo.77  This Tribunal found several high ranking officials guilty of
violations of the laws and customs of war for their responsibility for
widespread rapes and sexual assaults during World War II, despite the fact
that the Tribunal's Charter did not explicitly criminalize rape.78 These
assaults included the notorious Rape of Nanking, during which Japanese
70. BASSIOuNi & MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 1, 3-4.
71. See Theodor Meron, Rape as a War Crime, in WAR CRIMES LAW COMES OF
AGE: 1998 204, 206 (Oxford Univ. Press, 1998) (discussing national prosecutions of soldiers
for rape).
72. Catherine Niarchos, Women, War, and Rape: Challenges Facing the
International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 17 HUM. RTS. Q. 649, 663 (1995).
73. BASsiouNm & MCCORMICK, supra note 68, at 3-4.
74. Niarchos, supra note 72, at 663.
75. Id. at 664.
76. Id. at 665.
77. Id. at 666.
78. See id. at 677.
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soldiers raped approximately 20,000 women and children and later killed
most of them. 79 Yet, the Tribunal completely ignored the sexual slavery of
"comfort women" kept by Japanese soldiers to rape at will.80 Control
Council Law No. 10, which was enacted after World War H to try the
lesser Axis war criminals, continued this advancement by specifically listing
rape as a prosecutable crime against humanity. Unfortunately, this crime
was not prosecuted under this provision.
2. The Consideration of Crimes of Sexual Violence by
the ICTY and the ICTR
As noted above, the ICTY and the ICTR have even further advanced the
jurisprudence and prosecution of crimes of sexual violence. Rape is
explicitly listed in the Statutes of the ICTY and the ICTR as a crime against
humanity. 8 Although other crimes of sexual violence are not included in the
statutes, the Tribunals have held that rape and other forms of sexual violence
can constitute grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions of 1949, laws or
customs of war and genocide, as well as crimes against humanity.83 Three
judgments in particular show the development of this
prudence: Prosecutor v. Akayesu8 from the ICTR and the Celebici8l and
Furundzija 6 judgments from the ICTY.
79. See IRIS CHANG, THE RAPE OF NANKING: THE FORGOTrEN HOLOCAusT OF WORLD
WAR II 6 (1998).
80. Niarchos, supra note 72, at 666.
81. Allied Control Council Law No. 10, Punishment of Persons Guilty of War
Crimes, Crimes Against Peace and Against Humanity, Dec. 20, 1945, reprinted in VI Trials of
War Criminals Before the Nuremberg Military Tribunals Under Control Council Law No. 10
XVIII (1952).
82. See ICTY Statute, supra note 11, at art. 5; ICTR Statute, supra note 16, at art. 3.
83. Prosecutor v. Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. 96-4-T (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Rwanda., Trial Chamber, Sept. 2, 1998), available at http://www.ictr.org/ENGLISHI
judgements/AKAYESU/akayOOl.htm.
84. Id.
85. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugo., Trial Chamber, Nov. 16, 1998), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/celebici/trialc2/jugement/main.htm [hereinafter Celebici].
86. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Dec. 10, 1998), available at http://www.un.orglicty/
furundzija/trialc2/judgment/fur-tj981210e.htm.
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In the Akayesu case, the Prosecutor indicted the accused for killings and
sexual assaults of Tutsi residents in Rwanda during 1994.7 Although not
accused of raping anyone himself, the Trial Chamber found that as the
bourgmestre of the Taba commune in Rwanda, Akayesu "had reason to
know and in fact knew that sexual violence was taking place on or near the
premises of the bureau communal, and that women were being taken away
from the bureau communal and sexually violated."88  The Chamber
determined that Akayesu facilitated the commission of these acts through his
words of encouragement, "which, by virtue of his authority, sent a clear
signal of official tolerance for sexual violence, without which these acts
would not have taken place."89
This judgment is tremendously important for two reasons. First, it was
the first judgment of either of the Tribunals to define rape, finding it to be "a
physical invasion of a sexual nature, committed on a person under
circumstances which are coercive." 9  This judgment also included a
definition of sexual violence, which the judges determined was "any act of a
sexual nature which is committed on a person under circumstances which are
coercive. ' 91 This judgment found that such acts are "not limited to physical
invasion of the human body and may include acts which do not involve
penetration or even physical contact."
Second, the Trial Chamber found -that rape and sexual violence can
constitute the factual elements of the crime of genocide "in the same way as
any other act as long as they were committed with the specific intent to
destroy, in whole or in part, a particular group, targeted as such."93 Thus,
although rape is not specifically listed as a crime of genocide in the statute, it
has been held to cause "serious bodily and mental harm" to members of the
group and can therefore be prosecuted under the applicable provisions.
94
The Celebici case was next to address crimes of sexual violence. In the
Celebici indictment, one of the four accused was charged with subjecting
two victims to repeated incidents of forced sexual intercourse, a charge
which the prosecution argued could be considered torture as defined by the
Torture Convention and incorporated into the Statute of the ICTY in Articles
87. See Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. 96-4-T, at para. 12-12B.
88. Id. at para. 452.
89. Id. at para. 694.
90. Id. at para. 688.
91. Id.
92. Akayesu, Judgment, Case No. 96-4-T, at para. 688.
93. Id. atpara. 731.
94. Id.
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2 (grave breaches) and 3 (violations of the laws of customs of war).95 The
Trial Chamber adopted the Akayesu definition of rape,96 and, after seeking
guidance from cases from the Commission of Human Rights and the
European Court of Human Rights,97 found that rape could constitute
torture. 98 Specifically, the Trial Chamber held that, for a finding of torture
under Article 2 or 3 of the Statute of the ICTY: 1) there must be an act or
omission causing severe mental or physical pain or suffering; 2) the inflicted
suffering must be intentional; 3) the act must be performed for a specific
purpose such as obtaining information or a confession, punishment,
intimidation, or discrimination; and 4) the act or omission must be officially
sanctioned by one in an official capacity.99
The Trial Chamber ultimately found that rape, "a despicable act which
strikes at the very core of human dignity and physical integrity," satisfies a
factual element of torture. °° Interestingly, the Chamber determined that the
crimes were committed against the two victims because they are women,
finding that "this represents a form of discrimination which constitutes a
prohibited purpose for the offense of torture."' 0' Because gender is not
identified in the Statute of the ICTY as a basis of group identification that
enjoys protection from discrimination, this was a significant finding. 0 2
This is not to say that only women are the targets of sex based crimes.
In the Tadic case, the first trial to be conducted by the ICTY, the accused
was convicted for aiding and abetting in the sexual mutilation of a male
prisoner.10 3 In Celebici, the Trial Chamber convicted one of the accused of
war crimes and grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions for forcing male
inmates to perform fellatio and other sexually humiliating acts on each other,
95. Prosecutor v. Delalic, Indictment, Case No. IT-96-21, paras. 24-25 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Mar. 21, 1996), available at http:/www.un.orglicty/
celebici/trialc2/jugement/part6.htm.
96. Celebici, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21, at para. 479.
97. Aydin v. Turkey, 50 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 1867 (1996) (findings by the courts
that rape could constitute torture) (citing Mejia v. Peru, Case No. 10, 979 (Mar. 1, 1996)).
98. Celebici, Judgment, Case No. IT-96-21, at para. 479.
99. Id. at para. 494.
100. Id. at para. 495.
101. Id. at para. 941. This decision went further than the Akayesu Judgment which
found only that the victims were targeted as Tutsi women. See Akayesu, Judgment, Case No.
96-4-T.
102. The Statute does list gender as a ground on which persecution as a crime against
humanity can be committed in Article 7(1)(h).
103. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Opinion and Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1, para. 45 (Int'l
Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, May 7, 1997), available at http://www.un.
org/icty/tadic/trialc2/Jugement-e/tad-tj970507e.htm.
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finding that such conduct constituted "at least, a fundamental attack
on... [the victims'] human dignity."'4' The Trial Chamber found that the
act fulfilled the elements of inhuman treatment under Article 2 and cruel
treatment under Article 3.105 Importantly, the Trial Chamber there noted that
this act "could constitute rape" as well, implying that rape could be
committed against men or women'
°6
The Furundzija Judgment is more recent and builds upon the
jurisprudence established by the Tribunals addressing sexual violence.
There, the Trial Chamber found that the commander of a special military
police unit (ironically called the Jokers) interrogated a woman, and another
detainee, while she was beaten on her feet with a baton, and then failed to
intervene in any way while the woman was "forced... to have oral and
vaginal intercourse" with a subordinate officer.10 7 The commander was
found guilty of two counts of violations of laws or customs of war: torture
and outrage upon personal dignity including rape.108  Further, as stated
above, the Trial Chamber found that the definitions of rape in the Akayesu
and Celebici judgments suffered from a lack of specificity, and resorted to
national legal systems to craft a broader definition.139 Based on its review,
the Trial Chamber defined rape as:
(i) [T]he sexual penetration, however slight: (a) of the vagina or
anus of the victim by the penis of the perpetrator or any other
object used by the perpetrator; or (b) of the mouth of the victim by
the penis of the perpetrator; (ii) by coercion or force or threat of
force against the victim or a third person. 10
Significantly, this definition includes sexual penetration of the mouth of the
victim by the penis of the perpetrator, which would often be classified as
sexual assault in many systems, and carry a lower penalty."' Finally, the
Trial Chamber noted that rape and serious sexual assault should be
104. Celebici, Judgment, Case No. 1T-96-21, at para. 1066.
105. Id.
106. Id.
107. Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1, paras. 39-41, 44-46
(Int'l Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Dec. 10, 1998), available at
http://www.un.orgticty/ furundzija/trialc2/judgmentlfur-tj981210e.htm.
108. Id. at Disposition.
109. Id. at paras. 176-84.
110. Id. atpara. 185.
111. Id. atpara. 174.
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prosecuted as a grave breach, genocide, and of course, as a crime against
humanity as provided in Article 5 of the statute.'
1 2
The significance of this decision cannot be underestimated. It
recognizes that coercion-which the Trial Chambers in Akayesu and
Celebici found is inherent in armed conflict-exists whether directed toward
the victim or toward third parties. Further, the definition of rape is more
explicit than the prior definitions in the Tribunals and now unequivocally
encompasses oral sexual acts.'
1 3
On July 21, 2000, the Appeals Chamber affirmed the Trial Chamber's
findings, challenged by Furundzija, and denied the appeal. 14 I will only
mention three issues which were considered. First, Furundzija claimed he
was prejudiced because the Trial Chamber relied on evidence of acts that
were not charged in the Indictment, including Furundzija's complicity in
rapes or sexual assaults by another accused.'15 The Appeals Chamber found
that an indictment need only contain a "concise" statement of the facts that
the prosecution will rely on; it need not contain every fact."' Further, the
Appeals Chamber noted that if Furundzija believed that evidence came out
during trial that did not fall within the scope of the Indictment, he could have
challenged its admission or requested an adjournment to prepare his defense
against the charges.' 
17
Secondly, Furundzija argued that his sentence was so excessive that it
constituted "cruel and unusual punishment."'" 8 In support of this contention,
Furundzija noted what he saw as emerging sentencing principles in the
Tribunal." 9 Specifically, he claimed that the trial decisions of the ICTY thus
far indicated that "crimes against humanity should attract harsher sentences
than war crimes" and that crimes not involving the death of a victim
warranted shorter sentences.12' Based on this reasoning, and relying on the
112. Furundzija, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1, at para. 172.
113. See Prosecutor v. Furundzija, Appeals Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A (Int'l
Crim. Trib. Former Yugo., App. Chamber, July 21, 2000), available at http://www.un.org/
icty/furundzija/appeal/judgment/fur-tj000721 -e.htm.
114. See id. at paras. 25, 254.
115. Id. at para. 25.
116. Id. at para. 61.
117. Id. at 59, 61, 147.
118. Furundzija, Appeals Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, at para. 216.
119. Id. at para. 217.
120. Id.
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sentences imposed on Tadic, Erdemovic, and Aleskovski, he argued that his
sentence should be a maximum of six years.
12 1
The Prosecutor opposed the proposed reduction in the sentence, but
asserted that it would be beneficial for the Appeals Chamber to establish
sentencing guidelines to achieve consistency in sentencing.1 The Appeals
Chamber implied that such a process would be premature, given that there
have been only three final sentencing judgments, each of which admittedly
altered the sentence imposed by the original Trial Chamber.'2 In addition,
the Appeals Chamber noted that there were too many issues regarding
sentencing that had not yet been addressed to set such guidelines.1
24
The final issue I will refer to concerned the disqualification of a judge.
Furundzija argued that his conviction should be vacated because Florence
Mumba, one of the Trial Chamber judges, should have been disqualified. 12
This argument was based upon the fact that prior to joining the Tribunal,
Judge Mumba worked with the U.N. Commission on the Status of Women,
an organization which, among other things, was concerned with the
allegations of mass and systematic rape during the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia. 2 6 Furundzija claimed that this constituted an appearance of
bias, although he did not assert actual bias. 127 In rejecting this claim, the
Appeals Chamber established fuidelines for the disqualification of judges
when such a claim is made. 2 The Chamber found that there is an
unacceptable appearance of bias where:
i) [A] Judge is a party to the case, or has a financial or
proprietary interest in the outcome of a case, or if the
Judge's decision will lead to the promotion of a cause in
which he or she is involved, together with one of the
parties... [or]
ii) the circumstances would lead a reasonable observer,
properly informed, to reasonably apprehend bias. 29
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Furundzija, Appeals Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, at para. 237.
124. Id.
125. Id. at para. 169.
126. Id. at pam. 166.
127. Id. at paras. 169-70.
128. Furundzija, Appeals Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, at para. 179.
129. Id. atpara. 189.
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Based on these criteria, the Appeals Chamber found no bias.130 It noted that
Judge Mumba was serving as a representative of her country and not in her
personal capacity, and held that even if Judge Mumba expressed her support
of the objectives of the organization, there was no basis for a finding that
such an inclination would impede her impartiality in any given case.13 The
Chamber also pointed out that one of the Security Council's reasons for
establishing the Tribunal was to bring perpetrators of crimes against women
to justice. 32 Accordingly, sharing such goals was insufficient to prove
bias. 133
Each of these judgments devotes significant attention to crimes of rape
and sexual violence, showing that, at long last, they should be prosecuted as
vigorously as other crimes committed during conflicts. Although rape is
expressly enumerated only as a crime against humanity in the Statute of the
ICTY and the Statute of the ICTR, these judgments recognize that rape and
sexual violence can also constitute a grave breach of the Geneva
Conventions, a violation of the laws or customs of war, or an act of
genocide.
B. General Contributions of the Tribunals
Perhaps the most far-reaching contribution of the Tribunals is that their
very establishment signaled the beginning of the end of the cycle of
impunity. Those responsible for committing or ordering the commission of
horrific acts of violence against innocent civilians, simply because of the
happenstance of their birth, their ethnicity, their religious beliefs, or their
gender, are now for the first time being called to account for their criminal
deeds. By ensuring this accounting, the Tribunals concretely show that the
international instruments guaranteeing basic human rights are more than
merely an aspiration.
The Tribunals have also demonstrated that the rule of law is an integral
part of the peace process; expanded the jurisprudence of international
humanitarian law; raised the international community's level of
consciousness regarding the need of states to enforce international norms;
and accelerated the development of the permanent International Criminal
Court. Further, the Outreach Program, which I will discuss in a few
130. Id. at para. 199.
131. Id. atparas. 199-200.
132. Id. at para. 201.
133. Furundzija, Appeals Judgment, Case No. IT-95-17/1-A, at para. 202.
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moments, offers an important mechanism to help the reconciliation process
in the former Yugoslavia.
The Security Council's choice of a court of law as the measure to help
to bring about and maintain peace is a victory for the rule of law, the anchor
of civil society. In the ICTY's early days, some thought that the prosecution
of alleged war criminals was inconsistent with efforts to bring peace to the
region. Now, the goals of peace and international criminal justice are no
longer seen as mutually exclusive. Rather, they are interdependent and
complimentary.
Moreover, the trials in the Tribunals develop a historical record of what
happened in the regions of conflict, thus guarding against revisionism. The
judgments, which typically detail the factual circumstances of the crime
charged, provide an incontrovertible record of the brutality engaged in by
ethnic groups pitted against each other by incessant, virulent propaganda.
The judgments also have made substantive findings on a myriad of legal
issues, most of which had never been considered by a court. For example,
the Geneva Conventions of 1949 establish a "grave breaches" regime that
prohibits certain types of behavior directed against protected persons or
property.1 34 The ICTY has held that Article 2 applies only in the context of
an international armed conflict. Further, the victims must be regarded as
"protected" by the Fourth Geneva Convention.
In the Tadic case, the Trial Chamber, by majority, found that the
conflict in the Prijedor area of Bosnia was not international after May 19,
1992, the date of the purported withdrawal of the forces of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia ("FRY"), the Yugoslavian military.3  The majority
also found that the victims were not protected persons.13 6 The Appeals
Chamber reversed on this point and after a lengthy discussion of the
Nicaragua Decision from the International Court of Justice, construed it as
requiring only that the Bosnian Serb armed forces were acting "under the
overall control of and on behalf of the FRY."'3 7 Thus, the Bosnian victims
were deemed to be in the hands of an armed force of a state of which they
were not nationals and thus, were protected persons. The Blaskic Judgment
follows this approach and has found that the "grave breaches" regime
134. See Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, supra note 5.
135. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Appeals Judgment, Case No. IT-94-1, para. 607 (Int'l Crim.
Trib. Former Yugo., App. Chamber, July 15, 1999), available at http:/lwww.un.org/icty/tadic/
appeal/judgement/tad-aj990715e.htn.
136. Id. atpara. 608.
137. Id. at para. 162.
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applied. 38 The ICTY also construed broadly laws and customs of war and
held that this body of law, known as the "Hague Law," applies to both
international and internal armed conflicts.139  The judgments also have
significantly advanced the jurisprudence relating to crimes of sexual
violence, an area ignored in international law, which I have discussed.
Additionally, the work of the Tribunals has significantly raised the
awareness of the importance of enforcing international humanitarian law. It
has given the many human rights instruments some real meaning and power.
Since the establishment of the Tribunals, the awareness of the need to
enforce human rights violations in armed conflicts and the actual prosecution
of such crimes has increased. This is an important development because the
ad hoc Tribunals cannot possibly handle all of the potential prosecutions
growing out of the conflicts in the former Yugoslavia and in Rwanda.
Because of limited resources, the Tribunals can apply law which has been
ignored in a forum free from accusations of bias, thereby developing a body
of jurisprudence that can be used by municipal courts in their own trials.
Thus, by raising the consciousness of states and developing a body of law
that states can apply, the Tribunals pass the torch to national courts which
are, or may become, better equipped to handle large numbers of
prosecutions.
Another important contribution of the Tribunals is that they have,
without question, accelerated the movement to establish a permanent
International Criminal Court. The Tribunals have demonstrated that
international criminal justice is possible. They are positive proof it is
possible to try persons charged with serious violations of international
humanitarian law in international courts and that the differences in the civil
and common law systems-not to mention the country by country
differences even within the same type of system-are not insurmountable
obstacles.
Finally, the importance of the Outreach Program cannot be overstated.
Increasing the awareness of and combating the misinformation about the
ICTY was one of my priorities when I was elected President of the ICTY in
November of 1997. Considering the ICTY's extraordinary mandate, I felt
that the ICTY must take affirmative steps to make the processes and
138. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Judgment, Case No. IT-95-14, para. 73 (Int'l Crim. Trib.
Former Yugo., Trial Chamber, Mar. 3, 2000), available at www.un.org/icty/blaskic/trialcl/
judgment/main.htm
139. Prosecutor v. Tadic, Decision, Case No. IT-94-1, para. 89 (Int'l Crim. Trib. Former
Yugo., App. Chamber, Oct. 2, 1995), available at www.un.org/icty/tadic/appeal/decision-
e/51002.htm.
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personalities known and understood, especially by the people in the former
Yugoslavia:
Following much debate, the Program was finally established in
September of 1999. The Program has a coordinator based in the Hague, with
offices in Croatia and Bosnia, through which there are regular contacts with
the media, legal professionals, and other groups. To date, it has organized
weekly television updates on its activities, broadcasted its proceedings, and
conducted regular conferences and exchanges of personnel and information
between the Hague and the region. During my term as President, many of
the judges of the Tribunal wanted to visit the region, but for much of that
time the conditions on the ground would not permit such visits. Now there
have been visits to Sarajevo and Croatia, and the exchanges between the
people of the region and the judges have been mutually beneficial.
This is only a first step that must be consolidated and expanded.14° The
United States and the MacArthur Foundation responded to my personal
appeal for funding, and various European States have contributed as well.
However, the current funding will only take the Program to the end of 2000.
I continue to believe that it represents a vital aspect of the Tribunal's work,
which is so different than courts of national systems that are integrated in the
criminal justice framework of the community. Support for this initiative,
both within and outside of the Tribunal must not be eroded. If judgments
issued hundreds of miles from the scene of the conflict by an international
court are to have an effect on the community, that community must
understand and appreciate the work of the Tribunal; this is the goal of the
Outreach Program.
III. CONCLUSION
The critical contribution of the Tribunals has been to foster and enhance
the recognition by states of the need to enforce norms of international law
prohibiting massive violations of human rights. Judicial mechanisms are
now an established element of conflict resolution, and proposals under
discussion around the world envision a range of international, national, and
mixed Tribunals. Moreover, following the lead of the Tribunals, the culture
of impunity is being challenged by states whose national courts are applying
international law. Finally, the International Criminal Court would not be so
close to reality-getting closer every day-without the influence of both the
ICTY and the ICTR.
140. Justice, Accountability and Social Reconstruction, supra note 9, at 8-9.
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The judgments of the Tribunals do more than determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused. They do more than establish a historical record of
what transpired. They do more than interpret international humanitarian
law. Rather, the judgments of the Tribunals are evidence of actual
enforcement of international norms. This is the best proof that the numerous
conventions, protocols, and resolutions affirming human dignity are more
than promises. Rather, the rule of law is an important component of the
peace process.
It is clear then that we are living through tremendously encouraging
times. Yet, how do we situate the progress over the past seven years in light
of the amount of bloodshed that has gone unchecked from Iraq to the former
Yugoslavia, to Somalia, through Rwanda, Afghanistan, Burundi, Liberia,
Sierra Leone, Columbia, the Congo, Chechnya, Indonesia, and the Sudan?
The Tribunals have demonstrated that international criminal law is feasible.
We have seen that the establishment of international courts of law is now
being considered as a policy option to respond to humanitarian crises. No
court can prevent all war, and the challenge of the twenty-first century is to
utilize options to prevent the wanton destruction of innocent civilians which
was characteristic of the twentieth century.
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What is Needed to Protect International Human Rights in
the 21st Century
Dr. Oscar Arias
International human rights is a subject of special significance to me, as
a citizen and former President of Costa Rica. My country has a long
tradition of valuing and respecting human rights, while at the same time the
region of Central America knows all too well the pain and suffering caused
by brutal human rights violations.!
In Costa Rica, we believe that all people should be able to live and
express themselves without fear of their government, that all people are
entitled to educational and medical services, and that all people are entitled
to lead productive, dignified lives. Costa Rica has often served as an
* Dr. Oscar Arias, former President of Costa Rica and 1987 Nobel Laureate, holds
international stature as a spokesperson for the Third World. Championing such issues as
human development, democracy, and demilitarization, he has traveled the globe spreading a
message of peace and applying the lessons garnered from the Central American Peace Process
to topics of global debate.
Dr. Arias was born in Heredia, Costa Rica in 1940. He studied law and
economics at the University of Costa Rica. In 1974, he received a doctoral degree in political
science at the University of Essex, England. After serving as professor of political science at
the University of Costa Rica, Dr. Arias was appointed Costa Rican Minister of Planning and
Economic Policy. In 1986, Dr. Arias was elected President of Costa Rica and held that
position until 1990.
In 1987, Dr. Arias drafted a peace plan to end a time of great regional discord in
Central America. Widely recognized as the Arias Peace Plan, his initiative culminated in the
signing of the Esquipulas II Accords, or the Procedure to Establish a Firm and Lasting Peace
in Central America, by all the Central American presidents on August 7, 1987. In that same
year, he was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize.
In 1988, Dr. Arias used the monetary award from the Nobel Peace Prize to
establish the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress. From these headquarters, Dr.
Arias has continued his pursuit of global peace and human security.
Dr. Arias has received honorary doctorates from numerous universities and many
honorary prizes, among them the Jackson Ralston Prize, the Prince of Asturias Award, the
Martin Luther King, Jr. Peace Award, the Albert Schweitzer Humanitarian Award, the Liberty
Medal of Philadelphia, and the Americas Award.
** The Nova Law Review selected the materials included in the citations of this
essay.
1. Latin Am. Trek- Costa Rica, at http://www.worldtrek.orglodyssey/latinamerica/
oscar/costarica.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
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example and taken the lead in raising the subject of human rights in the
international arena. The treaty establishing hemispheric institutions to
protect human rights was signed in San Jos6 in 1969,2 and the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights3 has its headquarters in Costa Rica.4 A
related agency, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights,5 has its
headquarters in Washington D.C.
6
My nation's concern with human rights arises at least in part because
we have witnessed and learned from the painful experiences endured by our
neighbors in recent decades.7 In many Central American countries, the
repressive actions of military dictatorships and government sponsored death
squads created a climate of fear and disillusionment and has stifled the
creativity of an entire generation. During the civil wars of the 1980s,8
senseless violence claimed the lives of hundreds of thousands of our people;
and millions more suffered hardship and de~rivation as fighting and sabotage
disrupted the process of economic growth. In a poor region like ours, we
cannot afford to squander opportunities for development by wasting our
energy on violence and repression. Having seen the destruction wrought by
internal conflicts in Guatemala, 1° El Salvador," and Nicaragua, 12 Costa
Ricans have come to understand the true importance of maintaining a culture
that respects human rights. Fortunately, our neighbors are beginning to
understand the importance of human rights as well; with democratic leaders
2. Roy M. Mersky & Jonathan Pratter, The Inter-Am. Human Rights System:
Documents, Publ'ns & Internet Resources, 25 INT'LJ. LErAL INK. 112, 120 (1997).
3. Id. at 121. The Court renders decisions in contentious cases of human rights
violations brought before it. Id. at 122.
4. Id. at 122; see also Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, available at
http://www.cidh.oas.org/WhatsthelACHR.htm. (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
5. See Inter-Am. Comm'n on Human Rights, supra note 4.
6. Id.
7. Latin Am. Trek: Oscar Arias Sanchez, at http://www.worldtrek.org/odyssey/
latinamerica/oscar/costarica.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
8. Mersky & Pratter, supra note 2, at 124.
9. Dr. Oscar Arias, Nobel Peace Prize Acceptance Speech (Dec. 10, 1987),
http://www.arias.or.cr/fundador/nobel-e.htr.
10. See generally Susanne Jonas, Electoral Problems in Guatemala, in ELECIONS AND
DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, REvisrrED 32-37 (Mitchell A. Seligson & John A. Booth
eds., 1995).
11. Mersky & Pratter, supra note 2, at 124.
12. See Leslie Anderson, Elections and Public Opinion in the Development of
Nicaraguan Democracy, in ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, REVISrTED,
supra note 10, at 84-86.
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now governing all of the countries on the isthmus,' 3 we can reasonably hope
for a brighter future for our region.
As the title indicates, the focus of this article is on human rights in the
twenty-first century. However, I want to begin my analysis by assessing the
progress that has been made in the fight for human rights and human dignity
over the past hundred years. For those of us who are deeply concerned about
the establishment and protection of the fundamental rights of all people, the
twentieth century has been the best of times and the worst of times. On one
hand, we have made many important advances. For example, as we look
back upon the past hundred years, we can celebrate the adoption of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 14 through which all nations have
pledged to uphold the basic liberties of all human beings. 15  In recent
decades, additional treaties have been promulgated to protect the social,
cultural, and economic rights of all people.! An impressive array of
international bodies and nongovernmental organizations ("NGOs") have
arisen to protect and defend human rights, 17 and the cause of human rights
has advanced as democratically elected governments have replaced
repressive regimes in South Africa,18 Central America, 19 Eastern Europe,20
Indonesia,2 ' and Nigeria.22
13. See John A. Booth, Conclusion. Elections and the Prospects for Democracy in
Central America, in ELECTIONS AND DEMOCRACY IN CENTRAL AMERICA, REVISITED, supra note
10, at 264.
14. THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMMENTARY 13 (Asbjem
Eide et al. eds., 1992) [hereinafter UNIVERSAL DECLARATON].
15. Id. at 20.
16. Id. at 22-23.
17. See id.at28.
18. See generally LINDSAY MICHIE EADES, THE END OF APARTHEID IN SOUTH AFRICA
(1999). The first democratic election was held in 1994. Id.
19. BOOTH, supra note 13, at 264-65.
20. See WENDY HOLLs, DEMOCRATIC CONSOLIDATION IN EASTERN EUROPE: THE
INFLUENCE OF THE COMMUNIST LEGACY IN HUNGARY, THE CZECH REPUBLIC, AND ROMAINA
213, 443 (1999). The first democratic elections were held in 1990. Id.
21. See INDONESIA BEYOND SUHARTO: POLICY, ECONOMY, SOCIErY & TRANSITION
359-61 (Donald K. Emmerson ed., 1999). The first democratic election was held in the late
1990s. Id.
22. See ADEBAYO ADEDEJ, ET. AL., NIGERIA: RENEWAL FROM THE ROOTS?: THE
STRUGGLE -OR DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT 45-46 (1997). The first democratic election was
held in 1960. Id. at 45.
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We cannot forget, though, that the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights was drafted only after six million people perished in the Holocaust.23
It is sobering to think that the international community formally defined and
codified human rights only after the most systematic and brutal violation of
human rights the world had ever seen. It is even more sobering to note that
human rights have been flagrantly violated throughout the half century since
the adoption of the Universal Declaration. Despite the commitment of all
nations to defend human rights, two million people lost their lives during the
Khmer Rouge's reign of terror in Cambodia,24 dissidents and activists
"disappeared" during Latin American dictatorships, 25 and institutionalized
racism prevailed for decades in South Africa.26
Even as the new millennium begins, human rights continue to be
violated and abused around the world. Within the past few years, we have
seen an attempt at genocide in Rwanda, 27 where nearly a million people lost
their lives in government-sponsored violence.28 We have seen so-called
"ethnic cleansing" campaigns in the Balkans, 29 and we continue to receive
reports of atrocities in Chechnya. 30 In China, more than a billion people live
under an undemocratic regime that restricts religious freedom, persecutes its
Tibetan and Muslim minorities, and holds political prisoners in labor
camps. 31 Even in Western democracies like the United States, there are
well-documented cases of police brutality and racism.
32
Perhaps most distressing of all is the fact that leaders of some nations
have begun to question openly the universality of human rights. Certain
repressive regimes in the Far East have suggested "Asian values" are not
fully compatible with the individual rights that are enshrined in the
23. See HOWARD BALL, PROSECUTING WAR CRIMES AND GENOCIDE: THE TWENTIETH-
CENTURY EXPERIENCE 26 (1999) (discussing genocide in the 20th century).
24. Id.
25. See id. at 219.
26. See EADES, supra note 18, at 12-13.
27. BALL, supra note 23, at 155-56.
28. Id.
29. lad at 128-29.
30. The War in Chechnya: Russia's Conduct, the Humanitarian Crisis, and United
States Policy: Hearing Before the Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations, 106th Cong. (2000)
(statement of Jesse Helms, Chairman, Senate Comm. on Foreign Relations),
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate (last visited Mar. 24, 2001).
31. See generally Charlotte Wedin, The Human Rights Solution in Tibet, 25 INT'L J.
LEGAL INFO. 145-48 (1997).
32. See Inter-Anm C.H.R., Rep. No. 19/92, OEA/ser. L./V/II.83, doc. 14 (Mar. 12,
1993), available at http:lwww.oas.orglcidhlannualrep/92englch3q.htm.
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Universal Declaration of Human Rights,33 and the leaders of some African
countries have remarked that the Universal Declaration should not apply
fully to their continent because most African countries did not take part in
drafting the document in 1948. 4 To be sure, we must avoid ethnocentrism
when we formulate our concept of human rights, but we must strongly resist
the efforts of those who would deny the universality of those rights. By their
very nature, human rights extend to every man, woman, and child on the
planet, regardless of their ethnic background or social standing.
In promoting worldwide respect for human rights in the next century,
we must have the same courage and vision that the signers of the Universal
Declaration had a half century ago. Through that important document the
nations of the world promised that they would never again allow the
violation of human rights.35 The leaders who signed the Declaration in 1948
recognized that violations of human rights anywhere represented a threat to
36the basic liberties of people everywhere. They made a collective pledge to
respect fundamental human freedoms, and they called for collective action to
punish those who abused them.37 Sadly, however, the experience of the past
fifty years has shown that solemn pledges and noble intentions are not
enough to safeguard the rights of all people.3 8 Therefore, in looking ahead to
the twenty-first century, we must seek to create a new world order under
which human rights will truly be secure. I believe that it will be possible to
create such an order if we focus our energies on constructing stronger
international institutions, reducing global military expenditures, providing
debt relief to poor countries, controlling the proliferation of arms, and
responding quickly and decisively to human rights crises.
It will not be only the government's role to accomplish these things. If
we wait for national governments to take the lead in combating human rights
violations in the new century, we may be waiting a very long time.
Fortunately, NGOs are becoming increasingly visible and powerful in
drafting, promoting, and winning official approval of multilateral initiatives
33. See Anita Chan, Labor Standards & Human Rights: The Case of Chinese
Workers Under Market Socialism, 20 HuM. RTS. Q. 886, 899 (1998).
34. Prof. H. Gros Espiell, The Evolving Concept of Human Rights: Western, Socialist
and Third World Approaches in HUMAN RIGHTS: THRTY YEARS AFrER THE UNIVERSAL
DECLARATION 61 (B.G. Ramcharan ed., 1979).
35. BALL, supra note 23, at 91.
36. Id.
37. See Espiel, supra note 34, at 15.
38. See id. at 62.
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that contribute to peace, social justice, and human security.39  While
negotiations on such sensitive issues as disarmament and national
sovereignty were once the exclusive province of governments,
representatives of civil society are now having an impact on international
policymaking in a broad range of areas. 4°
Indeed, NGOs have become such an integral part of the international
system that we often fail to notice the many ways in which they affect
policymaking. Groups such as Amnesty International and Human Rights
Watch do more than any government to draw attention to human rights
violations around the world.4' Humanitarian NGOs like the Red Cross,
42
Doctors Without Borders, 43 and Oxfam"4 -to name just a few-save
countless lives in conflict torn regions.45 Organizations like Transparency
International46 seek to fight corruption wherever it is to be found, and a host
of environmental groups argue forcefully for the protection of the world's
ecosystems and natural resources. 47 Truly, NGOs are active in every
imaginable policy area.
In recent years, NGOs have become more fully conscious of the
influence they have on international policyma" , and they have begun to
come together in undertaking ambitious projects. 8 By doing so, they have
convinced many governments to adopt policies that protect human rights and
promote human development. What is encouraging is that ordinary citizens,
by banding together to fight for universal human dignity, have been able
to-and continue to-have an impact beyond what was formerly deemed
possible. The steps toward safeguarding human rights in the twenty-first
century, which I shall outline below, reflect the ways in which NGOs and
39. See Jan Mtrtenson, The Preamble of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
and the UN Human Rights Programme in UNIVERSAL DECLARATION, supra note 14, at 28; see
also BALL, supra note 23, at 196.
40. BALL, supra note 23, at 196.
41. See id. at 196-97.
42. Mirtenson, supra note 39, at 28.
43. Doctors Without Borders, Introduction, at http://www.doctorswithoutborders.org/
about (last visited Jan. 19, 2001).
44. OXFAM INT'L, About Oxfam Int'l, at http://www.oxfam.org/aboutdefault.htm (last
visited Feb. 13, 2001).
45. See id.; see also Doctors Without Borders, supra note 43.
46. Transparency Int'l, Programmes and Activities, at http://www.transparency.de/
activities/index.htnl (last visited Feb. 13, 2001).
47. See GREENPEACE, Greenpeace Global Annual Report 1999, available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/report99/html/content/pl 1.html (last visited Jan. 25, 2001).
48. See BALL, supra note 23, at 196-97.
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governments can and must work together to rid the world of human rights
abuses in the twenty-first century.
A first step toward the protection of human rights in the new century
will be the creation of multilateral institutions capable of deterring abuses
and empowered to punish violators of human rights. The international
community has taken an important step in this direction by establishing
tribunals to investigate war crimes and human rights violations that have
taken place in Rwanda4 9 and in the former Yugoslavia.50 However, the
deterrent value of these courts is limited by the fact that their work is purely
retrospective. 5' A comprehensive international system for dealing with
suspected human rights abusers is desperately needed, as the confusion and
controversy that surrounded the arrest of former Chilean dictator Augusto
Pinochet clearly demonstrated. 2
The creation of an International Criminal Court ("ICC")5 3 would do
much to address the deficiencies of the current system. Because the ICC
would be a permanent body responsible for trying suspected war criminals
and human rights abusers, its existence alone would serve to deter would-be
violators of human rights who might otherwise be able to act with impunity.
Moreover, by ensuring that the perpetrators of heinous crimes are brought to
justice quickly, the ICC would help conflict-torn nations on the road to
reconciliation and recovery.
Proposals for the establishment of an ICC have been circulating since
the days of the Nuremburg trials, but the movement to set up such an
institution has only gained momentum since the end of the Cold War.
5 4
Outraged by scenes of bloodshed and suffering in places like Somalia5 and
the Caucasus region,56 several NGOs and countless individuals have
energetically called for the creation of a permanent international tribunal5 7
Many governments have resisted this movement, citing the need to
protect "national sovereignty. ' '" 8 Because the political will to create such an
institution did not exist within the governments of most nations, NGOs have
49. Id. at 170-71.
50. Id. at 121.
51. Id. at 196-98.
52. Id at 219.
53. BALL, supra note 23, at 196.
54. Id. at 194.
55. Id. at 188.
56. U.S. Interests in the Caucasus Region: Hearing Before the House of Rep. Comm.
on Int'l Relations, 104th Cong. Sess. 2 (1996).
57. BALL, supra note 23, at 196-97.
58. Id. at 200-02.
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led the way in fighting for the establishment of an ICC.59 These efforts bore
fruit in 1998, when an overwhelming majority of delegates at a diplomatic
conference in Rome expressed their support for the foundation of an ICC.6
Since then, ninety-eight nations have signed the so-called Rome Statute, and
fourteen countries have ratified the accord. 61 The NGO coalition for an ICC
continues to apply pressure on governments to sign and ratify the agreement,
and it seeks to build a popular consensus in favor of an ICC in countries
around the world. 62 To be sure, much work remains to be done: forty-six
more ratifications will be necessary before the Rome Statute takes effect and
an ICC is established.63 Moreover, backers of the ICC face a difficult task as
they seek to convince key United States leaders to support their project.
Nonetheless, it is remarkable to note that a coalition of NGOs has achieved
so much, in collaboration with governments who were either supportive from
the beginning or who came to see the light because of the work of this
coalition.
The duty remains with those of us who are dedicated to preventing and
punishing human rights abuses to continue advocating for the ratification of
the Rome Statute until it takes effect with the necessary sixty ratifications.6
Since the Court will not be fully effective unless all nations recognize its
jurisdiction and support its work, activists and concerned citizens must work
to convince leaders of certain recalcitrant countries that the creation of an
ICC is both morally necessary and politically desirable. Not long ago, the
idea of an ICC would have been dismissed as an impossibly idealistic goal.
Today, thanks largely to the efforts of a broad-based coalition of NGOs, the
goal of creating a permanent international tribunal is within reach, even if
much work remains to be done.
The existence of an ICC would certainly help to deter the most
outrageous forms of human rights abuses such as genocide, war crimes, and
crimes against humanity, but there are also many simpler human rights to
defend. These basic rights include the right to education, health care, and
other essential social services, not to mention adequate food and shelter. To
59. Id. at 196-97.
60. Id. at 196-205.
61. Coalition for an Int'l Criminal Court, http://www.igc.org/icc/index.html (last
visited Feb. 13, 2001). Since Dr. Arias' address in April, 2000, the number of nations who
have signed the Rome Statute is 139 and the number to ratify has increased to 28. Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. Currently, 32 additional signatures are needed for ratification. See id.
64. See Rome Statute of the Int'l Criminal Court, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 183/9, pt. 13,
art. 126 (1998), available at http://www.un.org/icc/partl.htm.
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ensure that all people have the opportunity to exercise these rights, it will be
necessary to challenge a world military-industrial complex removed from
democratic controls and humanitarian standards. "Without a doubt, military
spending represent[s] the single most significant perversion of worldwide
priorities known today."65 The 745 billion dollars spent on weapons and
soldiers in 1998 constitute a global tragedy.66
In India, Pakistan, the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, Indonesia, and
in many other nations, unnecessary investment in military hardware has
helped to perpetuate poverty and create a global crisis.67 It is an economic
crisis when nearly a billion and a half people have no access to clean water,
and a billion live in miserably substandard housing.68 It is a leadership crisis
when we allow wealth to be concentrated in fewer and fewer hands, so that
the world's three richest people have assets that exceed the combined gross
domestic product of the poorest forty-eight countries.69 It is a spiritual crisis
when-as Gandhi said-many people are so poor that they only see God in
the form of bread, and when other individuals seem only to have faith in the
"invisible hand" that guides the free market. 70 It is a moral crisis when
40,000 children die each day from malnutrition and disease.71 And it is a
democratic crisis when 1.3 billion people live on an income of less than one
dollar per day and are effectively excluded from public decision making
because of the wrenching poverty in which they live.
All of these crises, in fact, constitute a crisis of human rights. For it is
not only kidnapping, torture, and assassination that constitutes abuse of
human rights. To quote from Article 25 of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, "[e]veryone has the right to a standard of living adequate for
the health and well-being of himself and of his family, including food,
65. Press Release, U.N., Secretary-General Opens Annual NGO Conference, Meeting
Also Hears Queen Noor of Jordan and Nobel Laureate Oscar Arias (Sept. 15, 1999)
[hereinafter Press Release].
66. See Associated Press, Peace Institute Paints Gloomy Global Picture, FLA. TIES
UNION, June 18, 1999, at A12.
67. Dorinda G. Dallmeyer, Reexamining Export Controls from the Demand Side, 88
AM. SOC'Y OF INT'L L. 552, 563-64 (1994).
68. Press Release, supra note 65.
69. Id.
70. Id.; MAHATMA GANDHi, ALL MEN ARE BRoTHERs 123 (Krishna Kripalani ed.,
UNESCO 1972) (1958).
71. Press Release, supra note 65.
72. ERIC TOussAINT, YouR MONEY OR YouR LIEV TAE TYRANNY' OF GLOBAL
FINANCE 17 (Raghu Krishnan trans., Pluto Press 1999) (1998).
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clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social services ... ,,7' The
Declaration goes on to state in Article 26 that "[e]veryone has the right to
education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary and
fundamental stages .... Technical and professional education shall be made
generally available and higher education shall be equally accessible to all on
the basis of merit." 74
Is it not a trampling of these rights when excessive levels of military
spending make it impossible for the poor to receive the basic services that
are due to them as human beings? Tragically, half of the world's
governments spend more money on defense than they spend on health
programs,75 and military spending is rising quickly in poverty-stricken
countries such as India, Sri Lanka, and China. 76 For its part, the United
States is hardly providing moral leadership; United States legislators and
presidential candidates seem intent on adding large amounts of money to an
already bloated defense budget, even as millions of American children grow
up poor and without health insurance.77 Such distortions in national budgets
contribute to poverty and retard human development. As President Dwight
D. Eisenhower once said:
Every gun made, every warship launched, every rocket fired
signifies, in the final sense, a theft from those who hunger and
are not fed, those who are cold and are not clothed.
This world in arms is not spending money alone.
It is spending the sweat of its laborers, the genius of its
scientists ....
War, and the preparation for war, are among the greatest obstacles to
the creation of a world in which human rights are universally respected.
73. U.N. Div. OF HUMAN RIGHTS: A COMPILATION OF INT'L INSTRUMENTS at 3, U.N.
Doc. ST/HR/I/Rev.3, U.N. Sales No. E.83.XIV.1 (1983) [hereinafter COMPILATION].
74. Id.
75. The Int'l Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers, available at http:llwww.arias.or.crl
fundarias/cpr/codel.shtml (last visited Jan. 28, 2001) [hereinafter Int'l Code of Conduct].
76. See generally Military Expenditure, Economic Dev. & Soc. Spending, available at
http://www.arias.or.cr/documentos/cpr/guat2-i.htm (last visited Apr. 9, 2001) (discussing
nilitary spending effects upon underdeveloped countries).
77. Oscar Arias et al., Less Spending, More Security: A Practical Plan to Reduce
World Military Spending, available at http:llwww.fas.orglpub/genlmswglyear20OO/oped.htrn
(last visited Feb. 2, 2001).
78. Dwight D. Eisenhower, Toward a Golden Age of Peace, Address before the Am.
Soc. of Newspaper Editors (Apr. 16, 1953), in PEACE wrrH JUSTICE 34, 37 (1961).
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Truly, unnecessary military spending fosters a vicious cycle of arms
buildups, violence, human rights violations, and poverty.
In addition to military spending, the tremendous burden of debt under
which many poor nations labor presents another colossal impediment to the
protection of human dignity for their citizens. In sub-Saharan Africa, the
world's poorest region and the current scene of a raging AIDS epidemic that
has life expectancies falling and horrifying numbers of children becoming
orphaned, debt payments exceed public spending on health care and
education by a factor of four. 7 9 In Nicaragua, where thirty-four percent of
the adult population is illiterate, the government spends approximately one
million dollars every day in interest on its foreign debt.
80
The scope of the problem is enormous. It is estimated that developing
nations together owe more than two trillion dollars to the governments of
rich countries, to foreign commercial banks, and to international financial
institutions.81 What is worse, we cannot even pretend that the money
borrowed was put to its intended use. In many cases, loans were carelessly
given to corrupt rulers and undemocratic regimes that either stole the money
or wasted it on unnecessary military hardware and useless public works
projects.82  Now, the democratic governments that have replaced those
dictators and that have not inherited any benefits from those loans are
demanded to repay them.
The debt burden of poor countries is creating hopelessness and
perpetuating poverty, public health epidemics, and widespread lack of access
to education, all of which are in violation of the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights. 3 If this document and the rights it was drafted to defend are
to be taken seriously, then debt relief to poor nations must be taken seriously
as well, and undertaken immediately. To this end, another coalition of
NGOs has led the way in calling for a just and humane solution to the debt
problem. The Jubilee 2000 Coalition is a global network of NGOs calling
for debt forgiveness for the poorest, most heavily indebted nations of the
world as the new millennium begins.84 By drawing attention to the massive
scale of the problem, and by applying pressure on governments in many
79. ToussAIr, supra note 72, at 195.
80. See CIA, THE WoRLD FACTBOOK 1999, 355-56 (1999).
81. See id. at 531.
82. See RuTH LEGER SivARD, WoRLD MmrrARY & SocIAL EXPENDITURES: 1983 22-
26 (1983).
83. See generally COMPItATION, supra note 73.
84. Jubilee 2000 Coalition: A Debt-Free Start for a Billion People, at
http:/www.jubilee2OOOuk.orglhome.html (last visited Jan. 19, 2001).
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parts of the world, the groups that make up the Jubilee 2000 Coalition hope
to prompt creditor nations to adopt far-reaching debt relief measures.8 5 They
also hope to convince debtor nations to invest in much needed anti-poverty
programs in exchange for debt forgiveness.
86
As debt servicing payments and military spending continue to rob the
poor of basic health and education services, developed nations continue to
profit from this tragic situation. Just as the Jubilee 2000 Coalition is calling
on wealthy nations to cancel debt, the arms sales by these same first world
powers must be put to an ethical test. For far too long it has been extremely
easy for governments that violate human rights to obtain weapons from
abroad. In the 1980s, Western governments and corporations played a
significant part in arming Saddam Hussein's despotic regime in Iraq.
87
Earlier in this decade, France provided significant military aid to the
genocidal government of Rwanda. 8s Until recently, the Indonesian military
used British-made equipment against pro-independence groups in East
Timor.89 When arms sales to undemocratic or repressive regimes are
proposed, humanitarian considerations are regularly subordinated to short-
sighted strategic interests or to a desire for profit. It is unconscionable that
undemocratic states and governments that abuse human rights can easily
acquire sophisticated weaponry on the international market, and it is
outrageous that leading democracies such as the United States, France, and
Great Britain fuel bloody conflicts by supplying warring factions with
armaments.
For these reasons, a group of NGOs and Nobel Peace Prize laureates are
advocating an International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers. 9  This
agreement demands that any decision to export arms should take into
account several characteristics pertaining to the country of final
destination.91 The recipient country must endorse democracy--defined in
terms of free and fair elections, the rule of law, and civilian control over the
85. Id.
86. l i
87. MARK PHYTmAN, ARMING IRAQ: How THE U.S. AND BRITAIN SECRETLY BuiLT
SADDAM'S WAR MACHINE 28-35 (1997).
88. See ARTHUR JAY KLINGHOFFER, THE INTERNATIONAL DIMENSION OF GENOCIDE IN
RWANDA 16-18 (1998).
89. Press Release, Amnesty Int'l-USA, UK and EU Arms Used in East Timor as
Review of Arms Exports Code Begins in Secret (Sept. 17, 1999), available at
http://www.amnesty-usa.orglnews/1999/44503199.htm.
90. See generally Int'l Code of Conduct, supra note 75.
91. Id.
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military and security forces. 92 Its government must not engage in gross
violations of internationally recognized human rights.93  And, the
International Code of Conduct does not permit arms sales to any country
engaged in armed aggression-against other nations or against its own
people-in violation of international law.94
Many say that such a code is impractical, but I am not alone in
denouncing the status quo and in supporting an International Code of
Conduct on Arms Transfers. Nobel Peace Laureates Elie Wiesel, Betty
Williams, and the Dalai Lama stood with me in presenting the Code in
1997.95 As did Jose Ramos-Horta, Amnesty International, the American
Friends Service Committee, and the International Physicians for the
Prevention of Nuclear War.96 Since then Archbishop Desmond Tutu and
Rigoberta Menchti have joined this impractical group, as have Lech Walesa,
Adolfo P6rez Esquivel, Mairead Maguire, Norman Borlaug, Joseph Rotblat,
Jody Williams, and John Hume.97 In all, nineteen winners of the Nobel
Peace Prize have endorsed the Code.98 But more importantly, thousands of
individuals, groups, and community leaders have expressed their belief that a
code of conduct is desperately needed to ensure that human rights will be
secure in the next century.99  These people, and the force of their
convictions, turn possibility into progress and impractical ideas into reality.
Finally, if this century is to be less bloody than the last, the
international community must show a greater willingness to intervene
forcefully and decisively to protect human rights. To achieve this .goal,
leading nations such as the United States will have to take a more active role
in world affairs. When human rights are under threat in any part of the
world, they will need to have the political will to take action-not
unilaterally but through legitimate multinational fora such as the United
Nations. New international treaties or agreements are not necessary. As I
said thirteen years ago when I received the Nobel Peace Prize, "[w]e already
have an abundance of words, glorious words, inscribed in the declarations of
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id.
95. Congresswoman Cynthia McKinney, Speech at the Public Signing of the Nobel
Peace Laureates' Int'l Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers (May 29, 1997), available at
http:llwww.arias.or.cr/findariaslcpr/codel4.shtml.
96. Id.
97. See generally Ctr. for Peace and Reconciliation, available at
http://www.arias.or.er/fundarias/cpr/english-cpr.htm.
98. See id.
99. Int'l Code of Conduct, supra note 75.
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the United Nations, the World Court, the Organization of American States
and a network of international treaties and laws. We need deeds that respect
these words, which honor the commitments avowed in these laws."'1'0
Shamefully, the international community has repeatedly stood on the
sidelines as innocent citizens have been imprisoned, tortured, and killed. The
United States overlooked the human rights records of many military
dictatorships in Latin America, because it considered those regimes to be
• 101
strong bulwarks against communism. The West turned its back on
Rwanda when the Hutu-dominated government set out to eliminate the
country's Tutsi minority. 102  The United States and other leading
democracies ignored clear evidence and denied that genocide was taking
103place, In the United Nations, Western governments actively obstructed
initiatives that would have saved the lives of many innocent people.'0 More
recently, bloody internal conflicts in West Africa have received little media
attention, and therefore, the suffering of people in that region has been
almost entirely ignored.1
0 5
When human rights are violated, foreign governments attempt to justify
their failure to act by saying that they have no strategic interest in the county
where the abuses are taking place, or they claim that the situation there is a
purely internal matter.106 But as the third millennium begins, we must move
beyond these empty excuses. We must accept the moral responsibility that
we all share as human beings, and we must take action to ensure that basic
human rights are respected everywhere.
In calling for a fundamental shift in the way in which the international
community responds to the violation of human rights, I am touching upon
the one change that is most desperately needed in the world today: it will be
vitally important for us to discard the destructive values that guided much of
100. Arias, supra note 9.
101. See EDMUND GASPAR, UNITED STATES-LATIN AMERICA: A SPECIAL
RELATIONSHIP? 80-81 (1978).
102. Frontline: The Triumph of Evil (PBS television broadcast, Jan. 26, 1999)
(transcript), available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/evil/etc/script.html.
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. But see The Current Human Rights Situation in Africa: Hearing Before the
Subcommittee on Africa of the Comm. on Int'l Relations House of Representatives 104th
Cong., 2d Sess. (1996) (statement of Hon. John Shattuck, Assistant Sec. for Democracy,
Human Rights, and Labor, Dep't of State).
106. Frontline: The Triumph of Evil, Interview of James Woods (PBS television
broadcast, 1999) (transcript of interview with James Woods), available at
http://www.pbs.orglwgbhlpages/frontline/showslevillinterviews/woods.html.
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the twentieth century, and it will be absolutely essential for us to embrace a
new set of values based on love, compassion, and mutual respect. The
selfishness and the cynicism that have resulted in two world wars, countless
internal conflicts, and centuries of economic exploitation must be set aside,
and a new sense of altruism and mutual concern must take their place as
guiding forces in our societies. Selflessness and solidarity must replace the
greed and materialism that have led to inequality and environmental
degradation. A more thoughtful approach, in which leaders take a global,
long-term outlook must replace the shortsightedness that has frequently
characterized the policymaking processes of our countries. In short, we will
have to change the ways in which we live, the ways in which we think, and
the ways in which we act. Such a transformation will not be easy, but it will
be necessary to ensure the security of human rights in the twenty-first
century.
Visionary leaders have long called for such a change in values in order
to bring an end to strife and suffering. More than a hundred years ago,
British Prime Minister William Gladstone made an appeal not unlike the one
I have made here. He said, "[w]e look forward to the time when the power
to love will replace the love of power. Then will our world know the
blessings of peace."
As the twenty-first century begins, we are still looking hopefully to that
time. At this critical juncture in world history, it is more important than ever
to develop a new global ethic focused on human need, human security, and
human rights. Fortunately, the dawning of the year 2000 has prompted
people around the world to reflect upon the direction in which the world is
heading, and I am hopeful that these thoughtful individuals will come to the
conclusion that a new spirit of humanism is desperately needed.
We face great challenges in our struggle for human rights. Violence
rages in many parts of the world, and intolerance, hatred, and poverty seem
to be omnipresent. Nonetheless, the dawn of a new century provides us with
an opportunity to recommit ourselves to the principles enshrined in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. In doing so, we must embrace
initiatives that will allow the human spirit to flourish. We must have the
courage to take innovative steps to create an international framework that
will promote respect for human rights. The international community would
take extremely positive and productive steps by creating an ICC, by reducing
military expenditures and providing debt relief to poor nations, by
implementing an International Code of Conduct on Arms Transfers, and by
responding more energetically to human rights crises. These should be top
priorities for the leadership of the nations of the world.
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But the international community should not limit itself to the projects
that I have outlined here. Each of us must do our part to expand the
definition of human rights, and we must give of ourselves in an effort to put
an end to poverty, despair, hopelessness, and all of the forces that prevent
people from leading dignified lives. Readers of this scholarly publication, as
trained professionals in the richest country in the world, have an important
opportunity and responsibility to contribute to the well being of those who
live without hope. Indeed, it is a solemn duty. Progress in the fight for
peace and human rights will not come effortlessly or automatically, but if we
work together, there is no limit to what we will be able to achieve.
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Henry T. King, Jr., The Meaning of Nuremberg, in 30 CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L. 143, 148
(1998).
** Nova Southeastern University, Shepard Broad Law Center, 2000, J.D., cum laude,
Florida International University 1996, BA. Ms. Kearns is an associate with Shutts & Bowen,
LLP, practicing in government relations and commercial litigation. The author would like to
thank Professors James Wilets and Douglas Donoho for their incites and debates throughout
the formation of this article.
115
: Nova Law Review 25, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
I. INTRODUCTION
The use of the word "sovereignty" historically referred to the
relationship between the rulers of a country and the persons over whom they
ruled. Yet, over time, this idea grew to its modem understanding as a
description of the relationship between states.2  Commentators have
criticized the creation of this new meaning as "an illegitimate offspring" 3 but
regardless, it is used and perceived as both a sword and a shield to protect a
state from the evils it perceives from other states. The legitimacy of a state's
ability to hide behind its sovereignty has been to be challenged over the past
half century as we witness an evolution to a new idea of what role a state's
sovereignty should play.4
This article will explore the role state sovereignty plays in the evolving
international human rights arena. Specifically, it will address the concept of
universal jurisdiction and how its growing acceptance cuts into a state's
ability to cry sovereign. Part I will begin with a brief discussion of the
evolution of state sovereignty into this modem day wall separating states.
This section will also describe the methods by which states use their
sovereignty as a defense from scrutiny or review through the development
and use of such concepts as the act of state doctrine and sovereign immunity.
Part III will address the concept of universal jurisdiction through a
discussion of its history and development over time. Included in this section
will be a discussion of the recent revival of the controversies which surround
the use of universal jurisdiction with Spain's attempt to prosecute General
Augusto Pinochet Ugarte for his part in the systematic widespread human
rights violations against the people of Chile while under his control. Part IV
will analyze the state's effect on sovereignty when it invokes universal
jurisdiction to review and judge actions that occur in other states. Although
it is the view of the author that the expansion of universal jurisdiction is
eroding the idea of sovereignty, this article will conclude by explaining why
this doctrine of jurisdiction alone can not, and will not, be its demise.
1. Louis Henkin, That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human
Rights, Et Cetera, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1, 2 (1999).
2. The use of the word "states" throughout this article will be used in its
international context, which refers to other countries, and not to any individual American
state.
3. Henkin, supra note 1, at 2.
4. See generally id. at 1-14.
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II. STATE SOVEREIGNTY
A. Historically
The historical use of the word sovereignty referred to the Fersons
having independent and supreme authority over those they ruled. This
meant that the Queen of England, for example, was the sovereign, but only
with respect to her subjects, not to other states. 6 Sovereignty was a domestic
term used in a domestic context; it had no international meaning.7
Through the centuries, however, this concept of sovereignty was
expanded to its modern understanding as a description of the relationship
between states.8 Under this view, we saw the creation of a new legal
concern: that of a state and the protection of its very existence. This was an
important shift because this new understanding of sovereignty was very
powerful. It became a widely accepted principle which governments and
courts used as a means of avoiding judgment or review by other states,
through the development and use of related attributes of sovereignty, such as
sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine. 9 Because of the very
existence of this new legal concern-that of the state and its territofy-states
had to develop the means by which to ensure their survival.
B. Defenses Created out of State Sovereignty
With the development of this concept of absolute sovereignty by
nations came the creation of two notable legal doctrines: the act of state
doctrine and sovereign immunity. These two legal theories, although not
founded solely on the principle of sovereignty, lose their necessity as the
concept of sovereignty loses its power. Each has at its core the idea that the
sovereign-the state-is not to be judged.
5. See id.
6. Id. at2.
7. See id.
8. Henkin, supra note 1, at 2.
9. See text and accompanying notes infra Part II.B.
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1. Sovereign Immunity
The doctrine of sovereign immunity provides that domestic courts
should decline to hear a case against a foreign sovereign.' 0 It evolved out of
the idea that the "king can do no wrong."" Historically this immunity was
absolute in that a foreign court could not hear the case no matter what the
acts complained of may have been, or what injuries were caused. 2 In recent
history, however, this immunity has been somewhat restricted. The
predominant understanding now is that a sovereign state is only immune
from those cases that involve injuries resulting from the sovereign's
governmental actions.
3
This trend of restricting the ability of a state to hide behind sovereign
immunity developed out of need. Historically the state was only involved
with such things as tax collection, national defense, and law enforcement.'
4
However, as the modem state became more involved in the commercial
arena, it became apparent that persons needed an avenue of redress when
that state failed to perform its obligations on its commercial contracts.'5
Additionally, as a result of the egregious acts committed during World
War II, the international community agreed that states need to be
accountable and responsible for the international crimes they commit.16 It is
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 1603(a) (1994); see, e.g., Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28
U.S.C. §§ 1330-32, 1391, 1602-11 (1994); United Kingdom State Immunity Act, 1978,
reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1123 (1978); Canadian State Immunity Act of 1982, reprinted in 21
I.L.M. 798 (1982); Australian Foreign States Immunities Act 1985, reprinted in 25 I.L.M. 715
(1986). Within this context, the use of the word "sovereign" encompasses the state, its
officers, its agencies, or its instrumentalities. RAY AUGUST, INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS LAW
123 (2d ed. 1997).
11. William R. Dorsey, III, Reflections on the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act After
Twenty Years, 28 J. MAR. L. & CoM. 257, 257 (1997). Additional bases for this legal
principle are comity and mutuality between sovereigns. See Verlinden B.V. v. Cent. Bank of
Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 486 (1983) (noting that foreign sovereign immunity is viewed as a
"matter of grace and comity on the part of the United States").
12. AUGUST, supra note 10, at 123; see also The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 11
U.S. 116 (1812). The Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act is the sole basis for subject matter
jurisdiction over a foreign state and its instrumentalities in a United States court. See
Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989).
13. AUGUST, supra note 10, at 124.
14. Id. at 123.
15. Id. at 123-24.
16. See Hari M. Osofsky, Foreign Sovereign Immunity from Severe Human Rights
Violations: New Directions for Common Law Based Approaches, 11 N.Y. INT'L L. REV. 35,
50 (1998).
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this idea that has helped foster the expansion of crimes subject to a state
invoking universal jurisdiction, and as a result, has allowed for a slight
erosion to the traditional notions of sovereignty.
The application of this belief, however, has proven to be much more
difficult in practice since the issue of sovereign immunity was not addressed
in the human rights treaties ratified after the war.17 Many of the treaties
provide for enforcement either through some international body, or through
the use of the appropriate state's national courts when handling internal
obligations, yet there were no discussions of a state's ability to take
jurisdiction over another state.18
To complicate this further, none of the states that codified some form of
the restricted sovereign immunity concept ever provided an explicit
exception for human rights violations.' 9 In practice, this proved to be a brick
wall in that numerous cases were dismissed or subsequently reversed on the
basis of sovereign immunity.2° However, in 1996, the United States stepped
up to correct this error by amending the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act
to provide an explicit exception for a civil suit to be brought against a
sovereign for "personal injury or death that was caused by an act of torture,
extrajudicial killing, aircraft sabotage, [or] hostage taking... .,,2 Although
this exception is a step in the right direction, it is important to note that it
merely provides for a civil remedy to obtain money damages for the
wrongful acts of a foreign sovereign. It does not provide for an exception
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. See id. at 38.
20. See, e.g., Saudi Arabia v. Nelson, 507 U.S. 349, 355 (1993) (holding that states
are presumptively immune from a court's jurisdiction and that the only method of obtaining
jurisdiction in the United States courts is under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act); Von
Dardel v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 736 F. Supp. I (D.D.C. 1990) (dismissing the
case on sovereign immunities grounds, citing six reasons why the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act does not apply). In Siderman de Blake v. Argentina, the Ninth Circuit
reversed the district court, which had dismissed the case on sovereign immunity grounds. 965
F.2d 699, 723 (9th Cir. 1992). The Ninth Circuit held that, in this limited fact situation,
Argentina had impliedly waived its right to the sovereign immunity defense because it had
previously sought the assistance of the United States courts. Id. at 720-23. For a detailed
discussion of the treatment of human rights cases under the doctrine of sovereign immunity in
other states, see generally Osofsky, supra note 16.
21. Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, § 221,
110 Stat. 1214, 1241 (1996) (amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a) (Supp. IV 1998)).
22. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(7) (Supp. IV 1998) (providing that "[a] foreign state
shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of the United States... in which money
damages are sought against a foreign state" for such acts as torture) (emphasis added).
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from immunity for criminal prosecution when the foreign state, through its
actors, commits these enumerated acts. Thus, this exception does not grant
jurisdiction to a United States court to universally prosecute a foreign
sovereign for its human rights violations, but merely prevents a foreign
sovereign from using immunity as a defense when the case is rightfully
before a United States court.23 Thus, the United States court must obtain
proper jurisdiction to hear the case by some other means. Only then will this
exception come into play by disallowing a defendant from arguing sovereign
immunity. Therefore, under current law, although a state may invoke
universal jurisdiction to prosecute those individuals, the Foreign Sovereign
Immunities Act still provides one more hurdle for that state to overcome.
Despite no explicit exception to sovereign immunity under the statute, it
has been argued that a person should not be permitted to assert a sovereign
immunity defense in a criminal prosecution for human rights violations.2
This argument is premised on the underlying purpose of the sovereign
23. This statute explicitly provides that the human rights exception cannot be used if
the actions alleged were committed solely in the territory of the foreign sovereign and neither
the claimant nor the victim is a United States national. See § 1605(a)(7)(B)(i)-(ii). However,
people in those situations are not closed off to civil remedies in the United States court
system. Under the Alien Tort Claim Act, an alien may initiate a lawsuit in the United States
seeking civil damages against another alien for actions that occurred in a foreign state. See 28
U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
24. Willard B. Cowles, Universality of Jurisdiction over War Crimes, 33 CAL. L.
REv. 177, 194 (1945) (noting that war criminals take advantage of the fact that often there is
no well-organized police or judicial system where the act is committed, and therefore they
hope to commit their crimes with impunity); see also Jodi Horowitz, Comment, Regina v.
Bartle and the Commissioner of Police for the Metropolis and Others Ex Parte
Pinochet: Universal Jurisdiction and Sovereign Immunity for Jus Cogens Violations, 23
FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 489 (1999) (discussing Prefecture of Voiotia v. Fed. Republic of
Germany, Case No. 137/1997 (Court of First Instance of Leivadia, Greece, 1997)). In
Prefecture of Voiotia, the Greek court held that a state should deny immunity for certain
violations of human rights because the sovereign could not have reasonably expected to
receive immunity for such grave violations of international law, and therefore it constructively
waived its privilege when it committed the egregious acts. Id. at 510. Additionally, the court
noted that when such acts are committed, the sovereign is not acting within its authority and
therefore should not be able to hide behind its sovereignty. Id. at 510-11. The United States
Supreme Court, however, rejected an implied waiver argument by holding that the Argentine
government did not implicitly waive its immunity by signing certain treaties. See Argentine
Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 442-43 (1989). In that decision,
the Court stated "[n]or do we see how a foreign state can waive its immunity under
§ 1605(a)(1) by signing an international agreement that contains no mention of a waiver of
immunity to suit in United States courts or even the availability of a cause of action in the
United States." Id.
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immunity doctrine and the rationale for its current limitations. Just as a
sovereign is not immune from inquiries into its commercial contracts since
those are distinguished from its official acts, so too should the sovereign be
subject to prosecution for its human rights violations, as those actions are not
within the ambit of any state's official acts. However, until such time as this
becomes a recognized exception to sovereign immunity, there is always the
chance that no justice will be served.
In addition to the overall sovereign, immunity exception, there is also
the subset of head of state immunity. Althcugh this doctrine is legally
distinct from state immunity,25 its force as a viable defense against
prosecutions for human rights violations is questionable. The Nuremberg
Charter, enacted after World War II, provided that "[t]he official position of
defendants, whether as Heads of State or responsible officials in
Government Departments, shall not be considered as freeing them from
responsibility or mitigating punishment. 26  This principle was recently
reaffirmed by the creation of the international tribunals in both the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda. 27 Yet, even if a state successfully overcomes these
two jurisdictional hurdles, it will then face another potential defense-the
act of state doctrine.
2. The Act of State Doctrine
The act of state doctrine is a judicial doctrine which precludes
American courts from inquiring into the validity of another foreign
sovereign's acts when those acts are committed within that foreign
25. Jerrold L. Mallory, Resolving the Confusion over Head of State Immunity: The
Defined Rights of Kings, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 169, 170-71 (1986) (noting that heads of state
are no longer viewed as actual states); Horowitz, supra note 24, at 505 ("[t]he state, rather
than its ruler, is the primary subject of international law, and is thus protected by immunity").
26. Charter of the Int'l Military Tribunal, annexed to the Agreement for the Prosecution
and Punishment of the Major War Criminals of the European Axis, Aug. 8, 1945, art. 7, 59 Stat.
1544, 1556, 82 U.N.T.S. 279, 288 [hereinafter the Nuremberg Charter].
27. See Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia,
S.C. Res. 827, U.N. SCOR, 48th Sess., 3217th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/INF/49 (1993) [hereinafter
ICFY Statute]; United Nations: Secretary-General's Report on Aspects of Establishing an
International Tribunal for the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of
International Humanitarian Law Committed in the Territory of the Former Yugoslavia, May 3,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1159, 1175; Statute for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda, S.C.
Res. 955, U.N. SCOR, 49th Sess., 3453d mtg., U.N. Doc. SC/5974 (1994), reprinted in 33
I.L.M. 1598, 1604 [hereinafter ICTR Statute].
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territory.2 This doctrine differs from sovereign immunity in that sovereign
immunity operates to deprive a court of jurisdiction to hear a case; whereas,
in contrast, the act of state doctrine does not defeat a court's jurisdiction, but
29rather, merely precludes inquiry on certain issues. Although this is a
doctrine used in the American court system, many other states have similar
concepts.
30
There are several justifications for the act of state doctrine.
Traditionally, it was seen as an offspring of sovereignty and a means to
protect the importance of sovereign authority.31 Other justifications for this
doctrine include conity32 and the separation of powers. 33  Comity is an
international principle based on reciprocity. Simply stated, it is the idea that
we, as a sovereign government, do not want to tell others how to rule their
country because we do not want them to tell us how to rule ours.34 Separation
of powers also comes into play because the United States Constitution vests
the executive branch with the exclusive right to conduct foreign affairs;
therefore, the judiciary is not authorized to review those actions.35
Originally, when the term sovereign spoke of the relationship between the
28. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 34 (6th ed. 1990).
29. Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co., 246 U.S. 304, 309 (1918). The Supreme Court noted in
that decision that the act of state doctrine:
[D]oes not deprive the courts of jurisdiction once acquired over a case. It
requires only that, when it is made to appear that the foreign government has
acted in a given way on the subject-matter of the litigation, the details of such
action or the merit of the result cannot be questioned but must be accepted by
our courts as a rule for their decision. To accept a ruling authority and to
decide accordingly is not a surrender or abandonment of jurisdiction but is an
exercise of it.
Id.
30. See, e.g., Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1331-32 (H.L. 1998) (reviewing
several variations of the act of state doctrine and recognizing that certain questions of foreign
affairs remain nonjusticiable).
31. See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (noting that "[e]very
sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of every other sovereign State...").
32. Comity is the "[riecognition that one sovereignty allows within its territory to the
legislative, executive, or judicial act of another sovereignty, having due regard to rights of its
own citizens." BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed. 1990).
33. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400, 404
(1990).
34. "In general, [the] principle of 'comity' is that courts of one state or jurisdiction
will give effect to laws and judicial decisions of another state or jurisdiction, not as a matter of
obligation but out of deference and mutual respect." BLACK's LAw DICTIONARY 267 (6th ed.
1990) (citing Brown v. Babbitt Ford, Inc., 571 P.2d 689, 695 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1977)).
35. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 404.
[Vol. 25:501
122
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss2/1
Kearns
government and its people, the idea of this doctrine was that the sovereign
made the law and therefore we could not challenge it. As the concept of
sovereignty expanded, this doctrine came to be understood as the absence of
a foreign government's right to enter another state and judge its actions.
Traditionally, the act of state doctrine required that United States
federal courts accept, without question, the validity of a foreign sovereign's
acts of state that were performed in that sovereign's territory. 6 The United
States Supreme Court explained this doctrine by stating:
Every sovereign State is bound to respect the independence of
every other sovereign State, and the courts of one country will not
sit in judgment on the acts of the government of another done
within its own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such
acts must be obtained through the means open to be availed of by
sovereign powers as between themselves.
37
Years later, the Supreme Court reexamined the doctrine in a case that
arose out of the Cuban expropriations of American assets. 38 In Banco
Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino,39 the Supreme Court noted that
"constitutional underpinnings" compel adherence to the act of state doctrine,
specifically, the constitutional mandate on separation of powers.40 However,
the Court put an end to the prior categorical approach to this doctrine and
replaced it with a case-by-case analysis, in which a three-part test would be
41used to determine when the doctrine should be applied .
This test, a form of "balanc[ing] of relevant considerations" looked to
whether adjudication of any given issue would interfere with the nation's
foreign affairs. 42 In deciding whether to apply the act of state doctrine, the
court must balance: 1) the degree of codification regarding the international
legal principle in question; 2) the impact of the matter on United States
foreign relations; and 3) the status of the foreign government whose act is
allegedly implicated.43 The Court articulated this test by stating:
36. See Oetjen v. Cent. Leather Co., 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Ricaud v. Am. Metal Co.,
246 U.S. 304 (1918); Underhill v. Hemandez, 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
37. Underhill, 168 U.S. at 252.
38. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
39. 376 U.S. 398 (1964).
40. Id. at 423.
41. Id. at 427.
42. Id.
43. Id.
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It should be apparent that the greater the degree of codification or
consensus concerning a particular area of international law, the
more appropriate it is for the judiciary to render decisions
regarding it, since the courts can then focus on the application of an
agreed principle to circumstances of fact rather than on the
sensitive task of establishing a principle not inconsistent with the
national interest or with international justice. It is also evident that
some aspects of international law touch much more sharply on
national nerves than do others; the less important the implications
of an issue are for our foreign relations, the weaker the justification
for exclusivity in the political branches.44
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Sabbatino, the act of state
doctrine has been litigated in numerous decisions, although rarely making it
to the United States Supreme Court.45 In its latest decision, the Supreme
Court has slightly deviated from its holding in Sabbatino by articulating a
threshold question that must be satisfied prior to a court embarking on the
46Sabbatino balancing test. The Court held that the proper question at the
outset is whether adjudication requires inquiry into the validity of the public
act of a foreign sovereign. 47 If the challenged acts are found to qualify as
acts of state, then the Sabbatino balancing test can be applied to limit the
doctrine's applicability." The Court articulated this distinction by stating:
Courts in the United States have the power, and ordinarily the
obligation, to decide cases and controversies properly presented to
them. The act of state doctrine does not establish an exception for
44. Sabbatino, 376 U.S. at 428.
45. The United States Supreme Court has only addressed the act of state doctrine in
three cases since its decision in Sabbatino. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co. v. Envtl. Tectonics
Corp. Int'l, 493 U.S. 400 (1990); Alfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v. Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
(1976); First Nat'l City Bank v. Banco Nacional de Cuba, 406 U.S. 759 (1972). The United
States Legislature reversed the effect of the United States Supreme Court's decision in
Sabbatino by enacting the Hickenlooper Amendment, also known as the Sabbatino
Amendment. See 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) (1994). This amendment requires United States
courts to adjudicate takings claims if the foreign government does not provide "speedy
compensation" for the property taken despite a claim of defense under the act of state doctrine.
Id. However, although this amendment reversed the outcome of the Supreme Court's decision
in Sabbatino, it did nothing to affect how the act of state doctrine is to be applied in future
decisions by United States courts for matters that do not involve a property taking.
46. See W.S. Kirkpatrick & Co., 493 U.S. at 409.
47. Id.
48. See id.
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cases and controversies that may embarrass foreign governments,
but merely requires that, in the process of deciding, the acts of
foreign sovereigns taken within their own jurisdictions shall be
deemed valid.
49
Under the above analysis, it appears that a foreign sovereign would not
be able to successfully use this doctrine to defeat a United States court from
hearing a human rights case against it. With the addition of the threshold
question a court must answer to determine whether the further balancing of
interests must be entered into, one can make a tighter argument that the act
of state doctrine should not defeat the court's ability to hear a human rights
case. Clearly, a state's actions of committing human rights violations could
not and should not be deemed "acts of state." By a court holding that such
actions are not acts of state, the court would not need to continue further into
the balancing test, and thus it would not be precluded from hearing the case.
However, until such time as the arguments are made and precedent is
set, both sovereign immunity and the act of state doctrine represent two
types of hurdles persons seeking punishment for human rights abuses must
overcome. With the expansion of universal jurisdiction, the threat of a case
being dismissed on sovereign immunity grounds weakens. Additionally,
with the United States' new articulation of the appropriate use of the act of
state doctrine, this, too, is no longer impossible to overcome.
m. UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
It is a basic premise of every legal system that a court must have
jurisdiction before it may decide a case. Jurisdiction is defined as "'the
authority of states to prescribe their law, to subject persons and things to
adjudication in their courts and other tribunals, and to enforce their law, both
judicially and nonjudicially."' 50 The jurisdictional principle of universality
provides that every state has the right to prosecute offenders under its
domestic laws for certain crimes even though the defendant and the victim
are not nationals of that state, or the alleged crime did not occur in that
49. Id.
50. Christopher C. Joyner, Arresting Impunity: The Case for Universal Jurisdiction
in Bringing War Criminals to Accountability, 59 LAw & CONTEMP. PROBS. 153, 163 (1996)
(quoting RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Tm FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES
JURISDICTION AND JUDGMENTS, pt. IV, Introductory Note (1987)).
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state. 5 1 These crimes are considered to be of such a universal concern and
mutual threat to all states that every nation has an interest in punishing the
perpetrators.
5 2
A. Historical Development of Universal Jurisdiction
The principal of universal jurisdiction was first developed as a means of
punishing pirates and slave traders.5 Pirates were considered hostis
humanis generis, enemies of mankind, and any nation could assume
jurisdiction over them 4 The rationale behind the development of universal
jurisdiction to this offense was based on the fact that the offenses were
committed on the high seas and not within the territorial jurisdiction of any
particular state. 5 Slave trading is also an offense that is subject to every
state's jurisdiction. 6 Through the use of various treaties, the international
community agreed that despite the fact that slave trading did not threaten
commerce or navigation between nations in the same manner as piracy, this
offense was of such a heinous nature that it was subject to prosecution in
every state. 7
51. Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX L.
REv. 785, 788 (1988). Universal jurisdiction is only one of five principles of jurisdiction a
state can use to have the authority to hear a case. These extraterritorial jurisdiction principles
are:
(1) [T]he territoriality principle, which applies when an offense occurs within
the territory of the prosecuting state; (2) the nationality principle, which
admits jurisdiction when the offender is a national or resident of the
prosecuting state; (3) the protective principle, which permits jurisdiction
where an extraterritorial act threatens interests that are vital to the integrity of
the prosecuting state; (4) the passive personality principle, which recognizes
jurisdiction where the victim is a national of the prosecuting state; and (5) the
universality principle, which holds that some crimes are so universally
abhorrent and thus condemned that their perpetrators are hostis humani
generis-enemies of all people-and allows that jurisdiction may be based
solely on securing custody of the perpetrator.
Joyner, supra note 50, at 164-65 (internal citations omitted).
52. Joyner, supra note 50, at 165.
53. See Randall, supra note 51, at 788.
54. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 890 (2d Cir. 1980).
55. Joyner, supra note 50, at 165 n.48.
56. Randall, supra note 51, at 798.
57. Id. at 800; see, e.g., Convention to Suppress the Slave Trade and Slavery, Sept.
25, 1926, 46 Stat. 2183, 60 U.N.T.S. 253; Protocol Amending the Slavery Convention, Dec.
7, 1953, 7 U.S.T. 479, 182 U.N.T.S. 51; Supplementary Convention of the Abolition of
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It was not until the conclusion of the second World War, however, that
the concept of universal jurisdiction began to truly develop. As World War
Hf came to an end, and the international community became aware of the
atrocities comnitted, the cries of "never again" became the theme.5 8 The
international community drafted the Nuremberg Charter of 1945
("Nuremberg Charter"), 59 which permitted the piercing of a state's
sovereignty in order to hold a foreign individual accountable, regardless of
his or her position as a head of state or a government official, for crimes
against peace, crimes against the laws of war, and crimes against humanity.Y6
The significance of the Nuremberg Charter not only paved the way for the
establishment of ad hoc tribunals in Nuremberg and Tokyo to prosecute
persons charged with these crimes, but it also sparked a growth in the desire
to enact treaties aimed at the codification of. international humanitarian
law.
61
The majority of the treaties passed, and the trials that took place never
directly made reference to the use of universal jurisdiction, 62 although it is
generally agreed that this was the appropriate justification for the
63
establishment of the tribunals and the various proceedings. It was not until
Slavery, the Slave Trade and Institutions and Practices Similar to Slavery, Sept. 7, 1956, 18
U.S.T. 3201, 266 U.N.T.S. 3.
58. In the days following the liberation of the Nazi concentration camps throughout
Germany, Austria, and Poland, the world became aware of, and was astounded by, the
revelation of the millions of Jewish people and Gypsies that had been exterminated by the
Nazis as a direct result of the policies of the German State under Adolph Hitler's "Final
Solution." See generally YvEs BEIGBEDER, JUDGING WAR CRIMINALS: THE POLITICS OF
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE 29-31 (St. Martin's Press, Inc. 1999); DANIEL R. BROWER, THE
WORLD IN THE TWENTIET CENTURY: THE AGE OF GLOBAL WAR AND REVOLUTION 148-49 (2d
ed. Prentice-Hall 1992).
59. Nuremberg Charter, supra note 26.
60. Id.
61. Jamison G. White, Nowhere to Run, Nowhere to Hide: Augusto Pinochet,
Universal Jurisdiction, the ICC, and a Wake-Up Callfor Former Heads of State, 50 CASE W.
RES. L. REv. 127, 135 (1999).
62. In fact, the ability of the international community to even hold the trials
prosecuting various German officials in Nuremberg was ridiculed as being merely "victor's
justice." BEIGBEDER, supra note 58, at 38-41.
63. See Demjanjuk v. Petrovsky, 776 F.2d 571, 582 (6th Cir. 1985). In Demjanjuk,
the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals held that the United States could extradite Demjanjuk to
Israel for the crimes he committed when he was a guard at Treblinka, a Nazi concentration
camp in Poland, pursuant to Israel's exercise of universal jurisdiction. Id. at 584. The court
held that the acts committed by Demjanjuk were of such a universally recognized nature that
they were punishable by any member of the international community. Id. at 582.
2001]
127
: Nova Law Review 25, 2
Published by NSUWorks, 2001
Nova Law Review
several years later that such a clear use of universal jurisdiction would be
seen.6 Almost fifteen years after victory was declared, the world witnessed
one of the most controversial trials in its history when the State of Israel
kidnapped Adolph Eichmann from Argentina and invoked universal
jurisdiction to prosecute him for crimes against humanity. In its decision,
the Supreme Court of Israel stated:
Not only do all the crimes attributed to [Eichmann] bear an
international character, but their harmful and murderous effects
were so embracing and widespread as to shake the international
community to its very foundations. The State of Israel therefore
was entitled, pursuant to the principle of universal jurisdiction and
in the capacity of a guardian of international law and an agent for
its enforcement, to try [Eichmann].66
The creation of various international agreements following the
conclusion of the war also helped to solidify the principle of universal
jurisdiction by codifying various aspects of international humanitarian law.
The European Convention on Human Rights,67 the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide ("Genocide
Convention"), 68 and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 69 are three
examples of such agreements. Of these agreements, the Genocide
Convention was the most notable since it called for the international
condemnation of not only those acts specified in the Nuremberg Charter, but
64. See Attorney Gen. of Israel v. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 5 (D.C. Jm. 1961), aff'd 36
I.L.R. 277 (Isr. S. Ct. 1962).
65. Id. The controversy over this case surrounded Israel's actions of kidnapping
Eichmann from Argentina without Argentina's consent. See Randall, supra note 51, at 813.
Although Israel had a right, pursuant to universal jurisdiction, to prosecute Eichmann for the
crimes against humanity, universal jurisdiction did not give it the right to invade Agentina's
sovereignty in pursuit of that right. Id. Additionally, controversy arose over Israel's ability to
try Eichmann, since Israel was not in existence at the time the acts were committed. Id. at
813-14. Although this argument could have been used to negate other jurisdictional
principles, it is irrelevant when using universal jurisdiction. Id. at 814.
66. Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. at 304.
67. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights & Fundamental Freedoms, Nov.
4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
68. Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045,78 U.N.T.S. 277.
69. G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948).
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added the crime of genocide to the list of punishable offenses.
Additionally, the international community, through its concern over the acts
that were committed during the war, as well as the lack of any international
court to address such crimes, ratified the four Geneva Conventions of
1949.71 Each of these treaties provide that the signatories are under an
obligation to either search for persons alleged to have committed grave
breaches and bring them to trial, or to extradite the offenders to another state
that is willing to try them.
72
The treaties codified the various crimes that the international
community believed to be of such importance as to demand worldwide
assistance in punishing the perpetrators. Over the next several decades,
numerous treaties were ratified to include additional acts which defined the
modern day enemy and therefore expanded the types of acts that are
considered universal. 3  The significance of these new additional crimes
were that they differed from piracy and slave trading in that they were not
international in nature. The new crimes were being committed within the
territorial jurisdiction of one state against the nationals of that state. Without
their inclusion into universal jurisdiction, any other foreign state lacked a
jurisdictional tie to prosecute these crimes when committed.
70. White, supra note 61, at 135 (citing the Convention on the Prevention and
Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat. 3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, 281-
83).
71. See Convention I for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick
in Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of
Wounded, Sick and Shipwrecked Members of the Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316,75 U.N.T.S. 135
[hereinafter Geneva Convention III]; Geneva Convention IV Relative to the Protection of
Civilian Persons in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter
Geneva Convention IV].
72. Geneva Convention I, supra note 71, art. 49, 6 U.S.T. at 3146, 75 U.N.T.S. at 62;
Geneva Convention II, supra note 71, art. 50, 6 U.S.T. at 3250, 75 U.N.T.S. at 116; Geneva
Convention III, supra note 71, art. 129, 6 U.S.T. at 3418, 75 U.N.T.S. at 236; Geneva
Convention IV, supra note 71, art. 146, 6 U.S.T. at 3616,75 U.N.T.S. at 386.
73. See infra Part IILB.
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B. Current Evolution
The momentum established after the war quickly dissipated, as the Cold
War went into full force. 74 In fact, even the four Geneva Conventions were
weakened by the failure on the part of the international community to
establish an international criminal court. The trend, however, to create new
international rules prevailed with the focus now on the new, contemporary
war criminal. These new hostis humanis generis were committing
outrageous acts within the territory of a state and were too often even
empowered by that state. The battle against this new type of war criminal
provided the perfect basis for expansion of the doctrine of universality.
The international community first turned its aim at the growing crimes
of hijacking and aircraft sabotage.76 These treaties, although providing for
both protective and territorial jurisdiction, also hinted at the ability to use
universal jurisdiction. 77  Next came the International Convention on the
Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid in 1973.78 This
convention defined apartheid as certain "inhuman acts committed for the
purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group of
persons over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing
them." 79  It required the signatories to create domestic legislation
criminalizing the use of apartheid.80 However, similar to the hijacking and
aircraft sabotage conventions, it does not explicitly mention universal
jurisdiction as a basis for a state to punish violators.8
74. White, supra note 61, at 135.
75. See, e.g., infra Part III.C, which details the legal problems Spain faced when it
attempted to prosecute Augusto Pinochet for his alleged role in the torturing and murdering of
persons in Chile between September 1973 and March 1990.
76. See Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, Sept. 23, 1971, 25 U.S.T. 564, 974 U.N.T.S. 177; Convention for the Suppression
of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, Dec. 16, 1970, 22 U.S.T. 1641, 860 U.N.T.S. 105; 1963
Tokyo Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept.
14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, 704 U.N.T.S. 219.
77. White, supra note 61, at 136 (stating that the 1970 Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft "mandat[ed] that no 'criminal jurisdiction
exercised in accordance with national law' is excluded").
78. Nov. 30, 1973, 1015 U.N.T.S. 244.
79. Id. at 245, art. II.
80. See id. at 244.
81. White, supra note 61, at 136.
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In the 1970s and 1980s, this trend continued with a focus on terrorism
and torture. The International Convention Against the Taking of Hostages,8
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents,83 and the
Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, 84 each contain a provision, with slight variations,
that provides:
The State Party in the territory of which the alleged offender is
found shall, if it does not extradite him, be obliged, without
exception whatsoever and whether or not the offense was
committed in its territory, to submit the case to its competent
authorities for the purpose of prosecution, through proceedings in
accordance with the laws of that State.85
Such a provision signifies the international community's willingness to rely
on the domestic courts of its nations to prosecute violators of these crimes.
These were the first treaties ratified that explicitly called for persons to be
tried in the national courts of various states around the world under that
state's laws. To facilitate this process, the treaties also required their
signatories to pass appropriate domestic legislation prohibiting the same
conduct.8
6
C. Universal Jurisdiction Today
The principle of universal jurisdiction for human rights violations has
recently come full circle with the creation of the International Criminal
Tribunals for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda.87 This is the first time
since the Nuremberg Trials that an international body has been established to
prosecute violators of human rights. Although the existence and use of these
international tribunals to prosecute those individuals responsible for human
rights abuses does not rely on universal jurisdiction, it does solidify the list
of acts that the international community agrees should be punished. This can
82. Dec. 4, 1979, 18 I.L.M. 1456.
83. Dec. 14, 1973,28 U.S.T. 1975, 1035 U.N.T.S. 167.
84. G.A. Res. 39/46, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess., Supp. No. 51, at 197, U.N. Doc.
A/39/51 (1984).
85. Randall, supra note 51, at 819.
86. Id.
87. Both tribunals were set up by the United Nations Security Council. See ICFY
Statute, supra note 27; ICTR Statute, supra note 27.
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then be used by a state to justify its use of universal jurisdiction in
prosecuting other individuals that commit such egregious acts as genocide,
torture, war crimes, and crimes against humanity.
The use and expansion of universal jurisdiction, however, took a step
backward with the recent legal battle in the English courts surrounding the
detention and attempted extradition of General Augusto Pinochet. On
October 16, 1998, while on a medical visit to the United Kingdom, General
Pinochet was arrested in London at the request of a Spanish court, which had
88issued a provisional arrest warrant. The warrant alleged that Pinochet was
responsible for systematic acts of murder, torture, disappearances, illegal
detention, and summary executions while he was President and Director of
the National Intelligence Directorate ("DINA").8 9 This extradition request
by Spain led to a legal battle that lasted approximately two years before
General Pinochet was released by the English courts and allowed to return to
his home in Chile. 90
During his seventeen years as the President of Chile, it is estimated that
more than 2000 people were killed and thousands more tortured by DINA
operatives at the direction of Pinochet in an effort to retain power.91 Prior to
his resignation as President, the government of Chile enacted a new
constitution. 92 This not only created a position of senator for life for all ex-
presidents who serve for over six years, but, more importantly, it
incorporated a general amnesty law which prohibited prosecution of any
individuals for crimes committed during the coup in 1973 through the
88. For a detailed discussion of the history surrounding General Pinochet's rise to
power and the human rights violations which formed the basis for Spain's attempt to prosecute
him, see Nehal Bhuta, Justice Without Borders? Prosecuting General Pinochet, 23 MELB. U.
L. REV. 499 (1999).
89. Id.at513.
90. See, e.g., Ray Moseley, Ailing Ex-Dictator Pinochet Heads Home to Chile:
Extradition Effort is Dead, But Foes Still Want a Trial, NEW ORLEANs TIMES-PICAYUNE, Mar.
3, 2000, at A8; Tim Vandenack, Pinochet Faces Future in Santiago: Freed Ex-dictator
Could Encounter Human Rights Charges as He Comes Home to Friends and Foes, SUN-
SENTNEL (Ft. Lauderdale), Mar. 3, 2000, at IA; Key Dates in Saga that Cost Pounds 15m,
SCOT. DAILY RECORD, Mar. 3, 2000, at 11, available at 2000 WL 13728918 (detailing the
chronology of events from Pinochet's arrest to his release). The legal battle to prosecute
Pinochet for his human rights violations continues as Chile has now sought to have him
charged in its domestic courts. See Jonathan Franklin, Pinochet Put Under House Arrest: Ex-
dictator Indicted For His Role in Hit Squad Murders, TE GUARDIAN, Jan. 30, 2001.
91. See Bhuta, supra note 88, at 508 (citing the Chilean National Commission on
Truth and Reconciliation).
92. Id. at 509.
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dissolution of DINA in 1978. 93 This law meant that Pinochet could not be
prosecuted in Chile for his human rights violations.94
Upon hearing that Pinochet was in London for back surgery, action was
taken by a human rights organization to notify the Spanish prosecutors that
were investigating alleged human rights violations in Chile and Argentina
against Spanish citizens.95 On October 13, 1998, Spanish Judge Garzon
issued a provisional international arrest warrant and requested that England
detain General Pinochet pending a formal extradition request.96 Pinochet
was subsequently arrested and he immediately applied for judicial review
and habeas corpus. 97  The legal issues raised in the courts in England
involved: 1) whether Spain had jurisdiction to hear the case;98 2) whether
Pinochet was immune from prosecution due to the fact that the alleged acts
were committed while Pinochet was President, and thus a head of state; 99
and 3) whether the arrest warrants listed an offense for which England could
rightfully extradite Pinochet to Spain.
10°
The English High Court granted immunity to Pinochet as a former
sovereign and head of state, and thus it held that he could not be extradited
to Spain.'0 ' In its decision, the High Court distinguished its grant of
93. Id. (citing Decree Law No. 2191, Apr. 19, 1978).
94. Id. at 510 (noting that the amnesty law was subsequently upheld by Chile's
Supreme Court as constitutional and-thus has been successful at barring any prosecutions for
human rights violations that fell within the amnesty time period).
95. Id. at 513.
96. Bhuta, supra note 88, at 513.
97. Id.
98. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. 68 (Q.B. Div'l Ct. 1998). This issue detailed whether
Spain could legally prosecute General Pinochet for human rights violations that occurred
within Chile. Although Spain prefaced its charges with the allegation that the acts were
committed against Spanish citizens living in Chile, thus making the argument that the Spanish
court has jurisdiction based on passive personality, universal jurisdiction was discussed and
recognized by the English courts as a means of finding jurisdiction in the Spanish court. See
id.; see also Joyner, supra note 50, at 163-65.
99. In addition, Pinochet also enjoyed the title of senator for life, and thus raised the
additional legal question of whether a current head of state could be prosecuted. See In re
Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 80.
100. As explained by the English High Court, for the crime to be extraditable under
English law, the defendant must have committed a crime that is an extraditable offense under
both Spanish law and English law. See Bhuta, supra note 88, at 513-14. Although this article
does not address in detail this aspect of the English decision, the process the English courts
used to analyze the issue raised questions of what crimes were considered international crimes
and thus subject to extradition by England.
101. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 85.
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immunity for Pinochet as a head of state from the current international view
that precludes head of state immunity for certain crimes. 10 2 The High Court
held that although heads of state have been subject to criminal prosecutions,
those prosecutions were the result of international agreements and thus one
sovereign state was not being judged by another sovereign state. 103  In
Pinochet, however, it was not an international body seeking to prosecute
Pinochet, but rather the sovereign state of Spain.
104
On appeal, however, the House of Lords reversed the High Court and
held that Pinochet was not immune as a former head of state for
internationally recognized crimes. 15 Within its decision, the court held that
the actions alleged to have been committed could in no way be regarded as
normal functions of a head of state, and thus no immunity could be had for
such activities.106 Yet this decision by the House of Lords was set aside as a
result of a potential bias, and a new panel heard the case.107  In this
substituted decision, the new panel held that Pinochet could only be subject
to prosecution for those crimes he committed after 1988.'08 This substituted
decision by the House of Lords was a setback to the international human
rights community because of its failure to recognize that Pinochet could be
prosecuted pursuant to universal jurisdiction for his actions prior to 1988. It
implies that torture was not an international crime prior to the adoption of
the Torture Convention. By such impliction, the case can now be used as
102. Under the Nuremberg Charter persons charged with crimes against humanity,
crimes against the laws of war, and crimes against peace were subject to prosecution despite
their position as heads of state or governmental officials. See Nuremberg Charter, supra note
26, art. 7, 59 Stat. at 1556, 82 U.N.T.S. at 288. This principle was recently reaffirmed by the
creation of the International Criminal Tribunals for the Former Yugoslavia and Rwanda,
which allow former heads of state to be prosecuted for the human rights violations they
commit. See lCFY Statute, supra note 27, art. 7, para. 2, 32 I.L.M. at 1175; ICTR Statute,
supra note 27, art. 6, para. 2, 33 I.L.M. at 1604 (stating "the official position of any accused
person, whether as Head of State or Government or as a responsible Government official, shall
not relieve such person of criminal responsibility nor mitigate punishment").
103. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 84-85. Those cases cited in support of not
recognizing head of state immunity are international tribunals and have been organized for the
sole purpose of these criminal trials. In the case at hand, Spain was seeking to use its
domestic courts to prosecute Pinochet.
104. Id.
105. Regina v. Bartle, 37 I.L.M. 1302, 1334 (H.L. 1998).
106. Id. at 1333.
107. In re Pinochet, 38 I.L.M. at 432.
108. See Bartle, 38 I.L.M. at 619 (holding that Pinochet could only be extradited and
thus prosecuted for those acts of torture he committed after the Convention against Torture
became binding on the United Kingdom, Spain, and Chile).
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precedent to preclude a state from invoking universal jurisdiction to
prosecute individuals for torture prior to the enactment of the Torture
Convention.
IV. LIMITATIONS ON UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION
Although the expansion of universal jurisdiction limits a state's right to
hide behind its sovereignty, several factors exist which restrict its ability to
make a more dramatic impact. It is important to emphasize that universality
is a limited jurisdictional means. Although it has expanded over the years, it
still covers only those acts held by the international community to be
egregious violations of world peace. The crimes that are subject to universal
jurisdiction must be of such world-wide importance and threat to the human
race as to warrant this extraterritorial reach.
Additionally, universal jurisdiction does not grant a state the power to
invade another state's sovereign borders to essentially kidnap the individual
in order to bring them to justice in that state." 0 Therefore, if an individual
remains in the safe borders of a chosen country, that for whatever reason,
decides not to prosecute him, the individual will, in essence, escape
prosecution. Yet, upon leaving that state, any country can then request that
the person be extradited to stand trial in its national courts."' However, as is
evident by the recent attempt by Spain to have General Pinochet extradited
from England, this is not an easy step.
As previously noted, the evolution of the new "sovereign" brought with
it legal doctrines to protect its existence. Each of these doctrines can be used
by a state to avoid review of its actions by another sovereign. The Foreign
Sovereign Immunities Act is an almost absolute bar on jurisdiction in United
States courts for cases against a sovereign." 2  It is important to note,
however, that this is for suits brought against a state, or an individualfor his
or her official acts. When a state is seeking to prosecute an individual,
such as a foreign president, for violations of human rights, a strong argument
109. See Joyner, supra note 50, at 165.
110. See generally Randall, supra note 51.
111. Id.
112. See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-32, 1391, 1602-11
(1994).
113. Id.
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exists to prevent this president from crying sovereign. 114 The illegal acts of
killing or torturing its citizens should not be considered official acts.
Likewise, a president's claim of head of state immunity would also fail. It is
clear in the international human rights context that a head of state is not free
from responsibility for such egregious crimes by reason of his official
position. This was clearly laid out in the Nuremberg Charter and recently
reaffirmed by the international tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda. Although some commentators have made the distinction that the
Nuremberg Charter, as well as the tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, only stand for the proposition that a head of state is not immune
from prosecution by an international tribunal, the recent decision by the
House of Lords declined to draw this distinction." 5 Because of such
arguments, however, a state wishing to invoke universal jurisdiction cannot
dismiss immunity claims lightly.
V. CONCLUSION
As this article discussed, the use of the word sovereignty has evolved
over the years from a reference to the relationship between the sovereign and
its subjects, to its modern understanding as a description of the relationship
between states. This new understanding of sovereignty has been used by
governments and courts as a means of avoiding judgment or review. More
recently, with the birth of the human rights movement following the
discovery of the atrocities committed during World War II, the role of state
sovereignty is again changing form. As the human rights movement
continues to gain momentum and the idea of some form of international
human rights obligations become engrained, what will happen to this notion
of sovereignty? Although there are additional factors contributing to this
reformation of sovereignty,"16 the expansion of the acts subject to universal
jurisdiction by another state indirectly chips away at this concept without the
direct consent of the state itself.
With the creation of the ad hoc tribunals in the former Yugoslavia and
Rwanda, the international community is sending a strong signal to the
114. In addition, as a result of the House of Lords decision denying immunity to
General Pinochet, the human rights community now has support for its contention that
sovereign immunity should not extend to human rights violations.
115. See id; Horowitz, supra note 24, at 515.
1.16. Other factors include globalization, the creation of the first international criminal
court, and the ever increasing use of treaties. For a detailed discussion on the effects of these
factors, see generally Henkin, supra note 1.
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individual nations of the world that the international community is not going
to idly stand by while its citizens' basic human rights are being violated. It
is no longer going to be acceptable to hide behind the wall of sovereignty.
Just as the Nuremberg trials held that it was not a defense that the defendant
was just following orders, sovereignty can not now be used to escape
prosecution for acts committed in the state's name. The former Yugoslavia
tribunal clearly addressed this idea in its first decision by stating:
It would be a travesty of law and a betrayal of the universal need
for justice, should the concept of State sovereignty be allowed to
be raised successfully against human rights. Borders should not be
considered as a shield against the reach of the law and as a
protection for those who trample underfoot the most elementary
rights of humanity! 7
This statement sends a clear warning to all future heads of state to respect
the human rights of the nationals of its state just as if those individuals were
not subject to their control. One commentator, while speaking on the lessons
from Nuremberg, hinted at what this new role of sovereignty should be. He
explained:
The fact is that unrestricted national sovereignty means, in real
terms, international anarchy. Nuremberg showed us that there must
be some limitations on national sovereignty if we are to have a
more secure world....
Nuremberg showed us that we must reach the behavior of
individuals to create a better world. That we must penetrate the
veil of national sovereignty and punish individuals for violations of
international law if we are to give that law life and vitality.!
18
Thus, despite the fact that universal jurisdiction has rarely been invoked
throughout history, the world-wide acceptance of its expansion has led to the
reformation of our idea of sovereignty. And, although universal jurisdiction,
with its various limitations, cannot alone crumble this brick wall, we are
witnessing an evolution of a new concept of sovereignty-the creation of a
world-nation to act as a true keeper of its citizens. This new world-nation is
117. Prosecutor v. Tadic, 35 I.L.M. 32, 52 (Int'l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yug.
1995).
118. Henry T. King, Jr., The Meaning of Nuremberg, 30 CASF.W. Rlis. J. INT'L L. 143,
147 (1998).
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one with no boundaries to act as a barrier to protect its people against
prosecution for crimes against humanity.
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I. OVERVIEW
This article discusses how international human rights and humanitarian
law can be applied to the current armed conflict in Colombia and specifically
considers whether human rights violators currently operating there with
almost total impunity can be effectively prosecuted and punished under
international law. Since the ongoing violations of the human rights of
Colombian citizens have been implicitly excused by a government that is
increasingly ineffective in dealing with the political chaos that has caused
them, an international solution may be the best available alternative. By
ceding or losing control of large portions of its national territory to guerrilla
forces, by allowing paramilitary groups to act as vigilantes or as unofficial
units of the military, and by looking the other way while its own military
abuses the rights of its citizens, the Colombian government has demonstrated
that it is unable or unwilling to address a problem that grows worse as the
conflict accelerates.
Part 11 of this article briefly analyzes the origins of the current conflict
within the context of Colombia's violent political history. Part Il identifies
the organizations that are principally responsible for Violating human rights
in Colombia today. Part IV identifies several of the major human rights
abuses taking place in Colombia that rise to the level of violating both
international human rights and humanitarian law. Part V discusses
Colombia's contradictory approach to human rights issues, including an
exemplary adherence to international treaties and an espoused commitment
to human rights in its domestic laws, coupled with a reputation as having the
worst human rights record in the world. Part VI examines the international
legal regimes that can be used to hold human rights violators in Colombia
liable for their actions, and identifies which fall short and which may be
effective in bringing perpetrators to justice. Part VII concludes with a
discussion of why the asserted solution is justified in this case.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Current Conflict in Colombia
Colombia is a country where impunity reigns.' In the face of a
protracted period of violence and insecurity, the government is increasingly
ineffective and unresponsive to the needs of its citizens.2 The judiciary is
virtually powerless as a result of decades of death threats and payoffs from
drug traffickers, and today less than three percent of crimes are successfully
prosecuted. The impact of this judicial vacuum exacerbates an already
weakened executive branch . Colombia's former president was widely
believed to have financed his presidential campaign with drug money,
revealing to the world the extent to which drug cartels have infiltrated and
compromised the government. 5  The current president, Andres Pastrana,
witnessed further deterioration of the situation due to the government's
inability to effectively control guerrilla groups, paramilitary groups, and to
some extent its own military, despite a concerted effort to negotiate peace.
6
Pastrana's government is seen as "weak and increasingly unpopular.' 7 His
brainchild solution, Plan Colombia, consisting largely of an infusion of
1. U.S. DEP'TOFSTATE, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices
(Colombia), Feb. 25,2000, at http:llwww.state.gov./www/global/human-ights1999-hrp-
report/ colombia.html [hereinafter 1999 Colombia Country Reports].
2. Id.
3. U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, Colombia Country Report on Human Rights Practices for
1998, Feb. 26, 1999, at http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rightsl1998-hrp-reportl
colombia.html [hereinafter 1998 Colombia Country Report]; see also 1999 Colombia Country
Reports, supra note 1 (reporting that "63 percent of crimes go unreported, and that 40 percent
of all reported crimes go unpunished").
4. 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3.
5. Pedro Ruz Gutierrez, Bullets, Bloodshed and Ballots: For Generations Violence
Has Defined Colombia's Turbulent Political History, ORLANDO SENTINEL (Fla.), Oct. 31,
1999, at Al; see also Jorge L. Esquirol, Can International Law Help? An Analysis of the
Colombian Peace Process, 16 CONN. J. INT'L L. 23, 31 (2000).
6. Human Rights in Colombia: 'Situation is Indeed Bleak,' BOSTON GLOBE, Dec.
31, 2000, at D2 [hereinafter Human Rights in Colombia] (Interview with Mary Robinson, the
United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights).
7. Tim Golden, Now, State of Siege, Colombian Style, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 10, 1999, at
20011
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military aid from the United States, has the potential to escalate hostilities
and make a bad situation worse. 8
As a result, governmental legitimacy has been severely eroded and
violence has become a way of life.9 Colombian citizens are constantly
subjected to rampant political and criminal upheaval perpetrated by
guerrillas, paramilitary groups, and drug traffickers, as well as by the
Colombian military and national police.10 Violence has divided the country,
killed thousands, and displaced even more."' Over the past ten years, more
than 35,000 lives have been lost in this continuing conflict, and more than
one million civilians have been displaced. This situation has led to
Colombia's reputation as having the worst human rights record in the world
today.1
3
B. Colombia's Violent History
Violence in Colombia is nothing new. More than 500,000 Colombians
have died as a result of political violence during the past 100 years.' 4 For at
least the past fifty years, the country has been mired in a protracted state of
political violence, which has caused a steady decline in national security.1
5
This violent political history provided fertile ground for the rise to power
and illicit political dominance of the drug cartels, which capitalized on
8. Andrew Miller, U.S. Military Support for Plan Colombia: Adding Fuel to the
Fire, 8 HuM. RIGHTS BRIE 8 (2000). In 2000, the United States approved a $1.319 billion aid
package to assist in the implementation of Plan Colombia, a $7.5 billion Colombian national
recovery program designed to address problems of economic recovery, strengthen state
institutions, strengthen national security and counter-narcotics operations, and kick start the
peace process. Id. at 10. The majority of the United States aid package was earmarked for
military operations. Id. The aid was originally tied to Colombian compliance with five
human rights conditions but subject to waiver. In August 2000, all but one condition was
waived and $1 billion dollars was distributed. Id.
9. See Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 6.
10. Julia Manglano, The Pervasive Immunity that Surrounds Human Rights
Violations Committed by Colombia's Military, 3 DEPAUL DiG. INT'L L. 45, 47 (1997); see also
1999 Columbia Country Reports, supra note 1; Human Rights in Colombia, supra note 6.
11. Sibylla Brodzinsky, Colombian Civilians Fear Repression, Retribution, USA
TODAY, Oct. 25, 1999, at 17A.
12. Id.
13. Manglano, supra note 10, at 45.
14. Ruz Gutierrez, supra note 5; see also Esquirol, supra note 5, at 26-29.
15. Ruz Gutierrez, supra note 5 (explaining that from 1948-1966, it is estimated that
nearly 300,000 Colombians died as a result of partisan fighting, in a period known as La
Violencia, "The Violence").
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governmental weaknesses and com1plicity, and embraced violence as a means
to exert control over the country.! This violent heritage was also the basis,
for the current conflict between the government and guerrilla insurgents that
had its genesis more than thirty years ago. 17 By using violence to maintain
their respective power bases, the drug cartels, the guerrillas, and the
government have accelerated the downward spiral in human rights violations
that has now reached crisis proportions.18
The current conflict in Colombia is the culmination of decades of
violence. 19 Throughout the twentieth century, human rights violations have
been inflicted on the citizens of Colombia with increasing impunity, first by
the political status quo, later by the drug mafia, and finally by the guerrilla
forces and their nemeses--the paramilitary groups and the Colombian
military.20 The human rights violators of today share a commonality of
purpose with their predecessors. Colombian history shows that political
factions-whether governmental, quasi-governmental, insurgent or
criminal-maintain power through violence.21  In the current conflict,
violence is used to maintain the respective fiefdoms of the military, the drug
traffickers, the guerrilla forces, and the paramilitary groups, thus preventing
the government from effectively addressing either national concerns of
governance or the promotion of internationally recognized human rights.
mIX. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS IN COLOMBIA?
Responsibility for human rights violations in Colombia is shared by
guerrilla factions, paramilitary groups, drug traffickers, and government
forces.2 " All of these groups have committed atrocious human rights
violations to further their respective positions in the ongoing conflict.2
16. Ruz Gutierrez, supra note 5.
17. Brodzinsky, supra note 11.
18. Manglano, supra note 10, at 45.
19. Ruz Gutierrez, supra note 5.
20. Id.
21. Id. This explains how the causes of violence, poverty, social reform, and political
maneuvering have not changed throughout the 20th century, and that the guerrillas have
"sacrificed ideology to survive through capitalism.... ." Id.
22. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1; 1998 Colombia Country Report,
supra note 3.
23. Id.
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Under international human rights law, liability for abuses normally
extends only to state action.U Liability can be extended to private
individuals or groups only if they qualify as state agentsY This extension of
liability occurs if the violations of human rights law by private individuals or
groups are acquiesced in, tolerated, or condoned by the state.26 International
human rights law is therefore arguably applicable to the guerrillas,
paramilitaries groups, and drug traffickers, as well as the military, because
the Colombian government, through its inability to effectively deal with the
violators, has acquiesced and tolerated their conduct.27 Even if some of the
human rights violators in the Colombian conflict are deemed to be private
individuals which human rights law therefore cannot reach, international
humanitarian law can fill the void and exact justice. It expressly binds all
parties to a conflict, including state security forces, dissident armed groups,
and all of their respective agents and proxies.2
A. Government Forces
Throughout the 1990s, government forces have been responsible for a
substantial percentage of the human rights violations that occur in
• 29. ..
Colombia. Most human rights violations inflicted by government forces
are perpetrated by the military and the national police.30 Responsible parties
range from specifically identifiable military officials to entire units.3'
Ongoing abuses by police in urban areas, and by the army in rural areas, are
regularly reported by local human rights organizations. 32  Government
sponsored abuses often occur when the military fails to distinguish between
guerrillas and noncombatant citizens in its attempts to contain
counterinsurgency, resulting in massacre, disappearance, and torture of
innocent civilians.33 In addition, there is evidence that the Colombian
military collaborates with paramilitary groups in committing human rights
24. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Third Report on the Human Rights Situation in Colombia,
OEA/ser.L.V./II.102, doc. 9 rev. 1, at 71 (1999) [hereinafter IACHR Colombia Report].
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 75, 96.
29. 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3 (the army and police appear to be
jointly responsible for almost as many violations as the combined nongovernmental groups).
30. Manglano, supra note 10, at 47.
31. Id.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 47-48.
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abuses.34 The national police and the Colombian military are also blamed
for maintaining a campaign of social cleansing within the country.35 Human
rights violators within the Colombian military and police are rarely brought
to justice.36
B. Guerrilla Forces
There are several different guerrilla factions currently involved in the
armed conflict in Colombia. The principally recognized groups are the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia ("FARC"), the National
Liberation Army ("ELN"), and the People's Liberation Army ("EPL"). 37
Of the three, FARC is the most influential and well-organized, and is
described as the oldest, most belligerent, and most powerful guerilla group in
the country. 38  FARC's ranks are estimated to total 10,000 to 15,000
soldiers.39 In an effort to induce the group to join peace talks, the
government ceded a 16,000-square-mile area in southwestern Colombia to
FARC in November 1998, which the rebels now completely control.
40
Approximately 100,000 Colombian citizens live in the ceded area. Since
gaining control, FARC has refused to allow international observers to
34. See 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3; Human Rights in Colombia,
supra note 6 (there are troubling reports of persistent links between the army and paramilitary
groups).
35. Elizabeth F. Schwartz, Getting Away with Murder: Social Cleansing in Colombia
and the Role of the United States, 27 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 381, 384 (1995-96)
(explaining that "[s]ocial cleansing ... consists of 'serial killings of people who have been
economically pushed so far toward the fringes of misery that the more affluent members of
society classify them as undesirable.' [As such, the] victims... are perceived... to be
dangerous and unfit to participate in society"); see also 1999 Colombia Country Reports,
supra note 1 (reporting that 279 such killings occurred during the first six months of 1999).
36. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 396; see also Colombia Convicts Former Army
General in Rights Case, USA TODAY, Feb. 14, 2001, at 13A (reporting that a former
Colombian general convicted for failing to defend a village during a killing spree by a right
wing death squad was "the first conviction of a Colombian general in a major human rights
case").
37. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
38. Pablo Rodriguez, Cada Vez Mas Distantes el Gobierno y Las FARC, EL NuEvo
HERALD (Miami), Sept. 21, 1999, at 6A.
39. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 29; see also Colombia, Rebels Will Talk Again, MIAMI
HERALD, Sept. 26, 1999, at 3A.
40. Brodzinsky, supra note 11.
41. See 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
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oversee conditions in the zone.42 It is estimated that with the addition of this
area ceded by the government, guerrilla forces now control approximately
forty percent of Colombian territory.43
Guerrilla forces are known to collect fees on narcotics production and
trafficking, which take place in the geographic areas they control, and the
funds collected are used to maintain their power base in the country."4 The
influence of these combined guerrilla forces is such that they have
effectively replaced the government in certain areas of the country. All of
the known guerrilla groups inflict a wide variety of human rights violations
on Colombian citizens with total impunity.4
C. Paramilitary Groups
As the government has ceded or lost control over large areas of the
national territory, the influence and power of paramilitary groups has
grown.47 It is estimated that a paramilitary umbrella organization consisting
from 5000 to 7000 combatants now exists in Colombia.48 The goal of this
organization is to extend its presence into areas of the country now under
guerrilla control.49  This is accomplished by terrorizing guerrilla
sympathizers into fleeing their homes and, by so doing, depriving guerrillas
of civilian support.50 In the process, civilians that are deemed to be
supporters of the guerrillas are murdered, tortured, and displaced. 51
42. Golden, supra note 7.
43. Colombia CallsforArmsfrom Uncle Sam, THE ECONOMIST, Sept. 25, 1999, at 17,
available at 1999 WL 7364607.
44. Juan 0. Tamnayo, U.S. Officials Tie Colombian Guerrillas to Drug Exports,
MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 13, 2000, at 3A; see also 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1
(estimating that these revenues run to the hundreds of millions of dollars); Andrew Selsky,
U.S.-Aided Drug War Starts Strong, SuN-SENTINEL (Broward), Feb. 4, 2001, at 21A (reporting
that FARC "earns huge profits by protecting coca crops and taxing the growers").
45. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
46. JACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 96-112. See discussion in text infra
Section IV.
47. See 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id.
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Evidence exists to suggest that the paramilitary groups have strong ties
to both drug traffickers and to the Colombian military. Drug traffickers
employ paramilitaries as their own private armies.s The military uses them
to fight insurgents.54 The influence of paramilitary groups is on the rise, and
the government is unable to bring them under control. 55
D. Drug Traffickers
The ongoing role of drug cartels in the Colombian conflict and their
complicity in perpetrating human rights abuses should not be overlooked.
Although much of the reporting on human rights tends to ignore their
involvement, drug traffickers have long been associated with murders of
government officials, peace negotiators, educators, journalists, and other
civilians.56 While the high point of drug violence may have ended with the
demise of the more notorious kingpins, it still exists in a more decentralized
and underground form.57 Even if violations of human rights by drug
traffickers are not as overt as in the past, there is evidence that drug
trafficking is used to finance the operations of other participants in the
conflict, and that drug traffickers hire both the guerrilla and paramilitary
armies for protection. 5  Regardless of the degree or nature of the
cooperation, it is apparent that drug traffickers are complicit participants in
the conflict in Colombia and as such bear responsibility for the rampant
violations of human rights that occur there on a daily basis.
IV. WHAT HUMAN RIGHTs VIOLATIONS ARE PREVALENT IN
COLOMBIA TODAY?
The following section by no means provides an exhaustive overview of
human rights violations being perpetrated in Colombia today-
unfortunately, there are many more. The specific abuses discussed below
were chosen to illustrate the types of abuses prevalent in Colombia today
52. JACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 131-32 (explaining that the
government "allowed the paramilitaries to act with legal protection and legitimacy in the
1970s and 1980s.... as a means of fighting the armed dissident groups").
53. 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3.
54. Id.
55. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
56. See generally Ruz Gutierrez, supra note 5.
57. Esquirol, supra note 5, at 35.
58. See 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3.
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that qualify as violations of both international human rights law and
international humanitarian law.59
A. Disappearances and Kidnappings
The prospect of forced disap0earances and kidnappings are threats that
Colombian citizens face daily. Well over 3000 cases of forced
disappearances have been reported in Colombia since 1977.6' The Center
for Investigations and Popular Research ("CINEP"), a nongovernmental
organization ("NGO") that tracks human rights abuses in Colombia, reports
that during the first nine months of 1998, paramilitary groups were
responsible for 126 known cases of forced disappearance. There were
reports of 309 cases of forced disappearance during the first nine months of
1999.63 These figures are corroborated by a second NGO, the Permanent
Commission for the Defense of Human Rights ("CPDH"), which reported
that during the first six months of 1998, 117 people were forcibly
disappeared.6 CPDH reports indicate that most victims of forced
disappearance in Colombia are never heard from again.65
While it is reported that forced disappearances are perpetrated almost
entirely by paramilitary groups, kidnapping is the forte of the guerrilla
factions and is described as an "unambiguous, standing policy and major
source of revenue for both FARC and ELN." Colombia was ranked
number one in the world for kidnappings for ransom in 1999. 67 According to
59. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24 (explaining that violations of
humanitarian law during internal armed conflicts such as the one taking place in Colombia
include, among other things, murder, forced disappearance, the taking of hostages, torture and
other cruel treatment, and displacement of civilian populations). The report explains, for
example, how summary execution qualifies as both a human rights violation and a violation of
international humanitarian law, in that "summary execution of a peasant farmer for alleged
cooperation with the guerrilla, which constitutes a violation of the right to life under human
rights law, will also involve a violation of the protections provided to civilians under
international humanitarian law, since the death was related to the armed conflict." Id. at 66.
60. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
61. 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3.
62. Id.
63. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
64. 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Julia Flynn, Global Kidnappings Climb to a New Peak, WALL ST. J., May 11,
2000, at A21.
[Vol. 25:525
148
Nova Law Review, Vol. 25, Iss. 2 [2001], Art. 1
http://nsuworks.nova.edu/nlr/vol25/iss2/1
Seagrave
the NGO Pais Libre, there were 2216 kidnappings in Colombia in 1998, a
thirty-three percent increase over 1997.58 The 1999 estimate was 2945.69
The preferred victims of guerrilla kidnappers covered a wide spectrum of
citizens, including politicians, cattlemen, businessmen, and children, as well
as foreigners. 70 Less than half of these kidnapping victims were known to be
released during the year, and arrests or prosecutions of the kidnappers were
rare.
71
B. Torture and Related Treatment
In 1999, reports of torture and mistreatment of detainees by the national
72police and the military continued. Torture perpetrated by government
officials most often occurred in connection with the detention of
insurgents.73 In addition, CINEP reported that both paramilitary and
guerrilla groups were also responsible for torture, and that the bodies of
victims kidnapped and killed by guerrillas often showed signs of torture and
disfigurement. 74
In addition, prison conditions in Colombia are particularly harsh,
largely as a result of severe overcrowding and unsanitary health conditions.
75
An Inter-American Commission for Human Rights ("IACIR") mission that
visited a Bogota prison in December 1997 found conditions there amounted
to cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment on the part of the government. 76
It also found that murder is prevalent inside prison walls.77
68. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1. According to the report, the NGO
Pals Libre attributed 667 cases to FARC, 566 to ELN, 109 to EPL, 43 to other guerrilla
groups, 20 to paramilitary groups, and 580 to other unknown organizations. Id.
69. Id.
70. Id. Pais Libre reports that 189 children were kidnapped, up from 131 in 1998. Id.
71. 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
72. Id.
73. Id.; see also IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 104-107. Armed
dissident groups were responsible for 15 percent of torture cases in 1996. Id. at 111. State
agents tortured, released, and displaced many persons in Colombia in 1995, and another
significant number were tortured before being executed. Id. at 104. Paramilitary groups
accounted for almost 75 percent of acts of torture in 1996. Id.
74. Id.
75. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24.
76. Id. at 104-107.
77. Id.
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C. Extrajudicial Killing
Colombia's murder rate is the highest in the world, and homicide is the
leading cause of death in the country.78 A large percentage of murders are
extrajudicial executions carried out by security forces or result from death in
combat due to the ongoing conflict. 79  Estimates of the number of
Colombians who died as a result of the armed conflict in 1998 range from
2000 to 6000.80 The Colombian military, paramilitary groups, guerrilla
factions, and drug traffickers have all been implicated as using extrajudicial
killings to further their respective goals in the ongoing conflict in
Colombia.81
D. Displacement
The internal displacement of thousands of Colombian citizens has been
described as a "longstanding and underreported problem" that is a direct
result of the ongoing conflict.82 It is estimated that during 1998, 300,000
Colombians were displaced as a result of ongoing paramilitary and guerrilla
attacks.8 3 Prior to 1998, Colombia's internal refugee population was
estimated to be one million, placing it among the top four in the world.8
4
Most displaced Colombians remain within the country, but many seek
international refuge, clearly placing this effect of the Colombian conflict in
an international context.85
78. Schwartz, supra note 35, at 382.
79. Id. at 383.
80. Colombia Unida Por La Paz, EL NUEVO HERALD (Miami), Oct. 25, 1999, at IA.
81. See generally 1999 Colombia Country Reports, supra note 1.
82. Margalit Edelman, Colombia's Quiet Catastrophe, CHRISTAN SCL. MoNrroR, June
22, 1999, at 11.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. Id. In a notable example, some 2600 refugees who sought refuge in Venezuela
were eventually repatriated to Colombia in an apparent violation of Venezuela's obligations
under international law. Id. An examination of this aspect of the Colombian crisis, however,
does not fall within the framework of this paper. It serves as an example, however, of the
international community's unwillingness to acknowledge the scope of Colombia's internal
turmoil and its human rights repercussions.
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V. WHAT IS COLOMBIA'S OFFICIAL POSITION ON HUMAN RIGHTS?
A. Colombia "Talks the Talk"
Colombia's record of espousing support for human rights within both
domestic and international legal frameworks is exemplary. The Colombian
Constitution of 1991 incorporates human rights provisions and specifically
provides for citizen's rights. Such rights include: due process, freedom
from torture, and right to life to be protected from violation. Article 93 of
the constitution places treaties that deal with international human rights and
humanitarian law in preeminent positions with respect to the domestic legal
systeM.8
7
On the international side, Colombia has ratified most major
international human rights covenants, protocols, and conventions, including
the Convention Against Torture. 88 Colombia has signed and ratified the
American Convention on Human Rights ("American Convention"), and has
accepted the competency of the Inter-American Court for Human Rights
("Inter-American Court").8 9 In accepting the competency of the Court,
however, Colombia reserved the right to withdraw its acceptance at any
moment that it considers to be opportune.9°
86. Manglano, supra note 10, at 46.
87. Id.
88. UNIT=D NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHrs, United Nations
Human Rights Website, Treaty Bodies Database, Status by Country, available at
http:lluntreaty.un.org. Colombia is a signatory of the following: Convention Against Torture;
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women; Convention
on the Rights of the Child (with reservations); International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights;
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights; Optional and Second
Optional Protocols to the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; and the International
Convention on Protection and Rights of All Migrant Workers. Id.
89. Inter-Am. C.H.R., Convention Signatories, available at http:llwww.corteidh-
oea.nu.cr/ci/ (last visited Oct 2, 1999). Colombia was the second country to ratify the
American Convention on Human Rights on July 31, 1973, and accepted the competency of the
Court on June 21, 1985. Id.
90. Id.
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B. Colombia Doesn't "Walk the Walk"
Colombia's record of enforcing human rights within its borders,
however, is dismal and is characterized as the worst in the world.91 Human
rights violations and violations of international humanitarian law perpetrated
by the participants in the current conflict go almost totally unpunished.
92
Although both the Colombian Penal Code and the Colombian Constitution
provide support for punishing human rights violators in the domestic system
by explicitly prohibiting such human rights abuses as extrajudicial killings,
torture, and kidnapping, the Colombian government has shown that it is
unable or unwilling to bring perpetrators to justice on this basis. 93
Some view the Colombian Constitution as a laudable effort by
Colombia to show the world that it recognizes that human rights violations
are prevalent in the country, but it has so far been ineffective, particularly
against one of the principal violators of human rights in the country: its own
military.94 By channeling human rights abuse cases against members of the
military to military tribunals, the constitution virtually guarantees that such
offenders will be judged only by military peers, if they are prosecuted at
all.95  While recent reports indicate some willingness on the part of the
government to prosecute a small number of military officials for human
rights violations, the number is limited compared with the scope of the
violations for which the military is responsible.
Although domestic law provides a legal basis to pursue other offenders,
the fact that the government cedes control of up to forty percent of the
national territory to guerrilla groups and allows drug traffickers to operate
with near total impunity suggests that any power to bring these groups to
justice on human rights grounds is extremely limited. As previously
discussed, this problem is further complicated by a generally ineffective
judiciary that is unable to successfully prosecute crimes. 7
It is, therefore, logical to conclude that such a domestic system is
particularly unprepared to prosecute human rights violations when common
91. Manglano, supra note 10, at 45.
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 47.
95. Id.
96. See 1998 Colombia Country Report, supra note 3; see also Colombia Convicts
Former Army General in Rights Case, supra note 36.
97. Manglano, supra note 10, at 50.
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criminals generally go free. In fact, reports indicate that where human rights
abuses are concerned, impunity reaches 100 percent.98 Whether by choice or
through powerlessness, it is clear that Colombia doesn't "walk the walk" that
is required to implement the effective prosecution and punishment of human
rights violations that its domestic laws and international treaty obligations
demand.
VI. WHAT ARE THE INTERNATIONAL LEGAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE
CURRENT CONFLICT IN COLOMBIA?
A Colombia's International Human Rights Treaty Obligations: No Teeth
As indicated above, Colombia is a signatory of most of the major
international human rights treaties, conventions, and protocols. 99 None of
these obligations provide a means by which perpetrators of human rights
violations in the current conflict in Colombia can be prosecuted or punished.
B. The Inter-American System: It Falls Short
Colombia's adherence to the American Convention and its acceptance
of the binding jurisdiction of the Inter-American Court offer a limited means
to address human rights violations. The Inter-American Court hears cases
brought by the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights against
consenting member states for violations perpetrated by the state itself, or
against private individuals or groups acting with the acquiescence of the
state.1° As a result, individual claims could conceivably be brought under
this system.
It is important to note, however, that the Inter-American system was
designed to treat cases involving the type of gross human rights violations
that occur in Colombia today through its in loco reporting system, rather
than by bringing individual claims before the Inter-American Court.101 In
fact, the individual claims mechanism was conceived as a precautionary
measure with a preventive role whereby "a single violation could be the first
indication of the beginning of a process that, if allowed to proceed, will
result in regression back to an authoritarian structure," seemingly before a
98. ZACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 75.
99. Manglano, supra note 10, at 52.
100. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at71.
101. Claudio Grossman, Strengthening the Inter-American Human Rights System: The
Current Debate, 92 AM. SOC'Y INT'LL. PROc. 186, 187-88 (1998).
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situation reached the gross and flagrant stage. 102 Such is clearly not the case
in Colombia. While it is certainly conceivable that an individual claim could
be brought before the Inter-American Court to address human rights abuses
in the current conflict, where abuses number in the thousands, indicative of a
breakdown of rule of law of enormous proportions, the individual claims
mechanism of the Inter-American system would be overloaded. 1
03
The result of applying the in loco reporting procedures in the case of
Colombia would be the preparation of a report by the IACHR suggesting
actions to be undertaken by the Colombian government to stem the tide of
abuses. 104 In the case of controlling human rights violations by the military,
the IACHR report addresses the issue of the autonomy of the military courts,
but it does not provide a means to punish any perpetrators of human rights
violations who currently operate in Colombia with impunity. 105 The in loco
system suggests a solution tied to a domestic judicial remedy. To be
effective, such a solution requires that the country involved have control of
its political system. In a country like Colombia where impunity reigns and
justice is ineffective, such a solution is of limited consequence in effectively
dealing with the human rights abuses that are being inflicted by a range of
both state and non-state actors, which the government is unable or unwilling
to control.
In fact, the IACHR recently released a report on Colombia following a
visit in that country that provides the Inter-American system response to the
conflict.1°6 The report acknowledges the existence of violations of both
human rights law and international humanitarian law in Colombia, but its
relatively toothless recommendations seem unrealistic and inadequate in
view of the seriousness and urgency of the situation.107
As the foregoing analysis indicates, the Colombian government has
become increasingly ineffective in dealing with the problems of conflict and
violence that have arisen within its borders over the last three decades. The
IACHR report, however, calls for action by this inactive government to
102. Id. at 188.
103. Id. (explaining that "the impact of the 'case approach' in situations of mass and
gross violations is more limited than the impact of visits in loco" because trying to use the
case system to address thousands of violations is like "the fable of the Dutch boy who tries to
stop a flood by putting his finger in a hole in a dike as the whole structure collapses"). Id.
104. See id.
105. See Manglano, supra note 10, at 51.
106 IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 70.
107. Id. at 71.
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resolve a situation it seems powerless to control.108 The report exhorts the
government to resolve the conflict based on a series of recommendations,
which include, among other things: 1) intensification of human rights
training of security forces; 2) dissemination of human rights information to
the violators and the general population; 3) immediate implementation of
measures to insure effective criminal investigation of human rights
abuses; and 4) immediate implementation of measures to dismantle
paramilitary groups 3 9 The report also calls on all parties "[to] respect,
implement and enforce the rules governing hostilities set forth in
international humanitarian law, with particular emphasis on the protection of
civilians."" It offers no insight, however, into how this resolution is to be
accomplished by a government that is at best powerless or at worst
complicit, and how parties that disregard basic humanitarian concerns will
all at once pay heed to this call.
The report exposes the deficiencies of the Inter-American system in
dealing with the type of situation that exists in Colombia today, where the
government is but one of several culprits participating in gross violations of
human rights. The Inter-American system was designed in large part to
respond to the abuses of dictatorships through individualized complaints that
would lead to reports by the IACHR that provided authoritative accounts of
the violations.' The current situation in Colombia does not fit the model. It
calls for a type of redress that the Inter-American system cannot provide,
either in terms of prosecution or punishment.
Moreover, whether a solution based on human rights law can even
reach such non-state actors as the drug traffickers and the guerrilla groups is
an open question, since it can be argued that the Colombian government
attempts to control them, albeit ineffectively, and therefore has not
acquiesced, accepted, or condoned their conduct.'
108. Id. at 70-71.
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Grossman, supra note 101, at 189-90.
112. The same may not be true for the paramilitary groups, since there is evidence of
acquiescence in the form of collusion between this group and government forces. It can also
conceivably be argued that the guerrilla groups are state actors themselves by virtue of the fact
that they control large portions of Colombian territory.
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C. International Humanitarian Law: Can Recent Precedent Stick?
Even if its recommendations fall short, the IACHR report offers a
detailed analysis of how international humanitarian law applies to the
idiosyncrasies of the ongoing conflict in Colombia.' 13  Several of the
observations and conclusions reached by the IACHR indicate that
international humanitarian law may provide the means to hold the
Colombian government, the guerrillas, the paramilitary groups, and drug
traffickers liable for human rights violations, and even punish them.
114
The IACHR report openly admits that the American Convention and
other universal and regional human rights instruments cannot be used to
regulate to any great degree human rights abuses that occur during internal
conflicts like the one that is now underway in Colombia.11 5  It does,
however, point out that international humanitarian law is specifically
designed to restrain such conduct.'
6
By invoking recent international humanitarian legal precedent, the
IACHR issues a warning to the offending parties in the conflict. It puts them
on notice that such recent international legal developments as the formation
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the
possible impending establishment of an international criminal court indicate
that there is growing precedent for an international remedy that will stick to
offenders like those in Colombia
1 17
As the IACHR report points out, the application of humanitarian law to
the conflict in Colombia is particularly appropriate for two reasons." 8 First,
Colombia has acknowledged that its internal conflict rises to the level
required for international humanitarian law to apply.119 Second, Colombia
has acknowledged the applicability of the Geneva Conventions, which its
constitution has established as preeminent law within its own domestic
framework.
20
The IACHR report specifically concludes that international
humanitarian law norms apply equally to human rights violations committed
113. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 94-96.
114. Id. at78.
115. Id. at 74.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 156-58.
118. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 71-72.
119. Id. at 77.
120. Id. at 78.
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in Colombia by guerrillas, the government, and paramilitary groups, because
parties to such a conflict "are directly bound by international humanitarian
law, and their belligerent acts are appropriately evaluated by reference to
those norms. '121 As a result, the report analyzes the activities of each of
these groups in light of applicable international humanitarian law and
reiterates a conclusion reached after a 1997 on-site visit to Colombia where
it noted that violations of human rights and/or international humanitarian law
"could constitute crimes of an international character which would incur the
individual criminal responsibility of the authors, who may be prosecuted in
any State in which they happen to be [found]. 122
Fortunately for the violators, and unfortunately for the citizens of
Colombia, the current state of international humanitarian law most likely
means that at most the perpetrators of human rights violence in Colombia
will receive the type of warning contained in the IACHR report. The
proposed International Criminal Court might offer a solution that applies to
the conflict in Colombia because it promises to investigate and bring justice
to individuals who commit the most serious crimes of concern to the
international community, such as genocide, war crimes, and crimes against
humanity.123 However, this solution is far from an immediate one. Even
though twenty-seven countries, including the United States, ratified the
treaty, sixty must do so before the court is established. 124 However, in the
case of the United States, the treaty is not binding without Senate approval,
and there is strong opposition to such approval.'2
The situation in Colombia cannot wait for the International Criminal
Court to be established. Thus, other suggested solutions will not do justice.
The IACHR report's suggested solution relies too heavily on the weakened,
beleaguered Colombian government to make a complete about face and
bring the perpetrators to justice.126 Other suggested courses of action
overlook the fact that there are multiple offenders of human rights in the
current conflict. This calls for prosecution of the military alone for failing to
address the full magnitude of the violations. 127 - Some suggest that
121. Id. at 96.
122. Id. at 156.
123. IACHR Colombia Report, supra note 24, at 72.
124. Joan Smith, Comment & Analysis: Hypocrite to the Last: The U.S. President has
Suddenly Signed up to the Plan for an International War Crimes Tribunal, THE GUARDIAN,
Jan. 3, 2001, available at 2000 WL 2910289.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Manglano, supra note 10, at 51.
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prosecution is not needed at all, and that the guerrillas should be excused
because the basis of their insurgency is a struggle for equality, overlooking
the suffering that Colombian citizens have endured for decades."2  Still
others espouse a negotiated settlement, ignoring the fact that such a
settlement in the end signifies one more round of impunity for human rights
violators in Colombia.129 And the government views the solution in dollar
terms, and seeks help in the form of financial and military aid, with the
United States ready, willing, and able to provide money.
None of these approaches have worked in the past and there is little
reason to believe they will work now. All overlook the depth of the chaos,
its ongoing nature, and the extent of the violations. Drastic measures are
required to resolve this quiet catastrophe that worsens with the passage of
time.1
31
The Colombian government is unable or unwilling to bring human
rights violators to justice. International human rights law offers little chance
of prosecuting and punishing human rights violators. International
humanitarian law may offer hope for the thousands of Colombians abused by
this conflict, which challenges established human rights law mechanisms
such as the Inter-American system. The level of violence and the fact that
blame can be laid at so many doors makes it impossible for the government
to effectively act.
It is time for the international community to recognize that the armed
conflict in Colombia has risen to the level that justifies invoking established
international humanitarian legal precedent. As in the case of atrocities in
other parts of the world, a Colombian war crimes tribunal should be
established to bring violators from all sides in the current conflict to justice.
Without international intervention of this type, there is little hope that the
Colombian government will be able to regain control of the national territory
while ending decades of human rights abuses inflicted upon the citizens of
Colombia. Without justice for Colombia, there will be no peace.
128. Nick Trebat, Drugs Replace Communism as the Point of Entry for U.S. Policy on
Latin America, COUNCIL ON HEMISPHERIC AFFAIRS (Aug. 24, 1999), at
http://www.icde.com/-paulwolf/hemisphr.htm.
129. Winifred Tate, Increased U.S. Military Aid to Colombia Won't Curb Drug
Trafficking, SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, Aug. 19, 1999, at 25, at
http://www.lightparty.com/WarOnDrugs/DrugTrafficking6.html.
130. See Christopher Marquis, Un "Plan Marshall" Para Colombia, EL NUEVO
HERALD (Miami), Sept. 21, 1999, at IA.
131. See Edelman, supra note 82.
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VII. CONCLUSION,
The foregoing analysis shows that Colombia has failed to protect its
citizens from human rights violations perpetrated by its own military, by
guerrilla groups, by paramilitary groups functioning either independently of
or in complicity with the government, and by drug traffickers. The
international and regional human rights treaties, conventions, and protocols
to which Colombia has submitted are inadequate to address the problem of
punishing human rights violators. Since the international criminal court is
not yet operational, an international criminal tribunal should be formed to
address the fact that: Colombia is unable to punish violators through its own
domestic laws due to the severity of the internal conflict and the
government's ineffectiveness; and international human rights law is geared
toward promoting human rights rather than enforcing them and is designed
to address the government as violator, an idiosyncracy that makes its
application to the current conflict in Colombia particularly ineffective.
Alan Seagrave
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